Labour and constitutionalism-from-below: on the effective potential of legal strategy by Meakin, Jack
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meakin, Jack (2020) Labour and constitutionalism-from-below: on the 
effective potential of legal strategy. PhD thesis. 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/81299/  
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge  
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author  
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses  
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
   
Labour and Constitutionalism-from-Below 
On the Effective Potential of Legal Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
Jack Meakin 
LL.B. (Hons.), M.A. 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
School of Law 
College of Social Sciences 
University of Glasgow 
 
 
December 2019
  
ii 
 
 Abstract 
This thesis engages in a critical socio-legal analysis that evaluates the potential effectiveness 
of legal mobilisation as a tool of social struggle with a view to conceptualising the labour 
movement’s capacity for political participation through meaningful engagements with law. 
The domination of financial markets on political systems, the diminishment of labour law 
protections and the proliferation of undignified working practices ask difficult questions of 
a constitutional theory that insists on the continued importance of national legal systems, 
and the potential opportunity that remains in law’s resources to transform the present 
conditions of work and the social relation between capital and law. This thesis takes a 
strategic approach to constitutional theory and argues that national legal systems remain a 
key site of struggle for labour. Rather than cede the regulatory space of the State to market-
interests, labour must engage in litigation, legislation and political actions that confront the 
inadequacy of existing work standards and insists on the constitutional protection of dignity, 
solidarity and the right to work. In order to locate the tools of such strategic engagements, 
we will turn to a method of constitutional analysis ‘from-below’ that is committed to 
uncovering the agency of social movements in constitutional practices. This will provide the 
space for a critical analysis of the following tenets of effective legal engagement: The 
articulation of recognisable legal claims, law’s institutional capacity and, the productive 
interaction between legal mobilisation and political objectives. This thesis presents a 
pragmatic conception of the potential effectiveness of labour’s engagements with law, as a 
means to reconstruct the link between political subjects and constitutional structures and 
provide important mechanisms for labour to confront its present condition. 
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 Introduction 
Law holds the promise to order social relations according to values and principles that are 
the foundation of our political communities. However, under contemporary conditions 
constitutional structures, while formally committing to popular sovereignty appear detached 
from emancipatory demands, with law reduced to a tool of regulation mainly operating to 
secure the protection of the extant property regimes. A key concern for contemporary legal 
scholarship is whether civil society can still draw on law’s promise to confront their 
conditions of exclusion, oppression and withdrawal of dignity. This thesis is concerned with 
the capacity for labour to engage effectively with law’s resources and transform the present 
conditions of work and the social relation between capital and labour. In order to address 
this challenge, we will turn to the potential of constitutional strategy to document the agency 
of labour in a political struggle that tests the opportunities and limitations of legal 
mobilisation. This thesis seeks to reclaim a constitutional discourse that is committed to the 
productive relation between social struggles and law, and contributes to an understanding of 
the conditions that determine the potential effectiveness of legal engagements ‘from-below’. 
The underlying problematic present in this research, is the absence of any reference to labour 
within democratic discussion. Despite the socio-economic importance of work, the State 
enshrines civil over labour rights, and the focus of political debate fails to register the social 
importance of labour. Take Europe for example: Labour is the primordial site of solidarity1, 
yet this project is conceived in a Europe that has moved toward the comprehensive clamping 
down of syndicalist action. Today, apart from worker collectivisation, solidarity is 
understood at the inter-governmental level as ensuring the servicing of public debts to 
maintain market confidence, and State decision-making is guided by market determinations 
over the political demands of citizens2. At the supra-national level, the Court of Justice of 
the EU has elevated capital’s freedoms of movement over that of labour’s right to strike3. 
While austerity politics has built upon the liberalisation of labour regulations, accentuating 
the capitalist logic of profit maximisation at the expense of democratic alternatives, the 
elevation of this logic into law realises a terminal problematic of the people’s exclusion from 
 
1 Alain Supiot, The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs. the Total Market (Verso 2012) 93. 
2 Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Verso 2014). 
3 International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) v Viking Line 
[2008] EC C-438/05, ER 127.; Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2008] EC C341/05, 
ER 166.; ACL Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ (2008) 
37 Industrial Law Journal 126. 
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socio-legal decision-making4. This has seen a global trend toward the hollowing-out of 
socio-economic rights whereby substantive rights protections have been replaced by formal 
guarantees leading to the absence of any meaningful protection of socio-economic rights5. 
We are therefore surrounded by the effects of the confrontation between capitalism and 
democracy6, and the subsequent effects upon both the legal and social value of labour, which 
raises concerns regarding the political capacity to realise change in the sphere of labour. 
In legislating against exploitation and for dignified work national legal systems have 
represented both an opportunity and limitation as they both provide the tools to institute 
economic and social reforms and yet simultaneously reproduce the social relation between 
capital and labour. The challenge of the State for labour movements is grounded in the fact 
that legal and political systems of western liberal democracies are weighted normatively 
toward the protection of capital over labour. The organisation of the modern State around 
bourgeois interests produced a legal and political system that is structured, through 
individual rights and a commitment to limited government, according to the normative 
programme of economic individualism that facilitates capital accumulation7. By placing 
property and the desire for accumulation as the basis of the modern social contract, Locke 
presents an understanding of labour as both the source of property during primitive 
accumulation and later a commodity that can be traded8. This transformation is made 
possible in the modern State with the emergence of stable institutional powers that guarantee 
contracts and titles and money that enables accumulation through exchange, and not physical 
labour. 
This brief history of the modern State captures its early development around specific market-
based interests but, we must also acknowledge the role of internal societal pressures as a 
result of universal suffrage and the demand for legitimacy9. Indeed, for our purposes, labour 
struggles have won valuable legal protections through sustained political campaigns, and the 
postwar State’s commitment to welfare reforms went some way toward providing economic 
 
4 Hauke Brunkhorst, ‘The Return of Crisis’ in Poul Kjaer, Gunther Teubner and Alberto Febbrajo (eds), The 
Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (Hart 2011). 
5 Paul O’Connell, ‘The Death of Socio-Economic Rights’ (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 532. 
6 Streeck (n 2). 
7 Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford University 
Press 1992) 119.; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form 
(University of Minnesota Press 1994) 54–136. 
8 See Ch.5 ‘Of Property’ in John Locke, Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration 
(Mark Goldie ed, Oxford University Press 2016).; On Locke’s conception of property, see further Ellen 
Meiksins Wood, Liberty and Property: A Social History of Western Political Thought from the Renaissance 
to Enlightenment (Verso Books 2012) 156–165. 
9 Poggi (n 7).  
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and social rights protections and redressing the inequalities between capital and labour10. 
Moreover, the development of Labour Law provides some proof that, as a site of action, 
national legal systems can be reformed in a manner that protects the constitutional 
commitment to dignity and provides substantive welfare provision11.  
This sets up the constitutional State as a challenging terrain for labour, it is structured in a 
way that recognises labour within a subordinate relation to capital and, at the same time, 
national legal systems have the competence to significantly improve the social experience 
of labour within this relation. This means that, liberal constitutional structures cannot 
provide the tools to emancipate labour from the condition of its subjection to capital but, 
from a pragmatic perspective, it represents a key site of struggle for labour that seeks to 
impose legal obligations on capital and improve working standards. This thesis will proceed 
from the presupposition that, in spite of its challenges, there is too much at stake for labour 
to disregard or disengage from the State and the content of its legal rules that order social 
relations. 
Today, labour endures threats of precarious work through zero hours contracts and mass 
unemployment owing to the migration of capital. The challenge of contemporary labour 
movements is to engage in legal and political struggles that can effect a positive recalibration 
of their constitutional relation with capital. The contemporary facts of the global 
organisation of capital vis-à-vis the fragmentation of labour, ‘flexibilisation’ and the 
diminishment of labour law protections, ask difficult questions of a theory that connects 
labour to political subject positions in the current constellation of politics, labour and 
financial markets. This thesis investigates the ways that labour movements can challenge 
their legal, political and economic dispossession through strategic uses of legal instruments. 
This requires a rejoinder that does not reduce democratic decision-making to electoral 
representation12, but theoretically analyses the political subject’s potential to affect 
constitutional structures. This task demands an innovative commitment to the potential of 
law as a tool of social struggle. 
The research questions that motivate and guide this research are as follows:  
 
10 Wolfgang Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political Economy (OUP 
Oxford 2009) 7. 
11 Ruth Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press 2014). 
12 Chris Thornhill, ‘Rights and Constituent Power in the Global Constitution’ (2014) 10 International Journal 
of Law in Context 357. 
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- What constitutional theory might recognise the agency of social movements in 
constitutional practices as opposed to reducing social conflict to a manageable 
demand in the process of societal reproduction? 
- Can law be used strategically, and can it be used effectively, to counter the 
reproduction of the order of capital? 
- What are the precise strategies that have enabled labour movements to engage 
meaningfully with law? 
- And, to what extent can law be used as a tool of social transformation where labour’s 
political demands confront the normative commitments of a legal system? 
In response to these questions this thesis will argue that potentially effective engagements 
with law represent a key strategic opportunity for labour movements. By identifying law as 
a tool of social struggle, we can evaluate the ways that legal mobilisation can re-insert 
labour’s political demands into legal and political structures. This means turning to a 
strategic approach to constitutionalism, one that does not rely on existing institutional 
mechanisms but argues that labour must engage with law in a manner that makes its 
normative demands recognisable in the fields of law and/or politics. A thread that will run 
throughout our conception of law’s potential effectiveness is that there is a productive 
tension between law’s opportunities and limitations. And, it is the navigation of this tension 
through strategic and tactical decision-making that we will locate the opportunity of legal 
mobilisation as a tool of struggle. By turning to the role of social struggles in the 
determination of law this thesis will contribute to a bottom-up conception of constitutional 
practices that reckons with the agency of social actors and their capacity to confront the 
reproductive processes of constitutional structures. 
Before we begin, I will provide some further clarity on the aims and parameters of this 
approach to constitutional theory, what a strategic approach entails, and the working 
definition of labour movements. First, this thesis is concerned for the continued role of 
national constitutions in the determination of social experiences and expectations, and the 
extent to which State law and its constitutional provisions can provide the tools for social 
transformation. This approach to constitutional studies does not focus on the promises of 
law and government to deliver progressive social programmes, but on how social struggles 
engage with constitutions and encourage social transformations ‘from-below’. In other 
words, this research re-inserts social struggles within constitutional discourse by 
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investigating how strategic engagements with law enable labour to register its democratic 
demands. 
The thesis contributes to the theoretical body of ‘constitutionalism-from-below’13 that is 
concerned with social struggles that have an effect upon and shape constitutional norms and 
structures. This focus on the practices of constitutions brings the agency of social movements 
within the realm of constitutional discussion, as opposed to perpetuating a theoretical 
approach to social conflict that focuses on top-down processes14. Constitutionalism-from-
below shifts the analytic focus on political power away from formal conceptions of 
constituent power15. Traditional constitutional theory locates the political power of the 
people in the constituent power that founds the constitutional order and this ‘consent of the 
people’ is maintained through institutional arrangements that check the exercise of 
governmental power and provide mechanisms of redress for citizens16. By turning to the 
exercise of political power by social groups, this thesis focuses on the ways that social 
conflicts challenge these institutional arrangements. Although I will not frame it in these 
terms, this study presents an understanding of the practical interaction between social actors 
and constitutions beyond formal conceptions of constituent and constituted power.  
In response to a potential definitional objection, I will briefly distinguish my concern for 
social struggles as contributing to the practices of constitutionalism as opposed to the 
processes of constitutionalisation. Constitutionalism is the study of the practices of a 
constitution, from the processes of its formation to the functions it performs in society17. It 
provides a political theory of government that sets out the instruments of government, its 
relation with civil society, the norms and values that are at the core of the constitutional 
document, and the key principles that determine the management of these factors, such as 
the commitments to the rule of law and separation of powers18. There are, of course, a range 
 
13 Gavin W Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ 
(2013) 20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 881. 
14 Gavin W Anderson, ‘Beyond “Constitutionalism Beyond the State”’ (2012) 39 Journal of Law and Society 
359, 382. 
15 Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (n 13) 902–
3. 
16 Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form (Oxford University Press 2008) 1. 
17 Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-
Sociological Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2011) 9–12. 
18 Martin Loughlin, ‘What Is Constitutionalisation?’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight 
of Constitutionalism? (OUP Oxford 2012) 55. 
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of traditions of republican19, liberal20, political21 constitutionalism, and more recent 
expansion beyond the State to consider societal22, transnational23 and postnational24 forms 
of constitutionalism. However, for our purposes, it is important to recognise that 
constitutionalism of all stripes is concerned with the practices that determine the structure 
and substance of constitutions. 
Constitutionalisation flows from constitutionalism in the sense that it attempts to apply its 
substance and aims to different aspects of social life25. Contemporary constitutionalisation 
is experienced in the application of constitutional norms and structures to a range of different 
aspects of social life. This extracts the institutional arrangements and norms of 
constitutionalism from its usual emplacement in the national context and applies it to 
different circumstances and forms of public life26. The most common example of this process 
is the constitutionalisation of the post-national sphere of governance27. In this regard, 
constitutionalisation is the process through which various social phenomena are brought 
within the remit of constitutional government. Given its focus on governmental processes, I 
will focus on the extent to which the agency of social movements can be recognised as 
practices of constitutionalism. This means contributing a bottom-up perspective to the 
practices of constitution-making rather than focusing on the top-down processes of 
constitutionalisation. 
In order to locate labour within constitutional analysis, this study will investigate the 
conditions that determine effective strategic and tactical engagements with law. Legal 
strategy is not simply the attempt to instrumentalise law for short-term gain but is tied to a 
wider political struggle about what law ought to be, and the re-determination of legal 
obligations and hierarchies of rights. I will proceed on the basis of a distinction between a 
 
19 Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005). 
20 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (Penguin UK 1987). 
21 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review.; Martin Loughlin, The Idea of 
Public Law (Oxford University Press 2004).; Marco Goldoni and Chris McCorkindale, ‘Three Waves of 
Political Constitutionalism’ (2019) 30 King’s Law Journal 74. 
22 Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (OUP Oxford 
2012).; Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?’ 
in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand and Gunther Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and 
Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing 2004). 
23 Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Transnational Constitutions (Cambridge University Press 2016).; Christian 
Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand and Gunther Teubner, Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart 
Publishing 2004). 
24 Jiří Přibáň, Sovereignty in Post-Sovereign Society: A Systems Theory of European Constitutionalism 
(Routledge 2016).; Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317. 
25 Loughlin, ‘What Is Constitutionalisation?’ (n 18) 61. 
26 ibid. 
27 Přibáň (n 24) 14. 
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strategic approach to law that carries long-term normative objectives and a tactical 
engagement that refers to actions targeting short-term protections28. In this respect, legal 
strategy refers to the broader political nomos of a movement and tactics are the specific 
temporal actions that seek either immediate relief from harm or contribute to longer-term 
objectives. I will elaborate on this distinction in chapter two; for now, we can see that a 
strategic approach reckons with law’s structural impediments that have prevented labour 
from being recognised and, turns to alternative strategic forms of political and legal action 
that might generate important protections for a social struggle29. 
This concern for strategic action as a means to engage with law confronts an important 
cleavage in legal theory between a conception of law as a communicative practice and its 
rejection of the strategic rationality. I do not intend to unpack the complexities of this long-
running debate but highlight its significance for the purpose of distinguishing this thesis’ 
strategic approach to the relation between law and social conflict30. In discourse theory there 
is a distinction between communicative and strategic action. Jürgen Habermas’ conception 
of communicative rationality is premised on the commitment to reaching understanding 
through language. Whereas strategic action is understood as instrumentalizing 
communication to achieve certain ends. Communicative action is based on a common 
rationality between both parties so that an addressor can understand an addressee31. Applied 
to law, the communicative approach assumes a common set of norms and rationalities that 
are seen to underpin communication and enable legal argumentation about what belongs to 
a legal order.  
For our purposes, the communicative approach and its imposition of a common rationality 
prevents certain claims from having traction in law. For instance, where a set of permissible 
norms and procedures structure communication, there is an inevitable narrowing of what can 
and cannot be said in law32. As Scott Veitch describes it, rationality in law is a process that 
limits the range of discursive opportunities because law must make a decision about what is 
 
28 Robert Knox, ‘Strategy and Tactics’ (2012) 21 The Finnish Yearbook of International Law 193. 
29 Matheson Russell and Andrew Montin, ‘The Rationality of Political Disagreement: Rancière’s Critique of 
Habermas’ (2015) 22 Constellations 543. 
30 See further, Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (MIT Press 1998).; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society (Polity Press 1984).; Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory 
of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (Clarendon Press 1989).; cf. E Christodoulidis, ‘The 
Objection That Cannot Be Heard: Communication and Legitimacy in the Courtroom’ in A Duff and others 
(eds), The Trial on Trial Volume 1: Truth and Due Process (Hart 2004). 
31 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (n 30) 29–38. 
32 Christodoulidis, ‘The Objection That Cannot Be Heard’ (n 30) 191. 
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and is not included in law33. This means that labour movements’ range of recognisable legal 
claims is limited to the normative and procedural consensus that grounds the communicative 
rationality of Western legal orders.  
The strategic approach adopted in these pages follows from a recognition of the structural 
impediments and normative commitments of national legal orders. We have already 
highlighted labour’s problematic accommodation within liberal constitutional orders that are 
normatively committed to the productive interests of capital, once we recognise such barriers 
to registering labour’s normative demands in law a communicative approach to law becomes 
counter-productive. It is our task to analyse the innovative ways that labour confronts these 
challenges, accept the limitations that liberal legal orders impose on social conflicts, and 
identify the strategic opportunities to engage with and challenge law’s communicative 
rationality. 
This thesis is concerned for the ways that a labour movement can assert itself democratically 
by engaging with constitutional structures. I do not intend to pre-determine what is or is not 
a labour movement by imposing qualifying criteria. This would run counter to an approach 
that moves away from formal institutional analysis of constitutionalism, and is concerned 
with the unexpected and disparate ways that social struggles engage with law and politics. 
The type of movement envisioned by this thesis will range from organised trade unions in 
the first world to ad hoc grassroots worker organisations in the third world. The experience 
of labour standards, organisational structures, legal institutions and demands of labour 
movements may be radically different but, at the same time, they share a common goal to 
challenge their present condition and the social relation between labour and capital. In other 
words, I am referring generally to the autonomy of labour as a social group and its specific 
instantiations as political movements that confront the ordering practices of government in 
a specific location. 
In order to comprehend the ways that labour movements interact with law I will draw from 
disparate literatures that are concerned with the conflictual interaction between social 
autonomies and constitutional government. I will proceed on the basis that while my focus 
is on a specific form of struggle our investigation into effective engagements will contribute 
to a body of knowledge that is useful to a range of social struggles. 
 
33 Scott Veitch, Moral Conflict and Legal Reasoning (Hart 1999) 161. 
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The structure of the argument is as follows. In chapter one we will set out a suitable 
methodological approach to the study of social conflict in constitutional theory. A key 
challenge to an understanding of the ways that labour movements engage strategically with 
law is the absence of agency and a concern for bottom-up processes in constitutional theory. 
I will document this challenge by setting out a representative example of the difficulty that 
top-down constitutionalism has in recognising social conflicts on their own terms. In order 
to bring labour movements, and social struggles per se, within the frame of constitutional 
analysis I will set out the method of ‘constitutionalism-from-below’34. This approach to 
constitutional studies provides space for our investigation into labour movements’ 
engagements with law due to two methodological commitments. First, it focuses on the role 
of social forces in constitutional practices; second, it aims to expand the canon of 
constitutional theory to include heterogeneous experiences of law and politics. 
Chapter two turns to the substantive treatment of strategic legal engagements in the 
constitutionalism-from-below literature. I will draw from Boaventura de Sousa-Santos’ 
conception of law as a tool of subaltern struggle and apply its insights to an understanding 
of labour’s capacity to engage with law. This will set up the importance of strategic 
engagements to a constitutionalism-from-below and highlight the central tension between 
the opportunity and limitation of legal mobilisation. Indeed, this literature is finely attuned 
to both the promise of law as a tool of political struggle and the effects of vested interests in 
liberal legal systems. In the second part of this chapter I will present an internal critique of 
the constitutionalism-from-below method that builds on its concern for the conditions of 
social struggle. This will set out the issues that must be confronted if we are to better 
conceptualise how labour movements can engage meaningfully with law. 
In chapter three I will present three tenets of effective legal engagement by labour 
movements. This draws on a range of influences from legal mobilisation scholarship and 
legal theory to contribute an understanding of the factors that determine the effectiveness of 
legal mobilisation. The first tenet will set out both a means to evaluate the ways that legal 
mobilisation can benefit a political struggle and, assess the role of framing in the articulation 
of effective legal arguments. Second, I will highlight the effect of context on legal 
mobilisation and why labour movements ought to pay specific attention to the institutional 
capacity of State legal systems. Third, we will explore the relation between legal 
 
34 Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (n 13). 
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mobilisation and political objectives and the extent to which the latter can be amplified, and 
not co-opted, by the former. 
Chapter four brings together our conceptual treatment of effective legal mobilisation with 
empirical analysis of a particular labour movement’s engagement with law. I analyse the 
trajectory of a labour movement as a means to ameliorate our conception of effective 
strategic and tactical uses of law with empirical legal analysis. Importantly, the case study 
will highlight the role of contextual contingencies and the pragmatism that shapes a 
movement’s use of legal and political actions at different times. The labour movement that 
will be the subject of our analysis are the worker recuperated factories (empresas 
recuperadas por sus trabajadores, hereafter ERTs) of Argentina. These self-managed 
worker cooperatives began with the occupation of their workplaces after their employers 
filed for bankruptcy and, through their innovative and competent use of legal resources have 
won legal protections for their control of property. I will examine the BAUEN Cooperative’s 
use of legislative and constitutional provisions and the effect of non-legal factors in the 
success and failure of their legal struggle for recuperation. The BAUEN Cooperative has 
been engaged in a legal struggle since 2003, the duration and complexity of their experience 
with law will provide a textured insight into the nuances of legal mobilisation. 
The ERTs’ relative success in confronting the legal system’s protection of private property 
rights and winning legal protections for worker cooperatives presents a unique opportunity 
to learn about the effective potential of legal strategy and the extent to which it can be used 
to confront the normative commitments of a legal system. The experience of the ERT 
movement will inform our conception of the juris-generative potential of labour movements 
and their capacity to intervene in constitutional practices. This thesis will draw equally upon 
both the theory of legal strategy to evaluate the ERT movement’s engagements with law, 
and on the BAUEN Cooperative’s experience to illustrate a theory of legal strategy in 
practice. 
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 Chapter 1. The methodological relevance of legal strategy in 
constitutional theory: A view from the ‘top-down’ and the 
‘bottom-up’ 
The aim of this thesis is to document the potential effectiveness of labour’s strategic 
engagements with law. However, before we can begin to develop our conceptual and 
empirical analysis, we need to establish a methodological approach that is capable of 
recognising the productive relation between law and social struggles. This chapter will 
consider how different methodological approaches include and exclude practices as 
constitutionally (ir)relevant and analyse the effect this has on their approach to social 
conflict. To draw out the importance of methodological perspective we will juxtapose the 
ways that both top-down and bottom-up approaches have rationalised social conflicts. I will 
argue that top-down constitutional theory has struggled to contend with the agency of social 
conflicts due to its concern for legitimate authority and a coherent account of constitutional 
practices. In order to bring social conflicts within our methodological framework, I will turn 
to a socio-legal method of constitutionalism-from-below. This approach enables an 
understanding of not only the effects of government functions in social reproduction but also 
the essential role of social movements in legal and political transformation. 
This chapter is divided into two parts, in the first we will focus on the top-down method and 
its focus on governing processes. I will argue that this approach presents an internal 
conception of constitutionalism that reserves all constitutionally relevant practices to the 
functions of government. This provides a coherent explanation of constitutional functions 
whereby government’s effective management of social conflict reproduces the legitimate 
authority of governmental power. The problem with this methodology, from the perspective 
of social struggles, is it fails to account for the role of social autonomies and the extent to 
which they challenge the structures and functions of government. 
In the second part, we will turn to a method of constitutional analysis ‘from-below’ that is 
capable of recognising and evaluating strategic legal action as a constitutional practice. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ analysis of subaltern cosmopolitan legality35 and Gavin 
Anderson’s concept of constitutionalism-from-below36 presents a constitutional method that 
 
35 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation 
(Cambridge University Press 2002). 
36 Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (n 13). 
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explores the tension between social struggles and constitutional structures. Both authors 
have criticised the traditional methodological approach of Western constitutional theory for 
focusing upon institutional functions and over-emphasising the importance of top-down 
processes. This call to decentre constitutional analysis enables socio-legal scholarship to 
refocus attention on previously unconsidered sites of political power and constitutional 
experience. The importance of this approach, I will argue, lies in two methodological 
commitments: First, it identifies the role played by social struggles in legal and political 
transformations; and second, it encourages the production of new constitutional knowledge 
that transcend the limits of top-down analysis. This will set up a methodological perspective 
that brings the strategic opportunity of law into the frame of constitutional analysis that will 
guide the remainder of this thesis. 
1 Top-down constitutionalism and the absence of social conflict in 
governing functions 
In this section I will consider how the agency of social movements in constitutional practices 
has been under-analysed in constitutional theory. The absence of social struggles can be seen 
as a general theme in constitutional theory, contemporary scholarship has been occupied 
with describing the constitutional orders of post-national society37, assessing the impacts of 
globalisation38 and structural transformations that have been initiated by post-State 
governance regimes39, and evaluating the potential futures of constitutionalism40. This 
scholarship has undoubtably provided key insights about the structures and trends in 
contemporary constitutionalism but they provide less analysis of the potentiality of social 
conflicts to engage with constitutional practices. I argue that there is a lack of an internal 
relation between orthodox constitutionalism and strategic legal action due to the former’s 
overreliance on functional processes that misread the intentions and capacity of the latter. I 
will present a methodological explanation for the absence of social struggles that considers 
 
37 For example, the identification of ‘societal’ constitutionalisms by Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 
22).; The concern for ‘global’ constitutionalism by Anne Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’ 
(2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 397.; see also Damian Chalmers, ‘Post-Nationalism and 
the Quest for Constitutional Substitutes’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 178. 
38 See Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality (Oxford 
University Press 2013). 
39 See Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP Oxford 
2012).  
40 Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin, The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP Oxford 2012); Cormac Mac 
Amhlaigh, Claudio Michelon and Neil Walker, After Public Law (OUP Oxford 2013). 
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how an over-determination of top-down practices in constitutionalism excludes 
engagements with law and politics ‘from-below’. 
I will focus on Martin Loughlin’s account of ‘Political Constitutionalism’ as representative 
of a methodological tendency in constitutional theory to privilege the role of government 
functions in constitutionalism. Loughlin’s constitutionalism is concerned with State-
building and the legitimate authority of governing processes. I will refer to this as ‘top-down 
constitutionalism’ because its methodological focus is the functions of government tasked 
with mobilising law and ordering conflicts. 
I will present a methodological critique of Loughlin’s constitutionalism from the perspective 
of social conflict. I argue that top-down constitutionalism’s focus upon government and the 
internal practices of ordering means that it is unable to recognise or explain the role of 
strategic legal action or use of law by social movements. The principle problem that 
Loughlin’s top-down approach poses to a conception of legal strategy in constitutionalism 
is its focus on governing processes which cannot account for the social autonomy of 
conflicts, their self-organisation and ways that they challenge constitutional structures. I will 
set out how the influence of functionalism and a concern for law’s legitimate authority has 
caused Loughlin’s constitutional theory to privilege governance practices over the ways that 
social conflicts engage with law. 
While I will highlight the limitations of Loughlin’s theory for an understanding of legal 
strategy, it is important to acknowledge the importance of his constitutional method to 
British public law. For Loughlin, public law is not restricted to the rules of civil association 
or the substantive content of a constitution, public law – as the practices of government - is 
understood as the means through which the modern constitutional State is ordered. This has 
shifted the focus of constitutional scholarship away from common law conceptions of legal 
validity and introduced a matter of fact account of the State. Loughlin does not reduce public 
law to juridical concerns or a positivist jurisprudence; on the contrary, it is a public law that 
contributes to an understanding of the modern State by bringing together an impressive range 
of legal and political theory41. Loughlin’s constitutional theory has drawn upon theoretical 
 
41 Michael A Wilkinson and Michael W Dowdle, ‘Questioning the Foundations of Public Law and 
Questioning Foundations of Public Law’ in Michael A Wilkinson and Michael W Dowdle (eds), Questioning 
the Foundations of Public Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2018) 3–4; Michael Gordon, ‘A Basis for Positivist 
and Political Public Law: Reconciling Loughlin’s Public Law with (Normative) Legal Positivism’ (2016) 7 
Jurisprudence 449; David Dyzenhaus, ‘THE END OF THE ROAD TO SERFDOM?’ (2013) 63 The 
University of Toronto Law Journal 310. 
  
Chapter 1. The methodological relevance of legal strategy in constitutional theory: A view from the ‘top-
down’ and the ‘bottom-up’ 
14 
works that chart the development of the modern State and ‘recast’ public law as an essential 
contribution to existing works of political philosophy, political sociology and State theory42. 
We will draw on this conception of public law and the reproduction of the State as a political 
unity in what follows. However, our focus will be on its methodological43 inability to grasp 
the role of social conflicts in civil society that are autonomous and not completely ordered 
by the State. 
The structure of the argument will unfold as follows. To comprehend Loughlin’s activity of 
governing and its treatment of social conflict, we will consider how Loughlin’s 
constitutionalism draws upon functionalism to explain the ‘activity of government’. I argue 
that this function of public law comes to dominate Loughlin’s understanding of 
constitutionalism and excludes any potential role of external social forces in constitutional 
transformation. To chart the influence of functionalism will require a brief detour that 
highlights Loughlin’s critical appraisal of the functionalist approach to public law. This will 
enable a unique reading of Loughlin’s activity of governing as the internal function of 
government and reproduction of legitimate authority. I will tie these insights to existing 
critiques of Loughlin’s constitutionalism that identify the absence of material and social 
forces in his conception of societal reproduction. Bringing these two conceptions together 
will reveal a methodological approach that can only recognise social conflicts as demands 
and threats that must be ordered by the function of governing, meaning the practices of civil 
society are reduced to their effect on ordering practices that does not capture the true 
potentiality of social conflict. 
In his 1992 monograph, Public Law and Political Theory, Martin Loughlin charts the 
tradition of public law and its theoretical accounts of the source of legitimate authority. For 
Loughlin, the expansion of government and the rise in regulatory frameworks pose a 
problem for traditional explanations of public law’s legitimate authority. The main concern 
is the proliferation of regulatory bodies and rise of administrative rules that structure 
multiple aspects of social life. Rather than the rules of civil association that are formalised 
in constitutional documents or other institutional writings and subject to mechanisms of 
 
42 Wilkinson and Dowdle (n 41) 3. 
43 For alternative methodological critiques of Loughlin’s public law, see further Andrew Halpin, 
‘Questioning a Uniform Concept of Public Law’ in Michael A Wilkinson and Michael W Dowdle (eds), 
Questioning the Foundations of Public Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2018); Panu Minkkinen, ‘The Tragic 
Politics of Public Law’ in Michael A Wilkinson and Michael W Dowdle (eds), Questioning the Foundations 
of Public Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2018); Jacco Bomhoff, ‘Immanence and Irreconcilability: On the 
Character of Public Law as Political Jurisprudence’ in Michael A Wilkinson and Michael W Dowdle (eds), 
Questioning the Foundations of Public Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2018). 
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account, the modern experience of government is replete with regulatory governance by 
disparate government bodies or departments: 
The empirical world of public law is best symbolised, not by some slim constitutive 
document, but rather by the loose-leaf encyclopaedias on such subjects as housing, 
planning, social welfare, health and safety, and the regulation of competition. These 
are weighty, dense, rapidly changing compendia of the rules, orders, and guidance 
relating to particular social fields. This, in fact, is our experience of modern law in 
general.44  
This grasps the role of contemporary governance practices in structuring social life and 
recognises the fact that laws passed by parliaments are no longer the sole means through 
which social relations are determined. From health and safety regulations to vehicle 
emissions and consumer directives, regulations have become an essential part of modern 
government and its capacity to order social life. It is this rise of regulation that, for Loughlin, 
asks questions of the contemporary source of governmental legitimacy. 
Loughlin argues that the traditional public law theories, such as conservative normativism, 
cannot account for the contemporary, positivist experience of law. Conservative 
normativism sees law as a set of practices and conventions that form the common law 
tradition.45 This concept of law is universal, with no differentiation between administrative 
law or ordinary legislation. The authority of law is explained by reference to common law 
traditions which, for Loughlin, cannot explain the practices of modern government and the 
rise of regulative governance detailed above. 
For the normativist, the transcendental authority of law is understood as the source of the 
common law’s legitimacy. Scholars in this tradition, such as Dworkin and Hart, have been 
preoccupied with an adequate theory of the common law’s authority or how we might 
identify something as a valid law. In its simplest terms normativism is the attempt to explain 
what law ‘ought’ to be according to the principles of the community. For Loughlin, this 
exercise is limited because it is forced to trace the daily operations of law back to its 
foundations. Moreover, the normativist focuses exclusively on the protection of individual 
rights and constructing adequate constitutional structures. The problem, Loughlin claims, is 
that normativist public law theory relies upon the tradition of law to explain its legitimacy 
at the expense of explaining the practices of law. In other words, the practices of public law 
 
44 Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Clarendon Press 1992) 241. 
45 ibid 232. 
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extend far beyond a normative conception of positive law’s transcendental validity and 
involves the range of fundamental laws and structures of governance that maintain the 
modern State. 
It is the concern for the practice of law, or how it operates in practice, that leads Loughlin to 
functionalism. However, a problem with certain trends in functionalism, Loughlin argues is 
that it can become too focused upon the instrumental possibilities of law for the achievement 
of certain societal transformations. The inadequacy of functionalism, for Loughlin, is its 
general tendency to view law in a purely instrumental sense – whereby law is not a 
theoretical abstraction but a means to achieve objectives with decisions evaluated on the 
basis of their political achievement.46 The limits of normativism and functionalism are 
summarised by Loughlin as follows:  
[T]he conceptualisation of the normative style distorts any attempt to examine the 
social significance of law while the instrumental or behavioural orientation of the 
functionalist style fails adequately to account for our understanding of the normative 
character of law.47  
The aim of Loughlin’s inquiry is to conceptualise both the normative character of law – the 
rules that define something as law - and accept that law is a social exercise performed by 
government. Loughlin wants an understanding of public law that accepts law as a complex 
array of contextual and specialised rules from constitutional rights to the regulative output 
of the modern bureaucratic State. For Loughlin, the complexity and contingency of modern 
law means that its validity cannot be rooted in transcendental notions, but it is found in the 
capacity of law to respond to new societal complexities and ensure the future of the political 
community. Moving away from theorisations of law that place its validity in the common 
law tradition of traditional practical knowledge or moralised higher order foundational 
norms, Loughlin ties the legitimate authority to the function of government: 
While the authority of the common law depends on how old it is and how far back it 
stretches, that of legislation rests on how recently it has been enacted. Positive law is 
no longer valid through inalterability. Rather its validity is now based on its function.48  
 
46 ibid 205. 
47 ibid 243. 
48 Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Oxford University Press 2004) 77–78; Loughlin, Public Law 
and Political Theory (n 44) 253. 
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Loughlin identifies the functionalism of Niklas Luhmann as providing a means to 
comprehend the practices of law, their normative character and, importantly, how legal 
functions reproduces its legitimate authority. Luhmann’s break with transcendental 
normativism as the authoritative basis for law and the functional reproduction of systems are 
key to Loughlin’s embrace of a functional conception of public law. Let us highlight these 
two features of Luhmann’s functionalism before comprehending its significance in 
Loughlin’s public law. 
For Luhmann, law is neither founded upon a moral tradition, nor does it have an ontological 
grounding49. Instead, law’s authority is explained from a functionalist perspective. This 
positive view of law separates the practice of law from conceptions of justice because the 
legal order is not legitimised by its moral content. For Luhmann, we can only understand the 
authority of law by turning to sociological analysis of legal practice. It is in the function of 
a system that Luhmann identifies the authority to perform a function.  
A second key insight from Luhmann is that law is an achievement in the reduction of 
complexity50. This provides an account of how legal functions manage to respond to social 
conflicts and manage the complex and infinite range of social expectations. Rather than 
becoming swamped by social complexity law sustains itself on the basis of normative 
differentiation. The function of law is a self-referential practice, meaning the legal system’s 
functions are an exercise in reproducing law’s internal normative structure. Law’s self-
reflexivity is informed by the theory of autopoiesis which is borrowed from biology and 
developed in cybernetic51 studies. Autopoiesis translates as ‘self-reproducing’ and presents 
systems as cognitively open but normatively closed52. The normative closure of the legal 
system “produces and delimits the operational unity of its elements through the operation of 
its elements”53. A system can operate only on the basis of its function, it is and is not capable 
of reproduction on this basis. Moreover, a system does not engage normatively with 
demands external to the system (environment); a system sustains itself through internal 
differentiation to the environment. A legal system will cognitively assess its environment, 
but any internal differentiation will occur according to its own binary coding: legal/illegal54. 
 
49; Loughlin p.252  
50 Luhmann (n 48) 88.; Richard Nobles and David Schiff Introduction to Luhmann (2004) 7 
51 Humberto R Maturana and Francisco J Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living 
(D Reidel 1980). 
52 Luhmann (n 48) 81–86. 
53 Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (n 44) 255. 
54 Luhmann (n 48) 93. 
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This reveals that a legal system does not absorb the claims of a social conflict but ‘responds’ 
indirectly to conflicts by producing its own normative output. 
Although Luhmann is not concerned with the source of law’s legitimate authority but with 
an explanation of social differentiation; for Loughlin’s purposes, his functionalism provides 
a means to comprehend how legal systems respond to social expectations and reproduce 
their legitimate authority. The principle insight that Loughlin draws from Luhmann is that 
modern law is too complex to be valid on the basis of transcendental norms and is best 
understood according to its function. For Loughlin, Luhmann’s conception does not simply 
reveal how legal systems work but that a “legal system can manage its own reproduction 
within an environment which is not in itself attuned to the precepts of the system.”55 This 
lays the groundwork for an account of constitutionalism that is determined by the production 
of positive laws in line with the normative aims of the legal system. In other words, Loughlin 
draws on Luhmann’s functionalism to show how modern legal systems are complex systems 
made up laws that manage social expectations and order conflicts in line with law’s own 
normative determinations. Rather than tying the legitimacy of law to transcendental norms, 
Loughlin recognizes an opportunity to understand the validity of law according to its 
function. 
The next step in our argument is to trace the influence of Luhmann’s functionalism into 
Loughlin’s later work and how it informs an account of modern law and government as the 
function of governing. Before we do so, we need to be clear about the limits of Luhmann’s 
influence upon Loughlin. Loughlin has praised systems theory and the functionalist 
approach per se as providing a scientific approach to the functions of law and politics. 
However, Loughlin does not hold onto a strict conception of social systems theory to guide 
his account of public law because its overly positivistic approach fails to comprehend the 
reality of modern constitutionalism56. At issue is the closed nature of a (legal) system in 
Luhmann which limits the scope of a social systems functions to either law or politics. For 
Loughlin, public law is not monopolised by the legal system but is a deeply political 
activity57. Indeed, Loughlin advocates an approach to public law that is capable of capturing 
the internal complexity of modern law and government and the interaction between the 
 
55 Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (n 44) 257. 
56 Martin Loughlin, ‘The Functionalist Style in Public Law’ (2005) 55 The University of Toronto Law 
Journal 361, 400. 
57 Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (n 44) 259. 
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practices of law and politics in the effective governance of the State58. This hybrid 
conception of the function of governing cannot cope with the theoretical demands of 
Luhmann’s autopoietic theory. 
While an explicitly functional account of law may be absent in Loughlin’s later work, I argue 
that its influence can be identified in Loughlin’s explanation of public law as the actual 
practices of government that maintain political unity. This is important because it reveals a 
methodological approach to constitutionalism that focuses on governing process at the 
expense of social conflict. The functional method gives insufficient weight to societal 
conflicts because of an overreliance on internal processes that allow the constitutional order 
to reproduce itself. For instance, functional processes universalise conflict by responding to 
its content according to law’s available resources which excludes the normative demands or 
agency that drives social struggles. In other words, by approaching constitutionalism as a 
practice done by government, we will see that Loughlin leaves limited space for the active 
role played by social conflicts in constitutionalism. 
In The Idea of Public Law (2003) and Foundations of Public Law (2010), public law is the 
function that governs/organises the State and ensures the preservation of political unity59. 
As Loughlin puts it: 
As a general phenomenon, the activity of governing exists whenever people are drawn 
into association with one another, whether in families, firms, schools, or clubs. In order 
to maintain themselves, and certainly to be able to develop and flourish, such groups 
must establish some set of governing arrangements, however rudimentary. The 
formation of governing arrangements is a ubiquitous feature of group life. Whatever 
the type of governing arrangement established, an iron law of necessity holds sway. 
Since it is simply not possible for associations of any significant scale and degree of 
permanence to be capable of governing themselves, the business of governing 
invariably requires the drawing of a distinction that has become fundamental to the 
activity: the division between rulers and ruled.60 
Conflicts are understood as an inevitable consequence of a political community. They are 
presented in Loughlin’s account as a challenge to political unity which requires government 
to be capable of ordering demands and threats, and to secure the future of a constitutional 
State. The management of conflicts occurs through a representative relation whereby the 
 
58 Wilkinson and Dowdle (n 41) 4. 
59 ibid 6. 
60 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (n 21) 5. 
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government has a duty to effectively perform its function through the provision of social 
needs and protection of the community from external threats. We can also see how the 
legitimacy of government flows from its capacity to effectively exercise these functions: 
Political power is thus derived from those tensions and conflicts which exist in all 
collectivities. These tensions must be properly handled, and it is for this purpose that 
the practices of politics have evolved.61  
In Loughlin’s account the legitimacy of government has come to be defined by the concepts 
of ‘political right’. Loughlin’s account of political right is a ‘political jurisprudence’62 that 
explains the political authority of law which, as we have identified, is central to Loughlin’s 
project. The idea of political right extends beyond positive law and identifies the range of 
governing practices that respond to conflicts productively thereby securing political unity 
and reproducing its legitimate authority to rule. I do not intend to explore the detail of this 
complex conceptual account of legitimate authority63, our task is to recognise how this 
conception of public law is concerned principally with the function of ordering conflicts. 
Wilkinson and Dowdle capture the focus in Loughlin’s public law on legitimacy and 
management of conflict: 
For the governing process to remain in productive tension, converting conflict into 
manageable contest, an overall unity of purpose and character needs to be established 
and maintained through representational devices. And the dominant mode this takes 
in the context of modern public law is the unity of the State and autonomy of the 
political on which its power and authority rests. The arrangements of public law thus 
contribute to the maintenance of the State as a political unity, one that discharges 
political responsibility to its subjects.64 
In order to comprehend Loughlin’s constitutionalism, we must recognise his conception of 
public law as the activity of governing and how its function – ordering – provides an 
 
61 ibid 64. 
62 Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (OUP Oxford 2012) 2.; Loughlin’s ‘political jurisprudence’ 
as public law brings together a conception of the modern State as caught between two modes of association: 
as a civil association of rules and an enterprise that pursues common goals. In addition to a conception of 
political power as both checked by this rule-based association (potestas) and the actual power of 
governmental resources to pursue these common projects (potentia). For Loughlin, public law is the 
pragmatic outcome of these tensions, where the government function of public law is directed toward the 
achievement of both the public need, understood as the citizens’ enjoyment of political liberty, and social 
solidarity of the political community. See further pp.157-180 Foundations (2012). 
63 In Foundations Loughlin draws upon range of Sieyes, Oakeshott, Spinoza, Bodin and others in 
constructing an account of the nature of government’s legitimate authority to rule. See, for example pp.159-
164 and 231-237. 
64 Wilkinson and Dowdle (n 41) 6. 
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explanation of public law’s legitimate authority. The activity of governing is the practice 
that orders internal antagonisms (low-intensity conflicts) and protects against external 
threats (high-intensity conflicts). In this sense, conflicts are visible either as a threat to social 
cohesion, or as a productive opportunity to effectively govern and reproduce the legitimacy 
of government. They are dealt with either by responding to social expectations (e.g., welfare 
and social reforms) or by excluding existential threats (terrorism, alternative political 
futures, or civil war). The appropriate response will depend upon the conflict’s intensity but 
in any case, according to this approach, it is the government that responds by exercising its 
function through law. 
The problem, for our purposes, is this approach contends that public law must organise 
modern society’s many groups, including “associations, trade unions, and corporations”65 
and co-ordinate their relationship with government. This is a conception of public law 
grounded in the rationality66 of government to order social conflict. While I have 
reconstructed Loughlin’s account as holding onto a functionalism that can only present an 
internal perspective of governing processes and cannot capture the effect of social conflict 
on these processes. For Wilkinson and Dowdle, the absence of more concrete social analysis 
in Loughlin “betrays a residue of formalism”67. This refers to the fact that Loughlin’s 
account of the political authority of law in modern societies does not provide any 
consideration of material social relations, such as class relations, politico-economic 
inequalities or entrenched interests68. The commonality between these two critiques is the 
identification of an overreliance in Loughlin on the functions of the State or a formal account 
of its ruling practices. In other words, Loughlin’s constitutionalism presents a coherent69 
scheme of law and politics that focuses on internal ordering processes and provides only a 
partial view of the potentially disruptive effects of social conflict. 
It is Loughlin’s overreliance on the ordering processes of government that make his account 
monolithic and insufficiently complex to account for the ways that social struggles engage 
 
65 Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (n 62) 459. 
66 This rationality is grounded in the prudential practice of politics. Loughlin follows Machiavelli, stating that 
“prudence is an ability to assess the situation and adopt the most appropriate course of action.” (p.40 
Loughlin 2004) This exercise in practical reason is the calculation of the best means to achieve specified 
ends with the minimum influence of passions or moral deliberations of right and wrong. 
67 Wilkinson and Dowdle (n 41) 12. 
68 Michael A Wilkinson, ‘Public Law and the Autonomy of the Political: A Material Critique’ in Michael A 
Wilkinson and Michael W Dowdle (eds), Questioning the Foundations of Public Law (Bloomsbury 
Publishing 2018) 182–3. 
69 Wilkinson and Dowdle (n 41) 9. 
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with constitutional structures. In Loughlin’s constitutionalism social conflict appears only 
as a claim about public need or a threat to political unity. It does not account for the aims of 
civil society organising, or the capacity of political subjects to engage with governmental 
practices70. Social conflicts appear only as in a ‘corporatist’ sense whereby their needs or 
threats are managed by the government. For example, social conflicts will seek to engage 
strategically with legal structures and mechanisms to encourage either immediate remedies 
or social reforms within the legal system. Loughlin’s top-down approach to 
constitutionalism excludes the constitutional effect of such strategic and tactical actions by 
social conflict and vests constitutive potential solely in the politico-legal functions of 
government. 
Political struggles have played a key role in the history of social transformations in the 
modern State and social movements continue to challenge governing processes. And yet, 
under Loughlin’s account we cannot contend the role of any such social struggles in civil 
society that are capable of self-organizing and struggling toward their normative objectives; 
instead civil society is something that produces conflicts that are simply ordered by 
government. To put it otherwise, the political in political jurisprudence is reduced to the 
functions of government and does not account for a more radical politics that is not captured 
by the State’s ordering practices. Rancière expresses this distinction as between the logic of 
police which includes the legal and political systems and the practices of ‘democratic’ 
participation and the practice of politics which is that which challenges or disagrees with the 
present organisation of society71. The disagreement between the structures of the political 
order (police) and the social conflicts (politics) highlights the struggles for recognition that 
exist within society that cannot be captured by governing processes72. In the present case we 
can see that Loughlin’s account provides limited space to the role of social struggles in social 
reproduction. Importantly, Loughlin’s project does not set out to recognize the role of 
material social forces but is explicitly concerned with an account of political jurisprudence73. 
Nonetheless, we can recognise the absence of political and social forces that play a key role 
in the construction and reproduction of social, political and legal structures. 
 
70 Marco Goldoni, ‘The Materiality of Political Jurisprudence’ in Michael A Wilkinson and Michael W 
Dowdle (eds), Questioning the Foundations of Public Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2018) 175–9. 
71 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (University of Minnesota Press 1999) 29–37; 
Jean-Philippe Deranty, ‘Jacques Rancière’s Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition’ (2003) 31 Political 
Theory 136, 147. 
72 Deranty (n 71) 137. 
73 Goldoni (n 70) 176. 
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As we can see, what is at stake for constitutional theory in determining its methodological 
aims is the capacity to either focus on the functions of government or to comprehend these 
practices whilst also giving a voice to the ways that social groups confront and use 
constitutional structures. My inquiry challenges top-down constitutionalism’s focus on 
government functions and encourages a theoretical approach that expands the horizons of 
‘constitutive potential’ to include instances of strategic action by social actors. The starting 
point is a shift in theoretical perspective and aim. I am not searching for the legitimate 
authority of constitutional functions but a better understanding of the strategic opportunity 
in law. In search of a more receptive constitutional method, I will move to analyse the 
treatment of strategic legal action by constitutional theory ‘from-below’. 
2 Constitutionalism-from-below: Identifying the constitutional 
relevance of social conflict 
In this section we turn our attention to constitutional scholarship that investigates the 
relations between social struggles and constitutional structures. I will set a methodological 
approach to constitutionalism from the bottom-up that identifies the constitutional-relevance 
of social struggles. The identification of a methodology that is sensitive to the constitutive 
role of social struggles from-below is essential for our present enquiry. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I will argue that the commitment of constitutionalism-from-below to 
documenting the practices of social struggles and challenging the present limits of 
constitutional knowledge provides a methodology that is capable of analysing the ways that 
labour movements engage effectively with law. 
Constitutionalism-from-below (or CfB) is the name that Gavin Anderson74 has given to a 
constitutional method that identifies the role of social struggles in constitutionalism. As 
Anderson defines it: 
[T]he generally occluded phenomena of ‘constitutionalism from below’ [is] found 
variously in innovative governance practices in the global South, non-institutional 
forms of politics, and the struggles of the marginalised and relatively powerless.75  
 
74 Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (n 13) 901. 
75 Gavin W Anderson, ‘Towards a Cosmopolitan Pluralist Theory of Constitutionalism’ in Upendra Baxi, 
Christopher McCrudden and Abdul Paliwala (eds), Law’s Ethical, Global and Theoretical Contexts: Essays 
in Honour of William Twining (Cambridge University Press 2015) 145. 
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The aim of CfB scholarship is to reveal the various constitutional experiences that can be 
found in society. This scholarship contends that constitutionalism is shaped from the bottom-
up by social forces as well as ‘top down’ institutional practices. This is an approach to 
constitutional study that inverts top-down constitutionalism’s focus upon the functions of 
government by analysing the ways that social struggles (broadly defined) engage with 
constitutional structures from the ‘bottom-up’. In line with my critique of Loughlin above, 
it argues that established conceptions of constitutionalism have failed to recognise the 
constitutive practices of social struggles. A bottom-up constitutionalism recognises the 
political power exercised by social conflicts and seeks to comprehend their role in 
constitutional transformation. It is committed to exploring the alternative mechanisms of 
realizing political aims in law and unfolding a constitutionalism that reflects the myriad of 
social, political, and legal forces that constitute society. 
While CfB is a term coined by Anderson the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos76 
dominates the field. In order to comprehend the contribution of this bottom-up approach to 
an understanding of strategic legal action in constitutional theory, we must introduce and 
examine Santos’ commitment to a broader, socio-legal conception of constitutionalism. 
During the past three decades Santos has produced various conceptual innovations with each 
seeking to rationalise the sociological experience of law, politics and social struggle. The 
most important for our purposes is ‘subaltern cosmopolitan legality’77 because it centres on 
the experience of grassroots political actions and their relation to hegemonic legal and 
political institutions. 
Subaltern cosmopolitan legality shifts the analytic focus of law away from hegemonic 
structures of transnational globalisation to sites of resistance that struggle against top-down 
governance, legal institutions, and rules that buttress hegemonic political ideologies. As 
Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito put it: 
In addition to hegemony theories that explain why global legal structures are as they 
are, we need sociolegal approaches capable of telling why and how they change. This 
entails turning our analytic gaze to plural forms of resistance and embryonic legal 
 
76 Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (n 13) 903–
4; Anderson, ‘Beyond “Constitutionalism Beyond the State”’ (n 14) 380–1; Anderson, ‘Towards a 
Cosmopolitan Pluralist Theory of Constitutionalism’ (n 75) 161–4; Santos, Toward a New Legal Common 
Sense (n 35); Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A Rodríguez-Garavito, Law and Globalization from 
Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
77 Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (n 35) 465. 
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alternatives arising from the bottom the world over. This is the goal of subaltern 
cosmopolitan legality.78 
This concept provides a socio-legal method of constitutional investigation that places the 
social experience of law and social struggle at the centre of its analysis. As the dominant 
conceptual account of constitutionalism-from-below, I will examine how subaltern 
cosmopolitan legality grounds a method capable of recognising the constitutional relevance 
of strategic uses of law by social movements. I will consider each of its three components 
and how its understanding of ‘subaltern’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, and ‘legality’ shape a method 
of constitutional analysis ‘from-below’. However, a mere description of what these terms 
mean to their author will not sufficiently elaborate the importance of the CfB method for our 
present purposes. 
I will explain this approach by highlighting two key concerns in subaltern cosmopolitan 
legality. First, the subaltern shifts the analytic focus onto counter-hegemonic struggles and 
their role in legal, political and constitutional transformation. This is important for our 
purposes because it brings the role of social conflict in constitutionalism to the fore and 
provides an opportunity to identify how agents engage effectively with legal and political 
structures. Second, the concern for cosmopolitanism is best understood as a commitment to 
revealing new legal, political and constitutional epistemologies. This commitment to new 
knowledge rejects existing definitions, concepts and theories that determine our 
identification of a constitutionally relevant act and bring new conceptions of 
constitutionalism into the frame of analysis. These two concerns underpin a method of 
constitutional analysis that is committed to examining the role of social struggles in 
constitutionalism and, importantly, it provides the framework to examine the potential 
effectiveness of strategic legal action. 
Before we begin, let us consider an early objection to this method of legal analysis that 
provides an opportunity to be clear about our approach to CfB and its contribution to an 
understanding of social conflict in constitutionalism. For some scholars, identifying the role 
of the subaltern and cosmopolitan legality means relying on notions of social struggle that 
are insufficiently concrete in their call for alternatives to present legal and political realities, 
and reliance on the capacity of social actors to contest the political power of top-down 
constitutions. As such, these abstract approaches to legal analysis fail to provide an 
 
78 Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito (n 76) 12. 
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understanding of the precise forms of action required to contest contemporary legal and 
political challenges. For instance, Joel Handler has criticised postmodern legal and political 
scholarship for deconstructing modern society without providing definite alternative forms 
of action79. Handler praises postmodern scholarship for identifying the limitations of modern 
law, the existence of alternative forms of political power in society, and the fallacy of 
universal projects. However, the problem, Handler argues, is that deconstructive politics is 
“disabling”80 because it cannot provide “belief systems, meta-narratives that allow theories 
of power, of action.”81 While Handler’s project shares the same objective as Santos’ – the 
identification of a transformative politics –they disagree about the forms of action that are 
required to achieve it and the role of scholarship in this task82.  
Santos does present his analysis in utopian terms83 and embraces precisely the sort of 
deconstruction and reflexivity that Handler is sceptical about. However, Santos’ criticism of 
modern law and concern for the conditions of social emancipation are not disconnected from 
concrete solutions as Handler suggests. On the contrary, as I will argue below, the 
importance of the CfB method lies in the identification of opportunities and effective forms 
of action that can respond to contemporary political challenges. In order to expand the 
perspective of constitutional studies it is necessary to engage in a degree of deconstructive 
work and move beyond the universalising impulses and exclusionary effects of top-down 
methodologies. The price of broadening the horizons of top-down theory may be that Santos 
and CfB do not provide a grand narrative about the means of legal and political 
transformation; however, its benefit lies in providing a method that can identify concrete 
emancipatory opportunities that remain under-analysed in traditional legal studies. In other 
words, CfB is a methodology that brings certain practices and opportunities into view 
precisely because it resists the temptation to impose pre-determined conceptions of the 
emancipatory project. 
 
79 Joel F Handler, ‘Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements’ (1992) 26 Law & Society 
Review 697; Rosemary J Coombe, ‘Finding and Losing One’s Self in the Topoi: Placing and Displacing the 
Postmodern Subject in Law: Comment’ (1995) 29 Law & Society Review 599.; For Coombe, the potentiality 
of a postmodern politics is not found in the identification of the ‘South’ or the oppressed but in the political 
practices that present opportunities for social transformation. Coombe’s critique is that the postmodern 
analysis appears to be detached from any time, space or cultural context (599-600). 
80 Handler (n 79) 698. 
81 ibid 726. 
82 ibid 705. 
83 William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge University Press 2000) 200.; cf. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Towards a Socio-Legal Theory of Indignation’ in Upendra Baxi, Christopher 
McCrudden and Abdul Paliwala (eds), Law’s Ethical, Global and Theoretical Contexts: Essays in Honour of 
William Twining (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
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2.1. The subaltern and social struggles in constitutionalism 
The methodological focus on the subaltern brings social conflict into the frame of 
constitutional analysis and identifies the productive relation between social struggles and 
constitutional structures. I will set out three key elements of CfB’s methodological 
commitment to the subaltern. First, it draws out the role of social struggles in 
constitutionalism and recognises the capacity of the former to engage with law from the 
bottom-up. Second, CfB is built upon a scepticism about modern law and government’s 
capacity to deliver social reforms. This scepticism recognises the historic role of social 
struggles in constitutional transformations, from the presentation of demands and protests to 
strategic legal mobilisation. Third, it highlights an opportunity to identify the ways that 
social conflicts engage with constitutional structures through legal struggle. By identifying 
the productive tension between top-down regulatory practices and the use of legal tools by 
the agents of social struggles, CfB encourages our concern for the potential effectiveness of 
strategic legal action. 
Our comprehension of ‘subaltern’ in Santos should be placed within the context of his 
concern for the experience of law in the ‘South’. The concern for the subaltern encapsulates 
the shift in perspective from top-down to bottom-up or, as Santos prefers, from North to 
South:  
[T]he South express[es] not a geographical location but all forms of subordination 
(economic exploitation; gender, racial, and ethnic oppression; and so on) associated 
with neoliberal globalisation. The South, in short, denotes the form of suffering caused 
by global capitalism. In this sense, the South is unevenly spread throughout the world, 
including the North and the West.84 
This ‘subaltern’ perspective informs a method that is capable of recognising emerging social 
phenomena, such as social movements, because its analytic lens is focused upon acts of legal 
and political resistance in society. These social struggles are understood to engage in a 
diverse range of ‘constitutional’ functions, including: Providing legal services to political 
groups, mobilising advocacy for rights protections and against rights abuses, and instituting 
their own legal and political systems. This constitutional method provides an opportunity to 
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analyse the potential effectiveness of the interaction between grassroots social struggles and 
constitutional structures. 
Social movements bring into view the role of agency in constitutional analysis that is 
dominated by structures and functions of government85. The social movement perspective 
moves away from the limits of institutional analysis and embraces the experience of social 
movements that widen our conception of constitutionalism. Indeed, Stammers has drawn on 
the creative interaction between agency and structure in the development of human rights 
norms ‘from-below’86. For Stammers, social transformations are not the result of uniform 
structural processes but are also the product of contingent and complex social processes87. 
By highlighting the ways that social movements both resist legal and political norms and 
struggle for reforms to institutional structures we can begin to see the agency of civil society 
groups in social transformation. Importantly, this highlights the potentiality of social 
struggles which encourages our bottom-up perspective on the productive relation between 
conflict and ordering processes that cannot be seen in top-down constitutional analysis. 
Santos’ concern for the subaltern informs a socio-legal perspective that aims to analyse the 
social experience of social struggles and their relation to legal and political structures. This 
defines a method that focuses on ‘counter-hegemonic’ struggles and draws attention to the 
constitutive potential of social struggles at the grassroots level. Santos’ methodological 
concern for social struggles is built out of a scepticism88 about modern law and its capacity 
to deliver social emancipation. 
The desire to shift the investigative focus to the constitutive role of social struggles can be 
summarised by identifying the dissonance between the promise and experience of modern 
law. If the modern constitutional State is premised on popular sovereignty expressed through 
parliaments, the reality of parliamentary democracy has been far from an idealised notion of 
democratic rule by the people. Santos draws on critical readings of modernity that capture 
the uneasy accommodation of a civil society replete with political demands and modern 
law’s failure to represent social demands through regulation. I do not intend to recreate 
 
85 Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (n 13) 905–
6. 
86 Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press 2009) 38. 
87 ibid 27. On the relation between structure and agency see further 24-39. 
88 Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (n 35) 39–61.; Twining (2000) at 197 has summarised this 
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Santos’ historical reconstruction of the modern State’s failure to address social needs and it 
is beyond our present task to provide a more detailed examination of the relevant literature89. 
Instead, for the purpose of comprehending Santos’ State scepticism, I will draw out three 
charges against modern law that are central in his analysis. 
First, the modern State’s use of law was developed as a rational tool of government that 
maintained political unity90, a phenomenon that is captured in Weber’s conception of 
rational-legal authority and the development of the modern bureaucratic State91. As such, 
law in the modern State is understood as an instrument of government as opposed to a tool 
of social emancipation or channelling political demands of civil society. Second, modern 
law facilitated the State’s foundational commitment to capitalist interests. Law developed as 
a means to protect private property and guarantee contractual obligations that facilitated 
trade and capital accumulation. This was, of course, qualified through social reforms that 
reached their zenith in the post-war ‘welfare State’ but these are ultimately seen as secondary 
to the entrenched interests of capital in the liberal State92. Third, the collapse of State 
regulation since the 1970s has facilitated the organisation of social life according to market-
based logics and the absence of meaningful checks and balances on capitalist interests whose 
practices have resulted in vast social and economic inequalities in the global North and 
South93. 
This brief historical overview of modern law guides Santos’ scepticism about the State’s 
capacity to re-organise social life in response to contemporary challenges. To be clear, 
Santos does not criticise State law on the basis of a romanticised notion that law ought to be 
the product of the ‘will of the people’, but highlights law’s preoccupation with the self-
reproduction of legal authority, enabling capitalist interests and, State law’s more recent 
retreat from the site of social and economic regulation94. It is the lack of redress mechanisms 
for citizens (and non-citizens) and State law’s seeming inability to confront the exclusionary 
effects of capitalism that lead Santos to consider the capacity of social struggles to re-
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politicise the content of law and law-making practices. In other words, it is the historical 
social experience of State law and its failures with respect to social emancipation that 
motivate Santos to call for ‘a new legal common sense’. 
These criticisms do not mean that the CfB method rejects the Nation State as a site of social 
emancipation. According to Santos, to abandon law on the basis of its historical inadequacies 
fails to recognise its potential to provide the means for social transformation. This capacity 
for social movements to transform social experience through legal and political reforms at 
the State level has been evidenced through the 20th Century with welfare reforms, public 
education and labour protections. Indeed, the CfB method highlights the role of the civil 
rights movement in the promulgation of the Civil Rights Act, the Suffragettes/Suffragists in 
the achievement of universal suffrage, the trade union movement is vast improvements to 
labour standards, and so on. As such, Santos insists upon the importance of law as an 
emancipatory tool. It is the aim of CfB scholarship to identify the opportunity, effective 
practices and capacity of social struggles to achieve positive legal transformations. 
For Santos, and CfB, the failures of modern law necessitate a turn to the subaltern that 
struggles against inadequate social provision and challenges governments to deliver social 
reforms. The subaltern is important because it reveals a subject who, through its actions, has 
engaged productively with constitutional structures. Rather than approaching 
constitutionalism as a top-down practice that delivers social reform through the performance 
of its functions, the focus on the subaltern identifies the role of social forces in bringing 
about legal and political transformations. 
The problem with modern law and its failure to deliver social emancipation is, for Santos, 
largely attributed to a process of depoliticisation95. This is a process through which political 
 
95 The depoliticisation of modern law is attributed to its three factors. First, once law was monopolised by 
State regulation became evermore premised upon scientific knowledge. Santos spends a great deal of time 
exploring the role of science in social regulation. His argument proposes that due to the complex task of 
managing modern societies the cognitive-instrumental rationality of science replaced politics as the field for 
determining the scope of emancipation. As such, politics was reduced to scientific calculations about the 
regulations required to manage social conflict. Accordingly, regulation became determined not by the 
political aspirations about increasing social expectations, but the function of governance performed by the 
institutions of government in the modern State. Second, law was depoliticised by the distinction between 
State and civil society and motivates Santos’ declaration that: “emancipation ended up absorbed by 
regulation.” This contends that law became the instrument of regulating civil society, which maligned any 
shared concern and interaction about social demands in favour of managing social conflict and reproducing 
legitimacy. Third, law’s monopoly over social regulation in the Nation State was negatively affected by the 
reduction of legitimacy to legality. The positivist evaluation of legitimacy according to formalist conditions 
limited national legal system’s concern for the substance of regulation. See further p.7, 39-44, and 47-49 
Santos (2002). 
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demands from civil society have been side-lined in favour of policy determined by scientific 
calculations and an over-emphasis on the reproduction of social order. Constitutionalism-
from-below is the reaction against this process and re-orients the constitutional imagination 
toward social conflicts and movements that seek to repoliticise the content of law and the 
process of law-making. 
The identification of the subaltern in the determination of law can be seen in Santos’ 
conception of the tension between regulation and emancipation. For Santos, law is caught 
between the following tension: Regulation ßà Emancipation. Regulation means “the set 
of norms, institutions, and practices that guarantee the stability of expectations”96; 
emancipation refers to the aspirations and practices that seek to transform social experience 
according to particular aspirations. There is, of course, a tension between regulatory 
practices and emancipatory aspirations which presents both an opportunity and limitation 
for social struggles engagements with law:  
The success of emancipatory struggles is measured by their capacity to constitute a 
new political relationship between experiences and expectations, a relationship 
capable of stabilising the expectations on a new and more demanding and inclusive 
level. […] The success of emancipatory struggles resides in their capacity to transform 
themselves into a new form of regulation97. 
This provides a schema through which social movements’ engagements with law are to be 
understood, it comprehends the potentially productive relation between law and civil society. 
Santos argues that the promise of law as an instrument for emancipation can only be 
reclaimed when there is a productive tension between regulation and emancipation. The 
productive tension is the practice of politics whereby social regulation is determined not by 
science but political conflict. While top-down theory provides a coherent account of 
regulation, CfB is committed to uncovering the important interaction between regulation and 
social struggles. Indeed, this call for politics identifies the potentially effective role that 
social struggles can have in the determination of regulations. 
The methodologically important contribution here is to centre on the role of social struggles 
in constitutionalism. CfB brings social conflict within the frame of analysis in constitutional 
theory and enables a more detailed conception of the ways social struggles engage with law. 
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Once we recognise the importance of the relation between social struggles and law, it is 
possible to identify their potentially productive role in the enforcement of piecemeal 
regulations to the delivery of wholesale reform. In the remainder of this thesis we will draw 
on this methodological focus on social struggles to develop a conception of the potentially 
effective ways that labour movements engage with law. 
2.2. New epistemologies of constitutionalism 
The second key aspect of the CfB methodology is its commitment to identifying and 
documenting alternative constitutional practices that have been excluded by top-down 
constitutionalism. This method rejects the pre-dominance of the Western legal tradition and 
aims to shift the analytic lens of constitutional theory onto previously unseen constitutional 
practices. I will unpack CfB’s commitment to expanding the range of constitutionally-
relevant practices. I argue that by focusing on those subjects, practices and experience of 
constitutionalism that have been excluded from top-down theory, CfB’s methodological 
frame encourages my concern for labour movement’s strategic engagements with law and 
politics. The structure of this discussion will begin by explaining Santos’ specific approach 
to ‘cosmopolitanism’ and how this underpins a methodological perspective that is committed 
to highlighting the absence of constitutional knowledge. This will lead into the importance 
of Santos’ symbolic enlargement of absence and exclusion for the purpose of drawing 
attention to emerging sociological phenomena that ameliorate our understanding of the 
relation between social struggles and law. 
Subaltern cosmopolitan legality is described as an oppositional variety of 
cosmopolitanism98. A key part of its ‘oppositional’ character is its rejection of 
cosmopolitanisms that are understood to impose pre-determined conceptions of the 
cosmopolitan project. The principle concern here is that a cosmopolitanism that imposes 
universal conditions, or an ideology that determines what is emancipatory, civilising or 
integral to the human condition risks presenting a limited conception of cosmopolitanism. 
An example provided by Santos is that of Christian missionaries whose ‘emancipatory’ 
project was in fact an imperialist project that subordinated populations and imposed Western 
ideals at the expense of indigenous or other local knowledge99. Western law is seen to 
commit a similar error as its imposition of human rights presupposes that there are no non-
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Western determinations of human dignity100. And, as a result, the cosmopolitanism of 
universal human rights standards can subordinate indigenous conceptions of collective rights 
to Western notions of individualism and environmental preservation101. This concern 
influences Santos approach to the modern State where, as we have seen, the emancipatory 
promise of liberal constitutionalism is collapsed into regulation and the failure of social 
reform. Rather than tying his method to any pre-defined cosmopolitan project Santos argues 
for a methodology that is committed to transcending existing boundaries of the 
constitutional. In other words, the ‘oppositional’ approach rejects any prior categorisation of 
cosmopolitanism in favour of a method that includes practices and experiences that have 
been excluded by top-down constitutionalisms. 
The unique and challenging nature of Santos’ cosmopolitanism can be seen in the difficulty 
for other cosmopolitanisms to break free from the influence of the Western legal tradition. 
To illustrate this point, we can draw on Gavin Anderson’s insightful account of the influence 
of methodological nationalism on contemporary constitutionalisms.102 Anderson presents 
Matias Kumm as a representative example here, whose scholarship has recognised the 
pluralised and fragmented nature103 of contemporary constitutionalism. Kumm’s analytic 
focus shifts attention away from the Nation State and includes the range of constitutional 
forms at the transnational level including international law, global governance mechanisms 
and Global Administrative Law104. However, for Anderson, this “cosmopolitanism may 
pluralise the sites of constitutionalism, but it does not necessarily pluralise our understanding 
of the constitutionalism which unfolds there.”105 Despite the move away from the Nation 
State the methodology remains grounded in the tradition of national constitutionalism. This 
means that the normative structures of transnational law remain tied to rights discourses, the 
role of courts in dispute settlement, the importance of common (demo-liberal) 
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communicative standards106, and the general influence of French and American 
constitutional traditions.107 In contrast, the cosmopolitanism of constitutionalism-from-
below is committed to: 
[B]roadening what is encompassed within constitutional discourse beyond formal or 
even functional indicia. Nothing is ruled in or out as to the possible reach of the 
constitutional axes of inclusion and exclusion, and so there can be nothing immutable 
about the subject of constitutional discourse.108 
It is, at its root, the attempt to document the practices of those that struggle against social 
exclusion and demand a form of inclusion that has been denied by the structures of modern 
law and politics.109 For our purposes, this commitment to uncovering what has been 
immutable in constitutional discourse presents an opportunity to counter the exclusionary 
effects of top-down constitutionalism. And, as a result, begin to analyse the subjects and 
practices of social movements as constitutionally-relevant. 
In order to better comprehend the opportunity presented by Santos’ methodological 
commitment to alternative constitutional knowledges and its aim to transcend the limits of 
the Western legal tradition, let us consider a key criticism of his approach. 
Santos’s work is important because it presents a much broader and more complex view 
of legal phenomena than are to be found in orthodox Western legal theory and 
scholarship. His work opens up new perspectives, and fresh lines of enquiry. This 
vision seems to be directly related to the rejection of orthodoxies that have dominated 
‘modernist’ treatments of law. However, to subvert an orthodoxy or provide a fresh 
perspective does not necessarily need a change of metaphysics or epistemology or a 
new ‘paradigm’.110 
For William Twining, Santos’ postmodernism appears to embrace a metaphysical position 
that draws a distinction between modern epistemologies (Western legal tradition) and the 
epistemologies of the south111. Rather than viewing all scientific knowledge as part of a 
whole, Santos is read by Twining as calling for competing epistemologies of the world. For 
Twining, this is a postmodern trope that should be rejected because all scientific knowledge 
 
106 See for example, the capacity for co-operation between post-national constitutional structures in Krisch (n 
39). 
107 Anderson, ‘Towards a Cosmopolitan Pluralist Theory of Constitutionalism’ (n 75) 155. 
108 ibid 160. 
109 Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (n 35) 460. 
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contributes to one epistemological field of science within which there is room for critical 
voices112. This criticism leads Twining to challenge Santos’ assertion that his call for 
‘epistemological openness’ is ‘paradigmatic’. For Twining, Santos’ contribution of 
previously excluded perspectives is important but remains within the existing paradigm of 
legal knowledge113. 
Twining’s argument that there is one paradigm of scientific knowledge is difficult to 
disagree with, however, to focus on this issue risks downplaying or missing the radicality of 
Santos’ provocation. While Twining suggests that Santos is at his best when read as 
challenging existing knowledge with new scientific knowledge114; we must recognise an 
important symbolic and methodological point in Santos’ claim about the distinction between 
the scientific and non-scientific and the call for new constitutional knowledge. Santos’ 
symbolic enlargement of exclusion places an analytic focus on the practices and experiences 
of law and politics that have been excluded from traditional ‘Western’ legal studies. In order 
to comprehend Santos’ specific methodological approach to excluded constitutional 
experiences, I will summarise three of subaltern cosmopolitan legality’ features (or, 
‘procedures’): The sociology of absences, the sociology of emergences, and ecology of 
knowledges115. Each of these factors will appear familiar as they have informed our 
preceding analysis of Santos’ method, the following draws out its specific aims and 
distinguishes it from more traditional approaches to legal studies. 
First, the sociology of absences, Santos claims, is concerned with uncovering what is 
presently ‘absent’116 from scholarly knowledge by focusing upon those social experiences 
that have, as yet, been unconsidered or excluded by scientific knowledge. For Santos, the 
absence of knowledge stems from the exclusionary effects of qualifying criteria that include 
and exclude social phenomena from scientific evaluation117. The predominance of Western 
knowledge means that its analytic tools exclude or render ‘invisible’ that which does not 
conform to its standards and relegates non-Western knowledge to the realm of the non-
existent118. 
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Second, the sociology of emergence is committed, in its analytic approach, to the possibility 
that something can be understood as a legal practice119. This means abandoning 
preconceived conceptions about what is legal (or constitutional) and holding open the 
possibility about the form and nature of legal practices. This underpins CfB’s commitment 
to empirical analysis of practices and forms of law that tests the limits of current legal 
knowledge120. Third, the ecology of knowledge can be summarised as a method that seeks a 
diversity of conceptions by combining scientific with non-scientific knowledge. This brings 
social experience into the frame of analysis and, in turn, contributes to the internal plurality 
and complexity of scientific knowledge121. Plurality here refers to the multiplication of 
diverse understandings that confront reductive accounts of social experience in scientific 
knowledge. The aim is to generate rich discussion between a range of knowledges that 
provide an opportunity to learn about alternative ways of doing that may, in turn, inform 
new approaches to law and social transformation122. 
In response to Twining’s critique we can see that Santos’ argument is not so much that there 
are different scientific epistemologies but that law has been understood by both scientific 
and non-scientific epistemologies123. This draws attention to the fact that there are legal and 
political knowledges outside of those given by the Western legal tradition124. And, for 
Santos, we cannot comprehend alternative, ‘southern’ or excluded experiences of law if we 
subscribe solely to a ‘scientific knowledge of law’. In this sense, the claim that there are 
epistemologies outside of the Western legal tradition serves as a symbolic enlargement that 
identifies the alternative ways that grassroots movements engage with law and politics125. In 
other words, it may be that there is one scientific knowledge but by categorising the legal 
tradition as ‘Western’ and ‘scientific’ Santos shines a light on the exclusion of multiple legal 
and political forms and experiences. Furthermore, there is, within Santos’ approach and 
contrary to Twining’s proposal, an implication that the Western legal tradition cannot 
include all forms of ‘legal’ knowledge owing to its normative commitments to certain social 
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interests. Therefore, the role of alternative epistemologies in Santos also recognises and 
highlights the inclusionary and exclusionary effects of modern law. We will return to and 
develop the significance of this point for legal strategy in chapter two when we consider 
law’s deficit of task. 
While Santos and Twining have praised one another’s approaches and they share a 
commitment to broadening the scope of legal knowledge by analysing either epistemologies 
of the south126 or southern voices127; there is a key distinction in their methodological 
approach to legal studies. Santos’ approach to law from the ‘bottom-up’ is more radical than 
Twining’s because it is committed to a re-conceptualisation of law using experience and 
knowledge that has been excluded from the Western legal tradition128. Whereas Twining is 
committed to advancing legal theory and expanding the canon of Western jurisprudence129. 
In other words, Twining and Santos diverge because the former is committed to modern law 
and the latter sees it as part of the problem130. For our purposes, it is Santos’ radical 
commitment to the challenges presented by modern law to emancipatory social struggles 
that make it an important methodological frame. This method aims to provide a socio-legal 
constitutionalism that details how social conflicts interact with and contribute to the practices 
of constitution. It is this commitment to new knowledges and a focus upon counter-
hegemonic actors that make constitutionalism-from-below an intriguing approach for 
scholars interested in the constitutional capacity of labour movements. In sum, it is a call to 
adopt an alternative methodological perspective on legal practices that draws out the relation 
between social struggles and law that have been excluded or under-estimated in traditional 
legal theory. 
The final issue to consider is the types of ‘legality’ that are under investigation in subaltern 
cosmopolitan legality. Given its commitment to the sociology of absences, emergences, and 
ecology of knowledge this method takes a broad approach to the identification of legal 
actions by social struggles131. The ‘legal’ aspect of SCL seeks to extend a conception of legal 
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knowledge and practice that is capable of accounting for the ways that subaltern movements 
engage with law. In Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito’s words:  
[S]ubaltern cosmopolitanism calls for a conception of the legal field suitable for 
reconnecting law and politics and reimagining legal institutions from below.132 
In general terms, a legal system determines legality when it includes and excludes certain 
actions by classifying them as either legal/illegal. Santos does not wade into these classical 
debates about how a law can be legitimately recognised as a law in a Western legal system. 
For instance, whether legality should be a merely positivist determination133 or whether 
legality is tied to substantive principles of a given legal culture134. Subaltern cosmopolitan 
legality is not concerned with identifying an absolute mechanism for determining valid law. 
The concern for legality in SCL is centred on a politics of legality that questions the 
ascription of legal rights to certain acts or persons and the criminalisation of others. As a 
type of legal action, SCL approaches law as either a tool for political struggles to combat 
social exclusion or, considers the possibilities and examples of ‘re-imagining’ legal 
institutions through practices from below. 
Importantly, for our purposes, SCL’s approach has recognised the use of strategic legal 
action but, this has not been its sole concern. The method has diverted the majority of its 
energies into the study of alternative legal orders and the capacity for political movements 
to realise counter-hegemonic institutions and governing practices. Case studies detailing acts 
of self-determination and autonomy have come to dominate constitutionalism-from-below 
scholarship. For this reason, I will draw a distinction within the CfB method between that 
which does and does not aid our investigation into strategic legal action. 
The literature has produced multiple case studies that explore the ways that social 
movements have challenged the present distribution of legality in various jurisdictions135. 
The case studies have taken two clear and distinct paths. On the one hand, the case studies 
have analysed either emergent legal orders that uncover innovative governing practices and 
political struggles for self-determination. For example, Santos’ investigation into the dispute 
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resolution and prevention mechanisms of the Pasargada Residents’ Association, an 
unofficial (non-State) legal system in a Brazilian favela136. And, Santos’ analysis of 
participatory budgeting practices in Porto Alegre, an example of innovative governing 
practices by a relatively autonomous citizen assembly that presents its own budget proposal 
to the city’s legislature.137 
On the other, they have detailed the ways that social movements challenge existing legal 
rules by engaging in strategic legal action. For example, Rodriguez-Garavito’s case study 
that documents a coalition of anti-sweatshop movements and TNCs and their use of 
international labour rights138. In addition, the U’wa people’s struggle against oil-drilling in 
their territory139 whose use of collective rights to territory, nature, and cultural defence 
provide important insights about strategic engagements with legal and constitutional norms.  
The former set will not be considered further in these pages because their overriding focus 
on autonomy140 and pluralism leaves little or no space for the role of strategic legal action. I 
will focus on the latter as it provides a methodology that holds onto the effective potential 
of strategic legal action at the State level. The commitment to constitutional knowledge 
provides an important opportunity to identify the ways that social struggles confront legal 
and political structures and to re-define our understanding of the productive relation between 
law and social forces. I will return in the next chapter to evaluate in detail CfB’s lessons 
about the constitutive capacity of strategic legal action. 
3 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to identify a methodological approach that is capable of 
recognising the potentially effective role of social conflict in constitutionalism. I have argued 
that such action by social struggles tends to be obscured in constitutional theory owing to 
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narrow top-down methodological perspectives. The top-down perspective privileges 
government as the sole agent of constitutionalism and rationalises all legal and political 
actions through the practice of governing. For example, Martin Loughlin’s constitutionalism 
focuses on the governing practices that manage social conflicts and reproduce the legitimate 
authority of government. Loughlin’s reduction of constitutionalism to governing provides 
an internal perspective on the practices of constitution, but it cannot account for the 
potentially disruptive effects of social conflict. There are social forces that do not simply 
leave constitutional structures alone but actively engage with and challenge the processes of 
societal reproduction. The significance of these actions cannot be documented from a 
methodological perspective that views social conflicts as either a threat to the political 
community or a demand about public needs. 
In search of a suitable method, I have argued for a renewed commitment to 
constitutionalism-from-below that brings legal strategy and the role of social struggles into 
the methodological frame. Constitutionalism is an explanation of the practices of 
constitution and the CfB method expands the range of constitutionally-relevant practices. If 
Loughlin’s constitutionalism is the practice of State-building by government, bottom-up 
constitutionalism focuses on the ways that social struggles intervene in the functions and 
structures of government and contribute to the processes of social reproduction. It is a 
method committed to uncovering the relation between constitutional government and social 
conflicts that is both antagonistic and productive. This is facilitated by an expansive 
approach to constitutionalism that is not limited to government functions but includes the 
experiences of social struggles engaged in legal and political transformation.  
This perspective is built upon two key methodological commitments. First, a commitment 
to the study of the practices of social struggles as constitutionally-relevant. CfB uncovers 
the historical role of social struggles in the achievement of social, political and economic 
rights and rejects the notion that government is the sole agent of constitutional 
transformation. Importantly, it locates the productive relation between social struggles and 
the structures of law and politics. This highlights the potentially effective role that social 
struggles can play in the determination of law and encourages our investigation into the ways 
that labour movements engage with law. 
Second, the CfB method rejects the limited conception of top-down constitutionalism and is 
committed to uncovering new constitutional knowledges through the study of the legal and 
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political practices of excluded populations. This means expanding our knowledge of 
constitutionalism by studying the ways that social struggles effect legal and political 
transformation. A central methodological insight is the importance of empirical investigation 
to a socio-legal constitutionalism.  
Constitutionalism-from-below provides a perspective from which the potential effectiveness 
of strategic legal actions by labour movements can be become a subject of constitutional 
analysis. The CfB method is committed to studying the ways that social struggles engage 
with constitutional structures and, to building a comprehensive account of constitutionalism 
that includes both internal ordering and effects of social forces. Importantly, as a socio-legal 
method committed to bringing together conceptual and empirical study it provides a suitable 
perspective from which to situate our analysis of labour movements. This thesis will draw 
on this methodological approach by bringing together both conceptual accounts of effective 
legal strategy and empirical legal analysis. In the next chapter we will consider in greater 
detail CfB’s conceptual and empirical treatment of the ways that social struggles engage 
effectively with law. 
  
42 
 Chapter 2. Constitutionalism-from-below as strategic 
opportunity 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the constitutive potential of labour movements’ 
strategic and tactical engagements with law. In chapter one we examined the key 
methodological commitment of ‘constitutionalism-from-below’ (hereafter CfB) to 
understanding the constitutive nature of legal and political practices by grassroots social 
struggles. The aim of the present chapter is to synthesise important lessons about the 
effectiveness of legal practices ‘from-below’ in the CfB literature and to identify the issues 
that require further elaboration in the remainder of this thesis. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, I reconstruct the treatment of legal strategy 
in CfB and argue that Santos provides four key insights. First, Santos recognises the 
importance of social struggles’ engagements with legal systems and places legal strategy 
within the scope of the CfB literature. Second, Santos sets legal mobilisation within the 
context of social struggles’ wider political intentions. This recognises how legal action will 
be used as a tool to achieve a social struggles’ political aims. Third, Santos’ legal pluralist 
approach is alive to the many facets and sites of legal regulation that could be more 
accommodating of social struggles’ legal claims and capable of providing effective 
protections. Fourth, a conceptual analysis of law introduces the strategic opportunity that 
resides in law’s abstract nature and provides an introduction to the jurisgenerative capacity 
of social movements. This final insight identifies the tension between law’s excess of 
meaning and deficit of task from which we will draw out an understanding of the opportunity 
and limitation that defines social struggles’ engagements with law. 
In part two, our evaluation moves to an internal critique of CfB’s conception of legal strategy 
that builds on the importance of CfB’s methodological approach by exposing its current 
limitations. I identify three concerns that limit the explanatory capacity of CfB in relation to 
contemporary labour movements and legal mobilisation. First, Santos’ ideological 
commitment to post-modernity leads him to embrace State scepticism in a way that diverts 
attention away from the range and significance of law’s strategic opportunity. I argue that 
Santos’ critical approach to legal mobilisation is inattentive to legal tools that might be 
profitably deployed by social struggles ‘from-below’. 
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Second, CfB’s insights are important but limited to an abstract account of the ways that 
social struggles engage with law. We require a sobering analysis of the ways that legal 
arguments can be mobilised by social struggles. Drawing upon CfB’s methodological 
commitment to empirical study, I will bring together its conceptual insights with empirical 
legal analysis to provide an account that is sensitive to the contextual factors that will affect 
legal mobilisation ‘from-below’. 
Third, the decision to underplay the significance of labour as a political subject or 
protagonist of social transformation in constitutionalism-from-below is problematic. I argue 
that labour is both empirically and normatively absent in the current constitutionalism-from-
below literature. The absence is normatively problematic because labour is a field of human 
activity that carries great engagement and investment, and to ignore it from field of social 
struggle diminishes its significance. The absence is empirically problematic because it is at 
odds with labour’s historical and contemporary role in the fundamental social struggle 
between capital and labour. I will set out the treatment of labour in CfB and argue for the 
need, in subsequent chapters, to provide a conceptual and empirical analysis of the ways that 
labour has engaged in effective legal strategy. This will take the form of a realist conception 
of legal mobilisation that identifies and evaluates labour’s engagement with legal and 
political practices ‘from-below’. 
1 Constitutionalism-from-below and legal strategy: Four insights  
In Toward a New Legal Common Sense Santos set out eight theses of subaltern cosmopolitan 
legality (hereafter, SCL)141. As we have seen in chapter one, SCL describes the legal and 
political struggle for social emancipation by excluded social groups. The theses present an 
understanding of the ways grassroots political organisations engage with law as part of a 
wider struggle for emancipatory social transformation. While some case studies have 
described the contribution of tactical litigation to political struggles142, Santos’ ‘conditions 
of SCL is the foremost conceptual treatment of the relation between law and social 
movements in the CfB literature. For this reason, I draw principally from his conception of 
 
141 Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (n 35) 465–471. 
142 Rodríguez-Garavito, and Arenas (n 101); Peter Houtzager, ‘The Movement of the Landless (MST), 
Juridical Field, and Legal Change in Brazil’ in Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A Rodríguez-Garavito 
(eds), Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press 
2005). 
  
Chapter 2. Constitutionalism-from-below as strategic opportunity 
44 
legal strategy as representative of the wider CfB literature. For Santos, we can identify the 
following eight theses: 
1.  ‘It is one thing to use a hegemonic instrument in a given political struggle. It is 
another thing to use it in a hegemonic fashion.’ 
2. ‘A non-hegemonic use of hegemonic legal tools is premised upon the possibility of 
integrating them in broader political mobilisations that may include legal as well as 
illegal actions.’ 
3. ‘Non-hegemonic forms of law do not necessarily favour or promote subaltern 
cosmopolitanism’.  
4. ‘Cosmopolitan legality is voracious in terms of the scales of legality’. 
5. ‘Cosmopolitan legality is a subaltern legality targeting the uncivil and the strange 
civil society143.’ 
6. ‘As a subaltern form of legality cosmopolitanism submits the three modern principles 
of regulation to a hermeneutics of suspicion’. 
7.  ‘In spite of the deep differences between demo-liberal legality144 and cosmopolitan 
legality, the relations between them are dynamic and complex’. 
8. ‘The gap between the excess of meaning and the deficit of task is inherent to a politics 
of legality. Cosmopolitan legality is haunted by this gap.’  
In what follows I will evaluate how these ‘theses’ conceive the relation between grassroots 
political struggles and existing ‘hegemonic’ legal systems. The aim of the next section is to 
draw from these important insights about the ways social struggles ‘from-below’ mobilise 
effective legal strategies. These insights will be divided into four distinct claims: (i) 
Hegemonic law is a tool of social struggle ‘from-below’; (ii) Effective legal mobilisation is 
reliant on the politicisation of law; (iii) Legal pluralism identifies multiple potentially 
effective sites of action; (iv) The abstract nature of legal rules reveals both an opportunity 
and a limitation. 
Santos has categorised as ‘hegemonic’ the Western legal tradition of modernity that is 
grounded in the principle of State sovereignty and includes the supranational and 
transnational legal systems that have proliferated in post-modernity145. The hegemony of 
certain legal systems in Santos refers to the dominance of modernity and its entrenched 
normative interests of capitalism and liberalism146 and structures of liberal constitutionalism. 
 
143 On the distinctions between the uncivil and strange civil society in Santos, see Santos, Toward a New 
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At its simplest, ‘hegemonic law’ refers to the predominance of certain legal institutions over 
local, indigenous or other normative orders in society. For instance, the contemporary scope 
of ‘hegemonic’ legal system includes not only States but also the European Union and the 
transnational global legal regimes of public and private international law. The present 
analysis is concerned not with the definition of a ‘hegemonic legal system’ but in the ways 
that Santos has conceived a strategic relation between social struggles for emancipation and 
these ‘hegemonic’ legal systems. In the following analysis, I will make repeated reference 
to ‘hegemonic legal systems’ or ‘hegemonic law’ when analysing Santos’ insights. For 
clarity, I am principally concerned with the continued importance of State legal systems and 
reference to ‘hegemonic’ ought to be read as an insight about the State, except where 
otherwise stated. 
1.1. Social struggle and hegemonic law 
In the first thesis, Santos claims that State law, or other ‘hegemonic’ sites of legal authority, 
can enable the emancipatory objectives of grassroots actors. This places legal strategy within 
the remit of constitutionalism-from-below literature and identifies the potentially effective 
interaction between social struggles and hegemonic legal structures. The value, or 
importance, of engaging strategically with law is that struggles over the meaning of law or 
the interests that it ought to protect are central to the organisation of society. Santos’ first 
thesis recognises that social struggles ‘from-below’ must engage in conflicts about the 
content of the constitution and the aims of legal rules. The broader issue of how social 
struggles might begin to confront law’s meaning and challenge the vested interests that are 
at the heart of modern law’s telos is of critical importance to this thesis and will be 
confronted in due course. For now, we must unpack CfB’s identification of legal 
engagements as a strategic opportunity to pursue political objectives. 
[A]ccording to subaltern cosmopolitanism, law is not reduced to State law nor rights 
to individual rights. This, however, does not mean that State law and individual rights 
are to be excluded from cosmopolitan legal practices. On the contrary, they may be 
used if integrated into broader struggles that take them out of the hegemonic mould.147 
The Western legal tradition is the target of Santos’ claim about the possibility of a ‘non-
hegemonic use of law’. For Santos, a hegemonic view comprehends law as an internally 
coherent legal system that determines the scope and limits of law and rights. Law is 
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understood to be an autonomous system because its validity is determined by the internal 
function of each government institution148. The autonomy of law refers to a legal systems’ 
monopoly over the production and content of law and rights within its jurisdiction. The 
challenge for social struggles is to recognise the opportunity and effective means to engage 
with and challenge the present content and application of law and rights. 
For Santos, the opportunity resides in a ‘politics of law’ and/or a ‘politics of rights’149 that 
involves challenging law’s current content of law and presenting alternative conceptions of 
what it ought to be. For Santos, the content of law and rights are determined and guaranteed 
by hegemonic legal systems, but they need not be reducible to their current form under 
hegemonic law. In other words, the content of law and rights are not reducible to their present 
determination by the legal system where the content of law is contested by social 
movements. This invites social struggles to present alternative interpretations of legal 
meaning and challenge the idea that the content of law is something determined only by the 
State.  
Robert Cover’s conception of social movements’ engagements with law as a practice of 
‘jurisgenesis’150, or the production of legal meaning, captures the opportunity in Santos’ call 
to engage with hegemonic law. Cover’s concepts of 'jurisgenesis'151 and 'jurispathic'152 
highlight the tension between the opportunity to present new legal meanings and the 
limitation on any such re-interpretations of law. Social movements are 'jurisgenerative' in so 
far as they present new legal claims or propose alternative ways to interpret existing laws. 
Legal normativity is plural, according to Cover, and there are more interpretations of law 
than those given by the official legal system and backed by State violence153. In contrast, the 
concept of jurispathy explains how judges ‘kill off’ these alternative legal meanings. For 
Cover, the jurispathic tendency of courts means that certain legal meanings are recognised 
and others are excluded. Cover’s insights about the tension between new legal meanings and 
law’s existing normative boundaries are key issues that social struggles will have to confront 
and manage effectively. We will return to the importance of jurisgenesis in legal strategy in 
relation to the excess of meaning below (1.4). For our present purpose both Santos and Cover 
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contend that the content and aims of law are subject to competing interpretations and that 
State law will be a key site of this struggle over meaning. 
We are given a more precise insight into the ways that social struggle could benefit from an 
engagement with hegemonic law in the seventh thesis. Santos suggests that in ‘a period of 
negative social expectations’ the implementation of existing rights and duties may lead to a 
vast improvement of social experience154. This is a pragmatic insight into the opportunity 
presented by law. Social struggles may present arguments about constitutional rights or insist 
on the enforcement of existing regulation. For example, it could be argued that the current 
provision of social welfare either fails to satisfy the government’s regulatory duties or 
amounts to a violation of constitutional rights to healthcare, education, minimum 
subsistence, work, etc. 
The challenge for Santos’ proposal is to reconcile an understanding of law’s organising 
concepts – coherence, autonomy, validity, etc – that play a key role in the functioning of the 
legal system, with the call to confront precisely these organising assumptions and insert new 
legal meanings. In other words, given that legal systems have a monopoly over the 
production of law and rights, any social struggle engaging in jurisgenesis must be capable 
of competently navigating the means of redress in a legal system. And, beyond competent 
formulation of legal claims and satisfaction of procedural requirements there are questions 
about the extent to which law can be used to challenge law. The precise opportunities and 
limitations of such strategic engagements with law are not, at this stage, detailed by Santos’ 
theses. For now, we can comprehend that the first thesis identifies the opportunity for social 
struggles to challenge the present content of law and rights. 
Before moving to the next insight, we must acknowledge that Santos’ endorsement of the 
potentially productive relation between social struggles and hegemonic legal systems 
operates alongside a more robust belief in the long-term need for alternative legal 
institutions. For instance, the proposal that social struggles ought to challenge the content of 
law and rights in hegemonic legal systems is a precursor to his more radical call for a legal 
system organised around the value of social emancipation. As we have already considered, 
Santos approaches hegemonic law as organised around capitalist and liberal interests that 
have proven incapable of delivering the conditions of social emancipation. I have drawn out 
the strategic potential at the State level in the theses but, both Santos and CfB scholarship 
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actively encourage the possibility that a truly counter-hegemonic use of law may reside in 
the construction of an alternative institution. For example, rather than challenging the 
property regimes of national legal systems by proposing a more re-distributive approach or 
contesting liberal constitutionalism’s protection of capital’s productive interests; CfB 
scholarship has tended to endorse a re-foundation of legal and constitutional orders that 
could be organised around the interests of subaltern populations. Therefore, we must 
recognise that within the first thesis there is both a claim about the use of existing law as a 
tool and a more radical claim that it is possible to conceive the content of law and rights 
outside of hegemonic semantics and imaginaries of law. For the avoidance of doubt, my 
analysis is concerned with CfB’s treatment of social struggles from below and their 
engagements with State law. The effect of such State scepticism and preference for post-
State institutional arrangements on Santos’ conception of legal mobilisation will be dealt 
with in detail in part two. 
Santos thus recognises the possibility of tactical litigation and remains realistic about the 
limits of any counter-hegemonic engagement with hegemonic law. This reveals a tension 
between the opportunity for social struggles engaging with hegemonic institutions and the 
aspiration toward autonomous counter-hegemonic institutions. This tension runs throughout 
Santos’ treatment of social struggles and their engagement with existing legal institutions 
and will feature heavily in our forthcoming evaluation of Santos’ approach to legal strategy. 
1.2. Counter-hegemonic legal action and political mobilisation 
Santos’ second contribution to an understanding of legal strategy is that legal action needs 
to be paired with political action and seen within a broader context of political mobilisation. 
The second thesis accepts that State law and rights function through top-down political and 
legal processes, and includes a warning to social struggles about the danger of co-optation. 
This warning recognises the difficulty of selective engagement with law and that a social 
struggles’ politically motivated legal arguments will be unavoidably rationalised by the 
internal normative structure of a State legal system. As we have seen in Loughlin, legal 
systems respond indirectly to social conflicts through internally coherent abstract norms. We 
can summarise the issue of co-optation as referring to the loss of a social struggles’ political 
telos to the logic and meanings given by law. Legal norms provide a legalistic response to 
political demands and, within the legal sphere of action, a social movement’s normative aims 
cannot be heard. 
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The issue of co-optation is not present in Santos’ conditions solely as a warning but to 
suggest a means of counter-acting its potentially negative effect of legal mobilisation. Santos 
argues that social movements ought to politicise their legal action to resist the loss of their 
normative aims to legal functions and decisions155. In order to avoid the depoliticising effects 
of legal action or juridification of political claims, legal actions should be integrated within 
a wider political struggle. Santos claims that by politicising the current boundaries of law, a 
political struggle’s legal mobilisation can also put pressure on the political system and 
encourage privileged political actors (all branches of government) to provide more inclusive 
legal norms. 
Once law and rights are resorted to, political mobilisation must be intensified, so as to 
avoid the depoliticization of the struggle which law and rights, left alone, are bound to 
produce. A strong politics of law and rights is one that does not rely solely on law or 
on rights.156 
Santos’ argument that any legal mobilisation must be set within a within a wider political 
movement has been widely endorsed by empirical studies in the constitutionalism-from-
below literature157. Peter Houtzager praises the explanatory capacity of Santos’ insight in 
relation to the strategy pursued by the Movimento sem Terra (MST) in Brazil. Houtzager 
documents how the MST’s strategic litigation has enforced existing legislation and 
encouraged innovative interpretations of existing law and rights. A key part of this successful 
struggles has been, Houtzager argues, the MST’s broad political mobilisation that is not tied 
to one particular legal battle: 
The movement’s capacity to concentrate the talents of diverse juridical actors on 
defending its claims has made it an important catalyst for legal change through the 
juridical field. It has been able to concentrate juridical talent by pursuing a strategy 
that Santos (1995, 2002) argues is most likely to succeed in the counter-hegemonic 
use of law and rights: it integrates juridical action into broader mobilisation, 
politicising struggles before they become juridified, and mobilising sophisticated legal 
skills from diverse actors. This strategy enabled the MST to engage in […] sustained 
and broad litigation.158 
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This means that the political movement is not reduced to the outcome of one litigation and 
its normative claims stand out from law’s own rationalisation of the conflict. In other words, 
the political strategy of a social movement should not be exhausted in a single line of 
litigation nor its future struggle entirely dependent on a judicial decision. We can see here 
the distinction between legal processes and a wider political struggle. For Santos, this 
distinction enables a political movement to not only insulate itself from legal determinations 
but to simultaneously engage in a politics of law. 
The second insight provided by Santos’ thesis, or simply a more radicalised version of the 
same insight, is that political pressure can be applied using a variety of options that could 
include direct action and illegal acts. This means engaging in “civil disobedience, strikes, 
demonstrations”159 and whichever actions are deemed contextually appropriate. Santos 
argues that the success of legal action may be contingent upon the concurrent use of political 
tools. This means that tactical litigation should be understood as one tool to be deployed 
alongside other political tools. 
Santos provides an important starting point from which to understand the relation between 
a movement’s political aims and their engagement in law. We will return to the issue of co-
optation in chapter 3 with a detailed consideration of the functional processes of law and 
their impact on political struggle from below. The present insights about the productive 
interaction between political mobilisation and legal engagements provide the foundation for 
later analysis. 
1.3. Legal pluralism in counter-hegemonic uses of law 
The third insight recognises the role of legal pluralism. Santos criticises the record of 
national legal systems in relation to progressive social reforms but is equally cautious about 
a blanket endorsement of all ‘non-hegemonic’ legal systems. The key issue that Santos 
introduces here is that social struggles must make a decision about where to launch their 
legal challenge, and how non-State legal systems and innovative legal practices might offer 
strategic opportunities. 
Thesis three warns that not all non-hegemonic sites of law are ‘counter-hegemonic’. Having 
advanced a criticism of the modern State, Santos warns that not all legal pluralisms provide 
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the opportunity to challenge the status quo.160 To use Santos’ examples, supra-State law, 
such as the lex mercatoria, may not enjoy the same power as a Nation State but it does 
advance the same politico-economic agenda. Similarly, traditional forms of law ‘from-
below’ – such as indigenous laws or other cultural normative systems - may be more able to 
protect entrenched social hierarchies than offer opportunities for social transformation. The 
lesson for social struggles is that, while traditional State-based legal systems may have failed 
to deliver social transformation, movements ought to recognise that not all legal pluralisms 
are necessarily organised around emancipatory interests. 
The fourth thesis encourages political struggles to use different ‘scales’, or sites, of legality. 
As Santos puts it: “the forms of political mobilisation and their concrete objectives will 
determine which scale must be privileged (local, national, global).”161 This recognises that 
legal systems from the local to national and global level will provide a range of different 
remedies, enforcement capacities and/or symbolic power. Santos endorses legal pluralism 
as an alternative to national and supranational legal systems that have not delivered either 
adequate social reform or more wholesale social transformation. Legal pluralism presents an 
opportunity to pursue legal claims in a legal system that is more receptive to interests that 
could not be accommodated within hegemonic legal systems. For example, if a national legal 
system fails to implement or hollows out labour standards, a legal challenge may be more 
successful in a supranational court that has consistently upheld the importance of a higher 
standard of labour regulation. 
Beyond this practical opportunity to search for a favourable site of legal action, legal 
pluralism enables social groups to engage with legal systems that are more suited to their 
claims. As we have seen, Cover insists in his analysis of social movements that legal 
normativity is plural and needn’t be limited to that which is contained in hegemonic legal 
systems. Legal pluralism represents an opportunity for different social groups to set their 
own legally-binding agendas and/or pursue new interpretations of current laws. For example, 
within national legal systems devolved or parallel legal systems will be able to pursue 
interests at their local level that receive limited concern at the national. In this respect social 
struggles should see legal pluralism as an opportunity to introduce legal claims that might 
not be recognised in other legal systems. 
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We can see from Santos’ theses that ‘pluralism’ is an important factor in legal strategy for 
two reasons. First, it affects decisions about which legal systems will be most receptive to 
certain legal claims. Second, there is a plurality of legal meaning and social movements will 
seek to have their interpretation of what law ought to be recognised and implemented. These 
insights identify the importance for social struggles of engaging with legal systems that 
could recognise their legal claims as belonging to the legal system and provide protections 
for their political actions. However, the theses do not go on to question the capacity of legal 
pluralisms to enforce their normative claims. Santos’ endorsement of legal pluralism does 
not take into account the institutional capacity of non-State legal systems, meaning their 
material and symbolic power to issue socially authoritative legal claims and/or physically 
enforce its decisions. In chapter three we will build on the insights that social struggles ought 
to target legal systems that are capable of satisfying their political objectives by asking 
critical questions of the capacity of different legal systems and its effect on legal strategy. 
1.4. The abstract nature of legal rules: The promise and limit of legal mobilisation 
In thesis eight Santos moves to more abstract explanations of the relation between social 
struggles and hegemonic law. It suggests that in using law as a tool to achieve its political 
aims a social struggle must negotiate law’s ‘excess of meaning’ and ‘deficit of task’. The 
excess of meaning refers to law’s “symbolic expansion through abstract promises” and the 
deficit of task to “the narrowness of concrete achievements”162. We could fill these pages 
discussing the idea of law’s ‘excess of meaning’ and ‘deficit of task’, but we must make do 
with a summary of Santos’ intended usage. These concepts highlight both the opportunity 
and limitations of engaging with law for labour movements. We will see how alternative 
interpretations of law can be used to confront the scope and meaning of existing legal rules 
and why law’s vested interests make these strategic practices difficult. 
The concepts of law’s excess of meaning and deficit of task are key considerations in post-
structuralist analysis of law that recognise an opportunity and limitation for social struggles 
in the determination of law’s content163. While Santos’ reference to these concepts is rooted 
in post-structuralist and post-modern debates I will not enter into the internal preoccupations 
of these traditions. Instead, I will unpack the tension between the emancipatory promise in 
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the excess of meaning the role of entrenched interests in the deficit of task. A detailed 
account of this tension will reveal both the opportunity and limitation inherent to the 
mobilisation of legal claims that is central to this thesis’ investigation. In order to draw out 
the stake of this tension, I will present an understanding of law’s excess of meaning that 
recognises the abstract nature of law as an interpretative opportunity and the warning that 
there will always be an excess of meaning that law cannot include. 
The abstract nature of legal rules refers to their general-applicability. For the avoidance of 
doubt, I am not referring to the ‘generality of law’ which is understood to be a key 
determinant of law’s formal validity and refers to the need for there to be laws164 that are 
publicly available and enable people to act voluntarily and exercise rational social control165. 
This idea of law’s generality is related to but not the same as the idea that legal rules are 
generally-applicable (or abstract). Law’s generality refers to the requirement that a valid 
legal system be governed by publicly available legal rules. In the Fullerian sense of law’s 
formal validity, law is identifiable on the basis of its generality. The general-applicability 
(or abstract nature) of legal rules goes further and explains how a legal system manages 
social complexities by responding to social conflicts using abstract rules that are applicable 
to a range of scenarios. The interesting point here is that there is something in the abstract 
form of law that presents an opportunity for its meaning to be interpreted and re-articulated. 
In what follows we will expand on the fact that legal rules are abstract and universal because 
it provides an important conceptual insight into how law’s form enables social struggles to 
pursue their political goals. 
The lesson that we need to unpack is that social struggles have an opportunity of engaging 
with the content of abstract legal rules so as to benefit from their available remedies. The 
idea of targeting law’s abstract form involves presenting an argument that is recognisable to 
the legal system. In other words, grassroots social struggles should seize on law’s general-
applicability by attempting to frame their political demands within law’s legal symbols or 
by presenting an alternative interpretation of its objective standards166. As such, a politically 
motivated act might be categorised by law as falling within the scope of an abstract rule 
whose available remedies are expedient to a social struggle. 
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This returns to the contention in Santos’ theses and Cover’s jurisgenesis that social struggles 
ought to recognise a plurality of legal meaning in society. The excess of meaning is present 
in the idea that social movements are engaged in the practice of challenging law’s current 
determination by presenting alternative conceptions of what it ought to be. Law can be 
interpreted in a multitude of ways, whether that is grounded in the constitutional text or 
claims about the normative purpose of law. Therefore, the idea that law contains an excess 
of meaning that is not currently represented in concrete legal protections embodies both the 
plurality of legal meaning and the opportunity to redeem certain values and insist on their 
application. 
The types of abstract promises that represent an opportunity can be seen at the level of 
constitutional values. It is a generally held view in constitutional theory that constitutions 
are a repository of values. The normative aims of a society are set out in the constitutional 
text and legal rules ought to embody the aims and spirit of the constitution. The promise of 
abstraction lies in the constitution’s promises about equality, dignity, solidarity, etc. 
Interpretation of the constitutional text is key to drawing on these values and presenting 
arguments about law’s excess of meaning. Attempts to re-insert constitutional values at the 
level of concrete legal protection will challenge the present effects of law’s meaning vis-à-
vis the supposed aims set out in the constitution. For example, if in constitutional abstraction 
the law promises dignity when workers are treated with indignity the law offers a remedy. 
Abstract values such as dignity are a repository of excess meaning that can be used by labour 
movements to present legal arguments about what the law ought to be. 
Moreover, it is not just values but constitutional rights that are sufficiently abstract as to 
offer certain opportunities to present alternative conceptions of what law’s meaning ought 
to be. Constitutions will contain competing rights claims, such as the right to work, right to 
minimum subsistence, right to family life and, the right to private property. The 
implementation and enjoyment of these rights in concrete legal rules will be subject to 
interpretative conflict.  For example, where a legal rule about the re-distribution of property 
aims to satisfy the constitutional right to subsistence and threatens to infringe the rights of 
those that hold property title, we can see that there will be competing legal claims about the 
proper meaning of the constitution’s abstract promises about rights. The abstract nature of 
constitutional values and rights means that their interpretation become a battleground for 
competing normative visions of society. 
  
Chapter 2. Constitutionalism-from-below as strategic opportunity 
55 
Furthermore, in an extreme case, a claimant might not ground their claim about what the law 
ought to be in the constitutional text. In this case the claimant purposefully denies the 
authority and/or substance of the present normative boundaries of law. For example, Nelson 
Mandela’s invocation of an ‘superior law’, a post-apartheid law that stands apart from the 
then law of South Africa167. Law’s excess of meaning here is drawn from a broader 
principled conception of what law ought to value and protect. 
The excess of meaning presents an opportunity for social struggles to contest legal meaning 
and encourage new regulatory standards or rights protections. As Christodoulidis puts it, in 
the determination of law there is a ‘re-entry’ moment where what was previously excess will 
become part of law168. There is, at this moment, a re-determination of the content and/or 
interpretation of the law. Importantly, Christodoulidis’ analysis insists that alongside any 
opportunity in law we must also recognise the inherent danger that comes with ‘excess’. The 
excess of legal meaning also identifies what is outside law, that which has not been 
accommodated within law169. In the act of determining the substance and meaning of a law, 
an alternative interpretation is always left out. 
Law cannot include all interpretations, it must determine which actions are permissible and 
which are proscribed. This begs the question, what prevents law from recognising certain 
interests? For instance, if the constitution is committed to the principle of equality before the 
law and promises to protect both the right to work and to private property, why does law 
offer greater protections to private property and the productive interests of capital than to 
labour? The answer, I will argue, lies in the tension between law’s excess of meaning and 
its deficit of task. 
The tension between law’s emancipatory promise and the content of concrete legal rules is 
essential to an understanding of legal strategy. Santos’ recognition of law’s deficit of task 
draws out two limitations on the opportunity presented by law’s excess of meaning: The 
practical limits on interpretation imposed by available legal rules and the effect of 
entrenched interests on law’s emancipatory promises. 
The first problem is that the scope for social transformation is limited to the legal rules and 
remedies that are already prescribed by law. While it is possible to use law as a tool of social 
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struggles this is limited to the implementation of existing law. Any demands for social 
transformation are rationalised and responded to within law’s finite normative boundaries. 
In other words, law can only respond to a social demand by reference to an existing legal 
rule’s prescribed remedies. For example, a perceived violation of labour standards and claim 
that law ought to provide a higher level of protection needs to be grounded in either a statute 
that guarantees a certain regulatory standard or, as we have previously seen, in the 
constitutional value of dignity and the right to work. There is a practical deficit in law’s task 
that means it only comprehends claims and issues responses on the basis of rules or values 
that can be drawn from existing legal or constitutional sources. 
The deficit of task has a second meaning that explains law’s incapacity to deliver unfettered 
social transformation. The deficit of task refers back to Santos’ conception of law as caught 
between the task of regulation and the promise of emancipation. Emancipation is the promise 
that law will respond to society’s demands and effect the conditions of social transformation. 
Regulation maintains social control through the enforcement of laws that defuse social 
conflicts and maintain social expectations. The tension between these two goals is revealed 
where emancipatory demands come into conflict with entrenched social interests. In 
situations where emancipatory demands threaten to destabilise social expectations the limit 
of what can be done in law – or its deficit of task – is reached. Let us unpack this issue 
further. 
Law is organised around the protection of vested (or, entrenched) social, economic and 
political interests. Law might contain the promises of dignity and equality but the actual 
interpretation and implementation of these values in the form of regulation will be shaped 
by these interests. For example, the liberal constitutions of modernity maintain the social 
and economic interests of productive capital through the inviolability of private property, 
the enforcement of contractual obligations and individual rights that promote formal (cf. 
substantive) freedom and equality170. This means that modern law has been organised around 
the protection of property title and the productive interests of capital and not the 
emancipation of the subaltern. Therefore, the constitutional promises of social emancipation 
are limited to those demands that do not compromise the expectations of dominant social 
interests. 
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The tension between law’s emancipatory potential and the entrenched interests that shape 
regulation says something about what normative claims can and cannot be accommodated 
within law. In practice, social struggles will have to accept certain structural restraints when 
engaging with law. For example, if a legal system is organised around the entrenched 
interests of capital then we can assume that the deficit of task will arise in relation to legal 
claims that seek to radically reform the legal rules relating to economic individualism, 
private property and the productive conditions of capital generally.  For labour movements, 
this means that their legal claims will appear to law within the confines of capital-labour 
relations. They might demand improved labour standards in line with the constitution’s 
commitment to dignity, but a labour movement whose legal strategy interprets the 
constitution as advocating emancipation from the conditions of capitalist exploitation is 
unlikely to be recognised by the legal system of a demo-liberal Nation State. 
Labour movements can draw upon this advice and their legal mobilisations should proceed 
with an awareness of both law’s possibility and its limitations. An awareness of the 
irresolvable tension between the excess of meaning and deficit of task, and the limiting 
effects imposed by the latter, highlights the need to engage with law in a manner that is 
capable of satisfying strategic objectives. In order to expand upon the reality of strategic 
engagements with law and how an ‘excess of meaning’ might be deployed and shaped by 
law’s ‘deficit of task’, chapters three and four will be dedicated to an in-depth and sobering 
analysis of the factors that shape effective engagements with law. 
2 Constitutionalism-from-below and legal strategy: Three concerns 
The theses of subaltern cosmopolitan legality have provided important insights to an 
understanding of the ways that social struggles might engage law from below. In particular, 
the CfB method captures the relation between political struggles with normative demands 
and the challenges that are presented by engagements with State law. In the remainder of 
this chapter I will present an internal critique of CfB that highlights the literature’s 
explanatory limitations and sets out the issues that require further dedicated analysis and 
elaboration. 
I present three concerns about CfB’s current treatment of labour and legal strategy. First, I 
argue that by starting from the presupposition that State institutions cannot deliver social 
transformation CfB has been unable to consider the strategic and tactical engagements 
between social struggles and State law. Santos’ embrace of post-modern criticisms of 
  
Chapter 2. Constitutionalism-from-below as strategic opportunity 
58 
modern legal systems has caused the analytic lens to move hastily toward alternative 
institutional arrangements when legal mobilisation at the national level remains an important 
opportunity for legal reform and protection. A general criticism that runs through the 
following analysis is that in its critical sweep CfB scholarship has been inattentive to 
important legal tools that might have been profitably deployed at the State level. I will set 
out the importance of both strategy and tactics to an understanding of the ways that labour 
movements engage with State law. The distinction between strategy and tactics builds upon 
our conception of legal mobilisation in CfB and provides a framework from which this thesis 
can comprehend both: The relationship between political strategy and legal mobilisation; 
and, evaluate the effectiveness of legal tactics that seek to win legal protections and/or 
reform the organising aims of legal regulation. 
Second, the account of legal mobilisation given in Santos is reliant on abstract principles 
that, I argue, have only a limited explanatory capacity in respect of strategic and tactical 
engagements with law that occur in practice and are subject to contextual contingencies. I 
will set out the need to pair conceptual analysis with empirical study. This will draw out 
CfB’s initial insights about the potentially effective relation between social struggles and 
law and return us to its methodological commitments. 
Third, I evaluate CfB’s approach to labour as a subject of social struggle. I will detail how 
CfB has overlooked the role of labour in social conflict both empirically and normatively. 
Given the fundamental importance of the conflict between labour and capital to the legal, 
political, economic and social relations of contemporary society, I argue that labour’s 
contribution to an understanding of strategic and tactical engagements with law needs to be 
inserted into an understanding of legal mobilisation from-below. 
2.1. State law and legal strategy 
An overreliance on critical accounts of the State in CfB scholarship mean that strategic 
engagements with State law are treated sceptically and it is prematurely dismissed as a site 
of social transformation. Although Santos’ State scepticism reveals important insights about 
the limitations of legal strategy at the State-level; it is both inattentive to instruments that 
could be profitably deployed and misses the ways that labour movements continue to engage 
at this level. In this section I will argue that legal strategy and tactics are key to understanding 
the ways grassroots labour movements engage with State law. By identifying the strategic 
objectives that drive tactical engagements with law we can build a textured conception of 
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legal mobilisation from-below. Before turning to the role of strategy and tactics in effective 
legal engagements, we will assess CfB’s focus on alternative representative formations and 
governance mechanisms. 
In chapter one we considered in detail the importance of Santos’ criticism of modernity to 
his particular approach to legal scholarship. Santos is sceptical of the State due to the failures 
of social reform and the historical facts of social exclusion that have been propagated under 
the conditions of modernity. Rather than approach the tension between regulation and 
emancipation at the national level as something to be engaged with, Santos diagnoses an 
irresolvable tension that mitigates against the State’s capacity to deliver socially 
transformative law171. In setting out this position I will argue that by focusing on alternative 
institutions CfB presents a narrow account of the ways that social struggles engage with law 
in practice. 
A focus on alternative governance mechanisms172 flows from a rejection of the State as a 
site of emancipatory law.173 In pursuit of socially transformative conditions, Santos argues 
for an approach that transcends dominant power relations in society and turns to alternative 
forms of social organising – be it law, market, community – as a site of political and social 
power capable of delivering social transformation174. In his empirical studies, we can find 
numerous examples of this turn away from State-based analysis of social movements. 
Constitutionalism-from-below is focused instead on an array of alternative legal forms from 
the World Social Forum175 to community organisations in Brazilian favelas176 and 
participatory budgeting innovations177. We can learn a great deal from these case studies 
about innovative governing mechanisms178 but very little about the ways social movements 
continue to engage with traditional legal institutions. 
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As Gavin Anderson’s analysis of the literature indicates, constitutionalism-from-below has 
more readily aligned itself with the radical grassroots political struggles of alter-
globalisation179 than the State-based socio-legal tradition. The type of social movements 
envisioned under constitutionalism-from-below are the type that will refuse to engage with 
hegemonic legal systems but engage with ‘unofficial’ legal systems180. In other words, 
constitutionalism-from-below has been methodologically committed to analysing certain 
non-State or post-modern types of legal engagement by social movements. 
In an attempt to draw out the legal experience of socially excluded groups Santos has focused 
on non-Western or post-modern forms of law at the expense of a more rounded consideration 
of how such grassroots social struggles ‘from-below’ will engage with law. In line with this 
approach, Twining has asked critical questions of the division drawn in Santos’ scholarship 
between Western and non-Western epistemology and ontology181, which we can summarise 
as a social group’s knowledge and experience of law. For Twining, Santos too readily aligns 
socially excluded groups, such as indigenous groups, to a non-Western legal experience and 
assumes their complete exclusion from the Western legal tradition. While Twining’s 
argument focuses on the fact that there can be no such distinctions (Western/non-Western) 
in scientific knowledge182, we can also see that in practice no social group can be exclusively 
non-Western, except in extreme circumstances. For example, indigenous groups will engage 
with modern State law and, even if they ultimately reject its structures, their strategic or 
tactical approach to law and politics need not be purely non-Western.  
If CfB is to engage with contemporary experiences of legal mobilisation, its focus on the 
conditions of post-modernity needs to be tempered with analysis of the continued role of 
modern law and politics in social struggles. Rosemary Coombe has questioned Santos’ 
embrace of post-modernism and argued that analysis of society must recognise the 
universalising effects of modern law183.  
 
179 Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (n 13) 903. 
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I fear that it is not enough to recognise the South, go south, and learn from the South… 
It may be too late to disrupt the privilege of the North or displace its assumption of 
perspective as universal. The moment of suffering, the moment of rebellion, and the 
moment of continuity of oppressor and victim may already be too coded by abjection, 
degeneracy, and sentimentality.184 
In other words, post-modern approaches to social struggles may seek to take social struggles 
out of a particular time and place but the effects of identities and structures that are already 
in place are not easily avoided. For example, the use of local or unofficial law may offer an 
opportunity to escape entrenched interests at the State level, but the ubiquity and force of 
modern law means that, in practice, social struggles cannot avoid it and may be forced to 
engage with it to challenge its effects. Therefore, we need an approach to legal mobilisation 
‘from-below’ that is sensitive to both the plural sites in which groups will make legal claims 
and the continued role of State legal systems in both determining social relations and as a 
site of legal action by grassroots social struggles. 
I do not deny the veracity of Santos’ critique of modernity; his analysis provides important 
guidance about the limitations of engagements with law from-below. However, we must be 
aware of the tendency in Santos to focus on post-State alternatives when, in practice, social 
struggles continue to engage existing legal systems. If the constitutionalism-from-below 
literature is to properly conceive how social struggles engage with law in practice; it cannot 
exclude State law on the basis of preconceived scholarly scepticism about its effectiveness. 
While such scepticism should inform an understanding of the limitations at the national 
level, with regard to the role of law’s protection of property title and capital interests, we 
cannot comprehend the ways that labour movements engage with law using an approach to 
social struggle that pays insufficient consideration to the realistic conditions of struggle in 
the Nation State. On the contrary, we require an approach that learns from theoretical and 
conceptual inquiry but is informed by empirical legal analysis and equally sensitive to the 
pragmatic reality of social, political and legal struggle. 
In order to grasp the ways that grassroots social struggles will engage with State law, we 
must turn to an issue that is central to this thesis- the role of strategy and tactics in effective 
legal engagements. In the following analysis, I will present an understanding of legal 
strategy as referring to long-term political objectives and tactics as an instrumentalisation of 
law for the purpose of providing important legal protections. This will highlight an important 
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distinction between the objectives that motivate legal engagements and the types of legal 
action that are taken in pursuit of them. This will also provide a framework from which to 
evaluate the type and effectiveness of legal engagements and whether they contribute toward 
strategic objectives. Moreover, the dynamic interaction between tactics and strategy will 
provide further insight into both the opportunity and limitation of legal mobilisation at the 
State level. 
Robert Knox185 has drawn attention to the tendency in scholarship to blur the lines between 
long-term strategic objectives and tactical engagements with law: 
[S]trategy concerns the manner in which we achieve and eventually fulfil our long 
term aims or objectives, whereas tactics concerns the methods through which we 
achieve our shorter term aims or objectives.186  
The ‘manner’ of a strategic engagement with law, as we shall expand upon below, does not 
submit to the terms of legal argument set by the legal system but involves a wider structural 
critique of the law itself. Whereas, the ‘method’ of tactical engagements involves 
instrumentalising existing legal provisions. A problem arises, according to Knox, where 
tactical methods are misunderstood as strategy. This refers to a scenario where a ‘strategic’ 
engagement with law uses (as its ‘method’) the terms set out in law without having a longer-
term political aim. For Knox, when there is no wider critique of the legal system 
engagements with law are merely tactical.  
Knox uses the example that those who argued against the 2003 Iraq invasion because it was 
‘illegal’ in international law ceded to the terms of liberal legalism and abandoned the 
political and ethical arguments against invasion187. In this sense, the decision to use 
international law as a means to prevent the invasion was tactical and “the adoption of liberal 
legalism was in fact an implicit capitulation to liberal legalism.”188 On this basis, tactics need 
not be excluded from a social struggle’s playbook as the instrumentalisation of law may 
provide important protections. However, tactical engagements should proceed with an 
awareness that such actions lack a lasting critical edge and reinforce both existing legal 
structures and law’s legitimate authority. 
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Tactical engagements with law might cede to its organising assumptions and offer limited 
critique of its structures but, the instrumentalisation of law can deliver important protections. 
Taking this stance involves letting go of the stricter theoretical concerns about legitimising 
existing legal structures and focusing on the practical opportunities provided in law which 
can be engaged to the benefit of a social movement. For example, a letter condemning the 
Iraq invasion may be criticised for lacking a deeper structural critique of international law 
but its provisions might have satisfied the ends of preventing an invasion. 
A further important element of tactical engagement introduced by Knox is ‘principled 
opportunism’ which involves a situation where the law is used tactically but for the purpose 
of a longer-term political strategy. Knox’s account of tactical opportunism is tied to a wider 
Marxist debate about the reasons for and against engaging with liberal legal systems189. 
While this literature provides important consideration to the theoretical complexities of legal 
engagement and its potential contribution to either reformism or revolution; I do not propose 
to engage with it beyond its contribution to an understanding of the distinction between 
strategy and tactic. 
To comprehend tactical opportunism’s role in effective social struggle let us consider as an 
example Jacques Vergès’ ‘strategy of rupture’190. As the defence lawyer for members of the 
Algerian National Liberation Front, Vergès engaged with the French legal system with the 
purpose of exemplifying the contradictions of implementing French Criminal Law in 
Algeria. Vergès argued that the imposition of the State of Exception by the French 
Government exposed the truth of the conflict as one between Algerian identity and French 
colonialism, as opposed to the French Government’s attempts to subordinate matters to an 
ordinary instance covered by criminal law. Moreover, Vergès’ decision to highlight the use 
of torture by French officials and the flagrant rights abuses this involved challenged the idea 
that a violation of the criminal law was at issue in the cases brought against the ANLF. 
Vergès’ engagement with law was tactical in so far as it involved engaging with the terms 
of law, but it was opportunistic and served a wider political strategy in so far as it sought to 
draw out French Law’s internal contradictions, subvert its legitimate authority191, and 
present a political critique of the law to the wider public192. The example, although extreme, 
shows how a political struggle with a critical approach to State law and political objectives 
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that radically challenge its vested interests may still find an opportunity to engage effectively 
with it. 
For a labour movement, law might offer certain protections that do not challenge the 
structures of capital-labour relations but do, nonetheless, provide an opportunity to pursue 
either a wider political aim or insist on specific legal remedies. For example, lawful 
industrial action might provide a legally defensible position from which to challenge the 
present state of work regulations, from low-pay to insecure pension funds. The proposed 
industrial action might not deliver a structural critique of law’s protection of capital interests 
and, there may be concerns that taking lawful industrial action accepts and legitimises 
current industrial action legislation that is heavily weighted against the mobilisation of 
labour. However, it does offer an opportunity to challenge legal rules and present a political 
critique of the market logic193 that has replaced legal/constitutional values as the rationale 
for legal rules. Above all, lawful industrial action remains a tactic that provides employees 
with a legal right and political opportunity to pursue either a long-term strategic objective 
or, insist on the implementation of existing rights and standards. Therefore, as a tactical 
engagement with law it offers the opportunity of greater, and much needed, legal protection 
in the short-term but also carries with it a wider critique of law’s present objectives. 
Having set out the basis for legal tactics, let us return to the role of strategy and how its 
political objectives dovetail with tactical actions. As we have seen above, while legal 
strategy that does not contain a broader structural critique submits to the dictates of the legal 
system; a ‘critical’ strategy is one that engages with law for the purpose of challenging its 
content. As Knox puts it: 
Critical scholars can help shape the direction of campaigns of other radicals, who often 
cleave to a rhetoric of liberal legalism, seemingly by default. In this way, critical 
scholars can attempt to shape the debate, without reinforcing the very legalism which 
needs to be undermined.194 
The presence of a critique of the legal system and a long-term aim to challenge its 
organisational interests are the markers of a critical legal strategy, or one whose objectives 
are not limited to reproducing the legal system along its current structural and substantive 
lines. Importantly, a legal strategy’s aim may be to subvert the legal order but the practices 
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that are taken in its name may take the form of tactical engagements that appear, ostensibly, 
to present a limited political critique. Drawing on insights from Rosa Luxemburg, Knox 
states that: 
[T]he only way in which the social democratic movement is not simply one that 
engages in ‘a vain effort to repair the capitalist order’ is in its strategic goal of 
overthrowing this capitalist order.195 
For instance, the long-term strategic goal may be a legal order that is organised around the 
protection of labour, however the barriers to such a radical outcome mean that, in practice, 
a labour movement will seek shorter-term reforms and protections. At this stage, we need to 
synthesise how these insights about strategy and tactics inform an understanding of the ways 
that labour movements will engage with national legal systems. In practice, the strategic 
aims of labour movements will often be somewhat less radical than the sort envisioned 
above. Few labour movements will, realistically, aim toward the overthrow of capitalism 
and/or propose a revolutionary agenda. For this reason, I propose that strategic aims are more 
likely to be pitched at the level of constitutional values and attempt to re-balance the relations 
between capital and labour. This will, no doubt, be received with criticism from Knox who 
has insisted on strategy being tied to more radical structural critiques. However, in light of 
the practical difficulties involved with a revolution, we can better comprehend legal strategy 
by taking a more nuanced approach and accept the less radical but materially significant 
aims of contemporary labour movements. This shift also returns our concern to more 
recognisable legal analysis at the State level. This does not mean abandoning Knox’s 
insights; on the contrary, the lesson that strategy and tactics will be paired with a wider 
political aim is essential. The political objective of strategy may not be to overthrow 
capitalism but to insist on the constitutional values of solidarity and dignity, to re-balance 
the relation between the right to work, and to challenge those legal rules that prioritise the 
productive interests of capital.  
The aim of this section has been to redeem the State level as a key site of struggle for 
contemporary social movements and encourage further analysis of State law’s capacity to 
deliver social reforms and protections. CfB scholarship has not considered the role of 
strategy and tactics at the national level because it has started from the position that the State 
is incapable of delivering social transformation. The first step in our conception of effective 
engagements has been to comprehend the productive interaction between tactical 
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engagements with State law and social movements’ political objectives. In sum, strategic 
objectives are enabled through tactical engagements with law. It is an exercise in challenging 
the present content of law and attempting to institute an alternative set of rules and 
organisational aims. In the remaining chapters of the thesis I will consider: How strategic 
and tactical engagements with law play out in practice? What factors constitute an effective 
engagement with law? And, what does this tell us about the opportunities and limitations of 
action within law? In chapter 3 we will address these issues by drawing on the insights from 
socio-legal mobilisation scholarship. 
2.2. CfB and contextual analysis 
In the first part of this chapter I set out the important insights of CfB to an understanding of 
legal strategy by social struggles, and in the beginning of the second I argued that an 
investigation into effective legal strategy needs to pay more attention to strategic and tactical 
engagements at the national-level. In the remaining two subsections I set out two further 
issues that will shape the research agenda for the remainder of the thesis. In the next section 
we will consider the need for a detailed focus on the relation between labour and legal 
mobilisation as an instance of constitutionalism from-below. Before that, I argue that a 
representative conception of the relation between labour movements and law will require us 
to move from abstract concepts to context-specific analysis of the ways that legal strategy 
will be deployed in practice. Indeed, we will need to bring conceptual and empirical insights 
together to re-connect Santos and constitutionalism-from-below to their original insight 
about the political and legal potential of engaging with hegemonic legal systems. 
In part one we analysed Santos’ theses and drew out important insights about: The potential 
effectiveness of legal engagement, the need to politicise the content of law, the opportunities 
presented by legal pluralism, and the opportunity in law’s excess and the limitations of its 
deficit. These conceptual insights have provided both a methodological approach that values 
legal mobilisation ‘from-below’ and recognised the potentially productive outcome of legal 
engagements that are paired with a broader political objective. However, the explanatory 
capacity of grand theory and abstraction extends only so far when we are dealing with legal 
engagements that will occur in practice. 
To build upon our conceptual analysis, we need to move to a more sobering consideration 
of what constitutes an effective engagement with law. A suitable approach will be sensitive 
to the reality of social struggles and how labour movement’s strategic and tactical 
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engagements occur in the context of legal, political, social and economic contingencies. Our 
analysis will need to consider those factors that determine the effectiveness of legal 
mobilisation such as, the capacity for a movement to present cognisable legal arguments, the 
opportunities presented by either legislative provisions or constitutional values, and the 
socio-political context, etc. We can only improve our conception of legal strategy by 
introducing specific questions about: How labour movements ought to frame their 
engagements with law? What legal systems will prove productive? And, how can strategic 
and tactical engagements with law hold onto their political objectives? 
In order to answer these questions, we will move from conceptual analysis of the opportunity 
to engage with law from-below to mid-level analysis that prioritises practical insights from 
socio-legal mobilisation literature and empirical analysis. A great deal of empirical work has 
been encouraged and delivered by Santos and the constitutionalism-from-below literature 
with case studies on popular assemblies in Brazil196, the World Social Forum197, the legal 
strategy of the MST198, and trade union organising in Mexico199. A unique characteristic of 
constitutionalism-from-below scholarship has been its use of specific examples of 
organising that have shone a light onto previously unseen and unknown legal practices. 
However, as I have argued above (2.1), the focus in these case studies are alternative forms 
of social, political and legal organising. In the CfB literature there has been, as yet, limited 
analysis of a labour movements’ continued engagement with national legal systems.  
In the final chapter of this thesis we will analyse how a labour movement in Argentina 
engaged with law and evaluate its strategic and tactical decisions in relation to its social, 
political and material context. This will provide an opportunity to bring together our 
conceptual and empirical analysis and forge an understanding of legal strategy at the national 
level as one that is both theoretically informed and adaptable to the practical realities of legal 
mobilisation. 
2.3. Labour and constitutionalism-from-below: An absent political subject? 
In spite of CfB’s concern for counter-hegemonic grassroots struggles, labour has not been 
identified as a central protagonist in either political or legal mobilisations from-below. The 
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normative absence of labour is problematic because labour has been and remains central to 
the activity of social struggle and, in particular the fundamental social struggle in modern 
societies between capital and labour in particular. If CfB is to offer insights about the ways 
that labour movements have engaged with law, it must be included within its normative 
approach to social struggle and receive adequate case study analysis. In this section I will 
set out how labour has been excluded normatively and empirically in CfB, and why this 
matters to an understanding of the political and legal mobilisation of grassroots social 
struggle. 
Before we begin it is necessary to qualify my criticism of CfB’s lack of concern for labour. 
Labour’s absence can be partially explained by Santos and other CfB scholars’ suspicion 
about trade unions and all organised labour movements in the first world. Trade unions have 
ensured their own workers’ interests at the expense of workers in the third world, or failed 
to deliver emancipatory conditions for their workers due to, for example, their close relations 
to employer interests. In the analysis that follows, I recognise that some CfB scholars have 
recognised the role of labour movements in social struggles, and that CfB is not inimitable 
to the study of labour as a social struggle per se. Indeed, the potential contribution of the 
CfB method to an understanding of the ways that labour has engaged with law ‘from-below’ 
is explicit in my preceding analysis. However, it is necessary to highlight a gap in CfB 
scholarship with respect to labour’s role in legal mobilisation ‘from-below’. 
2.3.1. Empirical absence of labour 
In this section, I will show that labour has been largely absent from CfB’s case studies of 
alter-globalisation movements and, where labour has been the subject of analysis it has not 
considered the role of legal strategy or legal mobilisation. CfB’s methodological approach 
is dedicated to uncovering new understandings of the innovative ways that social struggles 
have engaged with law as a tool against social exclusion and for social emancipation. There 
is, however, an empirical gap in CfB’s analysis concerning the ways that labour movements 
have engaged effectively with law from-below. I will argue that, empirically, labour remains 
a protagonist in contemporary social struggles which ought to be reflected in our analyses 
of grassroots political struggles and their legal engagements. In what follows I will highlight 
this absence and set out the need for a renewed focus on labour as a key subject in the study 
of legal mobilisation ‘from-below’. 
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There are case studies in the literature that document how labour movements have been 
engaged in counter-hegemonic struggles against neoliberal globalisation, however it is 
transnational pluralism and activism that are the central analytic focus, with limited concern 
given to the role of labour as a specific form of political struggle from below and its 
engagement in legal mobilisation. For example, Rodriguez-Garavito’s200 analysis of the 
workers’ struggle for trade union recognition in Kukdong is an excellent study of 
transnational political mobilisation’s capacity to apply pressure and influence favourable 
political and legal outcomes at the national level. This is representative of the tendency in 
constitutionalism-from-below case studies to focus on political activism or alternative legal 
institutions at the expense of greater concern for more traditional forms of social struggle. 
In section 2.1 and 2.2 we noted the limited concern for the State, but here we can see that 
even where labour has been the subject of struggle the analysis has focused on the alternative 
forms of CfB. CfB’s commitment to uncovering the innovative practices and potentialities 
of legal and political organising by grassroots movements would benefit from an additional 
focus on labour and the continued importance of the State. 
Labour movements have played a historic role in political struggles against socio-economic 
oppression wrought by dominant social classes. They have won important reforms to 
working standards in the legal and political systems that had enabled the conditions of 
oppression and excluded labour and other social groups from the structures of political 
representation201. There is ample analysis of labour’s historical202 and contemporary role in 
political struggle203 and sociological analysis of labour’s present problematic204. All of 
which provide excellent insights about the contemporary challenges facing workers and the 
wider struggle for alternatives to neoliberal globalisation and legal and political structures 
that are not consumed by ‘total market’ thinking205. However, labour has been given a 
peripheral role in much scholarship documenting and theorising contemporary grassroots 
struggles against neoliberal globalisation. 
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Santos and other CfB scholars are not alone in focusing on social struggles in general terms 
without paying specific attention to labour’s potential to confront the present politico-
economic and legal status quo. For example, in each of Pleyers206 and Falk’s207 leading texts 
on alter-globalisations there are few mentions of labour208. While the spectre of capital and 
its devastating effects are never far from their diagnoses, labour is no protagonist in their 
proposed solutions. In spite of labour often bearing the brunt of capital’s insistence on a race 
to the bottom in regulatory standards and maximisation of the profit motive, labour’s 
political agency and collective strength in challenging market diktats and changes to work 
is passed over at the expense of generalised diagnoses and calls for pan-social forms of 
resistance. As such, beyond applying general conceptions of the relation between social 
struggles and law to labour, we have a limited analysis of the ways that contemporary labour 
movements have engaged with law. I do not intend to diagnose the reasons for such a broad 
trend, each author has their own research aims and foci, however, we can identify a move 
away from labour in studies of alternative political and legal futures and a need to bring 
labour back to the forefront of our analysis. 
In setting an agenda for the type of analysis that is required we can draw upon the influence 
of Ronaldo Munck209 whose approach to globalisation places labour movements at the centre 
of any future struggle against global capital. Munck’s analysis stands out from those 
highlighted above because it identifies the role of labour movements in transformative 
political struggles and recognises their desire to contest the undignified working conditions 
imposed by neoliberal globalisation.  
Workers are clearly divided by national, regional, gender, ethnic and other fault-lines. 
The growing internationalization of capitalist rule may increase competition along 
national, regional and even city lines, but globalization has also created a more 
numerous global working class and, arguably, a common focus for workers 
worldwide.210 
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Munck has argued that labour is uniquely placed to challenge the smooth functioning of 
neoliberal globalisation owing to its position in a globalised economic supply chain. We are 
told that alter-globalisation struggles need not necessarily occur at the global level, but that 
labour has an opportunity to organise local interventions that have transnational 
consequences211. To support his claims Munck provides three examples, one of which is the 
industrial action taken by the United Auto Workers in the United States in response to 
General Motor’s attempts to change working conditions and impose ‘downsizing’ measures. 
The strikes had a significant impact on the production and supply chains of General Motors 
and exemplified how localised action in Flint, Michigan could have global consequences212. 
As Munck states: 
A strike by barely 9,000 UAW members in a small US community in a matter of days 
had impacted on 27 of the 29 GM assembly plants in North America, Mexico and 
Singapore… The company lost nearly US$2.5 billion and half a million vehicles as a 
result of this dispute. By successfully mapping the production and supplier chains of 
the multinational corporations, workers were able to locate the pressure points that 
they all inevitably possess… The power of the local to impact on the new global 
capitalism is clear from the GM strike.213 
In sum, Munck shows how labour confronts the conditions of neoliberal globalisation in 
practice. Although the example details politico-economic and not legal forms of struggle, 
the mobilisation of labour as a political group is recognised as a protagonist of contemporary 
social struggle. Munck’s analysis refocuses our attention to the specific experience of labour 
and its practical role in constituting new political and legal alternatives to globalisation. The 
next step in understanding the potential effectiveness of labour movements is to analyse its 
specific strategic and tactical engagements with law and politics, and the role of contextual 
factors. 
2.3.2. Normative absence of labour 
In this section, I argue that labour’s engagement in the field of human activity means that it 
ought to be central to our analysis of social struggle ‘from-below’. The importance and 
specificity of labour to an understanding of social struggles is rooted in the centrality of work 
to human life, all societies are built on labour and as a political subject it has played a historic 
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role in social reform214. A sufficient account of labour’s constitutive potential will require a 
normative concern for labour that identifies its specific demands for and approach to legal 
and political organising ‘from below’. 
The reason, I argue, for labour’s normative absence in Santos’ analysis is due to a definition 
of ‘social exclusion’ that shapes the scope and focus of his research. The problem, from the 
perspective of labour, in Santos’ analysis is that radical social exclusion is viewed in formal 
terms which privileges an analytic concern for those without legal and political standing and 
excludes a more nuanced consideration of the substantive marginalisation experienced by 
other social groups. This is not to discredit the insights that Santos’ concern for the subaltern 
have uncovered, on the contrary, this is an internal critique of CfB that attempts to expand 
its methodological reach. In order to comprehend the normative focus in Santos and the 
absence of labour we need to consider his turn to ‘abyssal thinking’ which represents his 
more recent conception of social exclusion. 
In early Santos215, the political subject is generalised as the ‘counter-hegemonic’ or 
‘subaltern’ and, while there are few explicit references to labour it can be included within 
the concept of subaltern cosmopolitan legality and its insights applied to labour, as I have 
done in the first part of this chapter. However, in later work the subject of social struggle has 
been refined to focus on those that suffer ‘abyssal exclusion’216 and how social groups 
struggle against it. For Santos, the abyssal distinction of modern society is between social 
inclusion (regulation/emancipation), on the one hand, and exclusion 
(appropriation/violence), on the other217. The latter introduces a new distinction to the former 
which we considered at length in chapter one. The social experience of appropriation and 
violence was introduced in Santos’ more recent work to temper his more optimistic 
conceptions of the tension between regulation-emancipation, and to bring un-redressable 
social exclusion within the analytic frame of socio-legal studies. 
Modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking. It consists of a system of visible and 
invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible ones. The 
invisible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social reality into 
two realms, the realm of “this side of the line” and the realm of “the other side of the 
line.” The division is such that “the other side of the line” vanishes as reality, becomes 
nonexistant, and is indeed produced as nonexistant. Nonexistant means not existing in 
 
214 Supiot (n 1) 93–7; Hobsbawm (n 202) 267. 
215 See Chapter 1 for distinction between Santos’ earlier and more recent scholarly focus. 
216 Santos, Epistemologies of the South (n 115) 118–124. 
217 ibid 125. 
  
Chapter 2. Constitutionalism-from-below as strategic opportunity 
73 
any relevant or comprehensible way of being. Whatever is produced as nonexistant is 
radically excluded because it lies beyond the realm of what the accepted conception 
of inclusion considers to be its other.218 
The purpose of these distinctions, for Santos, is to reveal the radical inclusion and exclusion 
that organises the contemporary social experience of law. Abyssal social exclusion is defined 
by the absence of political representation, rights protection or means of legal redress219. 
While societies, or aspects of social life, that are still governed by the tension between legal 
regulation and social emancipation can be considered ‘included’ or open to democratic 
decision-making; those societies, or aspects of social life, that are ordered by the logic of 
appropriation or violence are excluded from the decision-making process. Following Santos’ 
examples, the excluded are not citizens but refugees, migrant workers or terrorists. And, 
their claims are not ‘visible’ to the included because they do not have a voice within the 
logic of regulation/emancipation.  
Importantly, for Santos, the abyssal line represents a radical exclusion of those on the abyssal 
side220. By centring on the abyssal Santos’ attention shifts away from social transformation 
within the Nation State and onto alternative means of representation that mitigate the 
experience of exclusion from modern law and politics. Traditional organised labour or even 
ad hoc labour movements that occur at the State level does not qualify as abyssally excluded 
where they enjoy access to rights and have some form of political representation. Whereas 
workers in sweatshops of the global South and the undocumented migrant worker in Europe 
are abyssally excluded, their lack of citizenship rights and restricted labour protections mean 
they suffer radical, or abyssal, exclusion from legal and political systems. 
Non-abyssal exclusion is at the fringes of Santos’ analysis. As such, labour movements in 
the ‘global north’221 are not given any specific treatment because they fall outside the frame 
of abyssal social exclusion. The central concern is radical abyssal exclusion, with the 
political and social exclusion of groups within Nation States left largely unconsidered. For 
example, an unemployed worker sacked for challenging new ‘efficiency-savings’ falls in the 
schema of non-abyssal exclusion as they still enjoy access to political representation and 
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have rights, even if the level of legal protection or access to political representation is being 
rapidly undercut. It is because organised labour is not invisible to the legal and political 
structures of representation and is the subject of certain rights that labour as a social struggle 
from-below has fallen outside of Santos’ analytic lens. The problem, for our purposes, with 
Santos’ abyssal line is it enlarges the plight of the abyssally excluded but cannot capture the 
social experience of those groups that are formally included within the State’s legal and 
political institutions but suffer substantively from economic, political and legal inequality. 
As a result of this specific conception of social exclusion, Santos’ approach to contemporary 
social struggles is focused exclusively on those that contest radical social exclusion, and, in 
particular, on pan-social forms of organising. The problem, I will argue, is this narrow 
approach is built on an ostensibly agreeable principle but fails to contend with the realities 
of contemporary social struggle. Santos claims that social struggles by non-abyssally 
excluded social groups need to be repurposed according to the principle that their practices 
provide positive effects to the abyssally excluded. This stems from the following rationale: 
[A]s long as abyssally defined exclusion persists, no really progressive postcapitalist 
alternative is possible.222 
For Santos, social struggles for liberation or improved conditions are insufficient so long as 
their successes are not shared by all excluded populations equally. For example, Santos 
suggests drawing on the political strength of labour and tying its claims to women’s rights, 
environmental protection, cultural and social protections, etc223. This sets the scene for 
Santos’ normative support for a collective universal subject as the means to tackle social 
exclusion. This idea is premised on “a global emergence resulting from the fusion of local, 
progressive struggles with the aim of maximising their emancipatory potential in loco 
(however defined) through translocal/local linkages.”224 There is a lot underpinning these 
assertions and it is beyond our present task to unpack the breadth of Santos’ intention in 
detail, however, for our purposes his proposal argues that what is required is a unification of 
all victims of social exclusion in a collective global struggle for social transformation. 
It is difficult to disagree, in principle, with Santos’ fundamental claim that social groups with 
legal and political standing should not take actions that do not also benefit those that are 
abyssally excluded. However, in practice, we need to recognise that political and legal 
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struggle will take different forms depending on the specific grievance and normative demand 
of a social group. In other words, there are autonomous social groups (e.g., labour) that will 
take group-specific actions tailored to their grievance/demand. Contemporary social 
struggles from-below do not necessarily compound abyssal exclusion but challenge the 
conditions of non-abyssal exclusion. For instance, labour will have specific normative 
demands directed toward re-ordering their social relation with capital, be it concerns about 
labour standards, the shift towards contractual precarity, or the insecurity of pensions, etc. 
These are all important demands and representative of labour’s struggle against social 
exclusion. 
The demand that we consider only those social struggles that are paired with a struggle 
against radical social exclusion risks leaving us with a restricted account of social struggles 
‘from below’. In sum, by viewing social struggle from the perspective of a universal subject 
motivated solely by combatting abyssal exclusion we don’t begin to engage with the myriad 
of social struggles by groups that are formally included with legal and political systems but 
substantively excluded. CfB ought to be capable of recognising the condition of abyssal 
exclusion without compromising its capacity to analyse the ways that supposed rights 
holders and citizens engage with legal and political structures. 
The absence of labour is not merely the consequence of conceptual barriers or a focus on 
universal social struggle. Santos has presented a more pointed critique of labour that 
contrasts its normative demands with the call for universal struggle against radical social 
exclusion. 
A postabyssal [sic] conception of Marxism (in itself, a good exemplar of abyssal 
thinking) will claim that the emancipation of workers must be fought for in conjunction 
with the emancipation of all the discardable populations of the global South, which are 
oppressed but not directly exploited by global capitalism. It will also claim that the 
rights of citizens are not secured as long as noncitizens go on being treated as 
subhumans… The recognition of the persistence of abyssal thinking is thus the 
conditio sine qua non to start thinking and acting beyond it. Without such recognition, 
critical thinking will remain a derivative thinking that will go on reproducing the 
abyssal lines, no matter how antiabyssal [sic] it proclaims itself.225 
The target of Santos’ attack is not a particular variant of Marxism but the category ‘working 
class’ and its specific normative demands that perpetuate the distinction between abyssal 
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and non-abyssal social groups. While the earlier Santos recognised the role of different social 
groups and their engagements with hegemonic law, the latter shift to the post-abyssal 
thinking takes a more radical form that views progressive social struggle in purely radical 
non-Western terms. Santos argues that there must be a “radical break with modern Western 
ways of thinking and acting” which means moving away from Western social groupings and 
struggling for an “subaltern insurgent cosmopolitanism”. We can see in plain view here the 
reason for labour’s exclusion from Santos’ schema. Marxism and working-class 
internationalism come in for criticism because they are Western ways of thinking. They are 
seen as couched within a Western tradition that does not speak on behalf of the oppressed 
and fails to struggle against the conditions of abyssal exclusion. 
As I stated in the introduction to this section, Santos’ scepticism about the emancipatory 
aims of organised labour ought to be understood in the context of the failures of trade unions 
in the first world and the subsequent mistrust about their political and legal intentions. For 
example, the close relation between trade unions and entrenched capital interests prevented 
the former from pursuing a genuinely radical agenda in line with the principles of the labour 
movement. And, at certain times trade unions may have pursued policies of economic 
nationalism that had a detrimental effect on workers in the third world.  
The charge against labour is that as a social group it has had a tendency to further their own 
self-interest to the detriment of others. These generalisations make sense if directed at 
particular examples of working class struggle whose actions have had a negative impact on 
social groups elsewhere. For example, labour unions that disregarded the environmental 
impacts of certain industrial ventures owing to their positive effects on employment. 
However, this assumption is not generally-applicable and is falsifiable according to both 
historical fact and labour’s normative commitment to solidarity with other social struggles. 
The normative point of the labour movement is centred around the struggle for human 
dignity. And, while the focus of Marx’s analysis was the oppression suffered by workers at 
the behest of capital and not the oppression of other social groups such as indigenous 
populations, this does not mean Marx should be read as promoting social exclusion for all 
social groups apart from the working class. 
Furthermore, Santos groups ‘working-class internationalism’ within a ‘long tradition in 
Western culture’ along with earlier universalising ideas of the res publica christiana and 
Renaissance humanism that have culminated in expansionism, colonialism and 
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imperialism’226. Working-class internationalism is presented here as perpetuating a Western 
form of cosmopolitanism that does not serve the interests of oppressed groups. And yet, 
working-class struggles have been avowedly internationalist and have extended their 
solidarity to other socially excluded groups. In fact, historical examples of labour 
internationalism227 have followed Santos’ prescription that social struggles must aim for 
emancipation in other locales. For example, the refusal of Scottish workers to repair Rolls-
Royce engines that had been used in the coup d’état against Chile’s Socialist government. 
Indeed, there are numerous historical and ongoing examples of such international 
solidarity228. 
Santos’ conception of abyssal exclusion uncovers a radical perspective on social exclusion 
and struggle but, we need to introduce some nuance if we are to include labour movements 
at the State level into the CfB method. CfB provides the methodological tools to engage with 
the relation between law and social struggles ‘from-below’ but it needs to be careful not to 
pass over the experience of social struggles at the State level. In the remainder of this thesis 
I will draw on these insights and re-insert labour as a social group that struggles against the 
conditions of their legal, political and social exclusion. 
3 Conclusion 
This thesis seeks to comprehend the ways that labour movements engage effectively with 
law. A central issue to this investigation is the extent to which law can be deployed against 
itself, or to put it otherwise, how legal arguments can be used to challenge the content of 
existing legal rules. In this chapter, I have drawn on Santos’ theses of subaltern cosmopolitan 
legality and synthesised four important insights about the ways that social struggles engage 
with law.  
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CfB scholarship has recognised the potentially productive relation between hegemonic law 
and social struggles and set out a conceptual account of the opportunities and limitations of 
engaging with law ‘from-below’. This first insight recognised the importance of legal 
engagements by social struggles to the CfB method. The second insight highlighted the 
essential relation between political strategy and legal mobilisation that runs throughout CfB 
scholarship. The role of political action and the importance of politicising the content of law 
provide important lessons about the form and nature of effective legal strategy. For instance, 
civil demonstrations and other forms of political action and publicity enable social struggles 
to draw legal conflicts outside of law’s restrictive and self-referential framework and into 
the realm of politics. As such, the nature of the conflict is transformed into a matter of socio-
political significance beyond the courtroom. We will return continually in the forthcoming 
chapters to the need for effective legal mobilisation to politicise the terms of legal 
engagement and the content of law. Importantly, we will need to consider in more detail the 
ways that legal disputes are politicised and the extent to which political action might affect 
legal processes. 
A third insight from CfB has been to recognise the potential importance of legal pluralism 
to social struggles. This introduces the opportunity to engage with legal orders that will be 
more accommodating to certain legal claims. The potential for legal strategy to shape legal 
and political systems need not occur at the national level to be considered effective, the 
plurality of contemporary legal orders that are organised around their respective interests – 
be it, the protection of human rights, market-freedoms, etcetera - represent opportunities for 
social struggles to present legal arguments and receive potentially favourable judgments. 
The concepts of excess of meaning and deficit of task provided a fourth insight. The former 
highlights the interpretative opportunity in legal argument and identifies law and the 
constitutional text as a repository of emancipatory promises. At the level of constitutional 
values (dignity, equality, solidarity, etc) social struggles can challenge the present scope and 
content of legal rules as failing to meet the standards set out in the constitution. The plurality 
of legal meaning, or the capacity for the law to be interpreted otherwise, is an essential 
characteristic of potentially effective legal strategy that targets constitutional and legal 
change. The deficit of task, on the other hand, introduces an important limitation on the 
interpretative opportunities in law. The entrenched interests that determine the 
organisational aims of law, such as the inviolability of private property and the productive 
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interests of capital, impose a limitation on the types of legal arguments that will be capable 
of challenging existing legal rules. 
The relation between law’s excess of meaning and deficit of task highlights a critical tension 
between the emancipatory promises of constitutional values and the law’s protection of 
certain interests. The political aims of a social struggle will have to be reconciled with the 
insight that only certain interpretations of the law and constitutional values will be 
recognised by a legal system. Or, to put it otherwise, the deficit in law’s task exposes a 
threshold for legal claims that can be accommodated without infringing entrenched interests. 
The challenge for the study of legal strategy is to consider the effect of this threshold on the 
effectiveness of legal mobilisation by social struggles, and whether, under certain conditions, 
strategic and tactical engagements with law can challenge law’s protection of entrenched 
interests. The answer to these issues drives at this thesis’ preoccupation with the potential 
for labour movements to re-constitute the legal relation between capital and labour. 
In order to build on these key insights from CfB, the second part of this chapter has 
considered the issues that require further elaboration if we are to provide a detailed 
conception of the ways that labour movements engage effectively with law. I have presented 
an internal critique of CfB that considers three concerns about its present approach to legal 
mobilisation from below.  
First, CfB’s embrace of State scepticism passes over the continued importance of strategy 
and tactics at the Nation State level. While a guiding assumption of post-modernism is that 
alternative forms of law already exist and require scholarly attention229, this shift in attention 
should not dispense with the potential effectiveness of engagements with State law. In order 
to recognise the opportunity and limitation of legal mobilisation at the State level, we will 
analyse its capacity to provide short-term legal protections and/or insert new legal meanings 
over time. The remainder of this thesis will be dedicated to drawing out the factors that affect 
both strategic and tactical engagements with law and, how the productive interaction 
between them reveals the potential of law in the struggle for political objectives. 
Second, at present, CfB provides an important conceptual account of the relation between 
hegemonic law and social struggles. In order to build on its methodological commitments, 
we will bring together CfB’s more abstract accounts of legal mobilisation with empirical 
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legal analysis. This will provide a textured account of strategy and tactics that is responsive 
to the contextual factors that will shape their effectiveness. 
Third, labour’s empirical and normative contribution to social struggle has been de-
emphasised by CfB’s focus on radical social exclusion and alternative forms of social 
organising. There will be shared insights about the ways that social movements and labour 
movements in particular engage will law, however the current orientation of CfB scholarship 
has underplayed the contribution of labour to these general insights. In chapter four, we will 
bring together the role of labour in social struggles ‘from-below’ and the need for empirical 
analysis by evaluating the strategic and tactical decisions of an Argentine labour movement. 
In the next chapter, I will present three tenets of legal strategy ‘from-below’ that attend to 
the issues that have been identified in the course of the present chapter by presenting a 
detailed consideration of the ways that labour movements might engage effectively with law. 
I will examine: The ways that labour movements ought to frame their legal arguments so as 
to be recognised by law and deliver either immediate protections or challenge the present 
organisational aims of law; the effect on legal strategy of a legal system’s capacity to 
recognise certain legal claims and enforce its own judgments; and, how a movement’s 
political objectives can be shielded from the danger of legal co-optation. 
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 Chapter 3. Labour movements and the potential effectiveness 
of legal strategy: Three tenets 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the conditions of effective engagements with law. While 
the previous chapter has acknowledged the potential effectiveness of legal mobilisation, our 
current concern is the ways that labour movements access the opportunity presented by law. 
I will argue that the productive interaction between labour movements and law will be 
dependent on the former’s ability to engage competently with legal tools, and recognise the 
types of benefit that law can provide for its political objectives. A further aim of this chapter 
is to identify why national legal systems continue to play a key role in legal mobilisation 
from-below. I will argue that State law’s ability to impose legal obligations makes it an 
essential site of struggle for labour movements. In order to address each of these concerns I 
will present three tenets of effective legal strategy that will assess the role of (i) effective 
legal arguments, (ii) law’s institutional capacity, and (iii) law’s tactical contribution to a 
movement’s political objectives. 
Tenet one is concerned with the ways that labour movements articulate effective legal 
claims. To begin our conception of effective legal engagements, I argue that legal strategy 
and tactics need to be evaluated broadly, which means recognising that legal mobilisation 
can deliver both direct legal protections and indirect benefits to the wider political struggle. 
In addition, the distinction between direct and indirect effects of legal mobilisation provides 
a conceptual tool that will recur throughout the tenets to explain the potential effectiveness 
of legal engagements. The second part of our analysis turns to the issue of framing and how 
labour movements present their claims in law. Central to our understanding of effective 
engagements with law is the fact that, in order to access law’s general applicability labour 
movements must present legally cognisable claims. I will argue that the effectiveness of 
legal mobilisation is contingent upon presenting legal claims whose content can be 
recognised by the legal system and/or benefit a movement’s political objectives. 
Tenet two argues that labour movements must engage law in an effective context. The 
context of legal mobilisation matters because the institutional capacity of law varies between 
national legal systems and plural alternatives. I argue that labour movements must engage 
with legal institutions that have the capacity to impose legal obligations on employers and 
(potentially) re-order the social division of labour. The material and symbolic power of 
national legal systems means that State law remains a key site of struggle for labour. A 
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nuanced approach will recognise that the context of legal mobilisation will also have to 
respond to the limited means of redress at the national level. Therefore, in each circumstance, 
the most effective context of labour’s engagement with law will be a pragmatic 
accommodation between the demands of institutional capacity and the practical realities of 
legal mobilisation. 
The third tenet argues that legal mobilisation is a tactic that has the potential to deliver a 
movement’s political objectives. This tenet is important in the context of the supposed 
danger of co-optation posed by legal mobilisation. I will detail these potential limitations 
and recognise the need for labour movements to avoid their potential pitfalls. However, I 
will draw on several rebuttals of the co-optation critique and argue that legal mobilisation 
need not mitigate against political objectives. In order to grasp the nuances and complexities 
of the productive relation between legal mobilisation and political struggle, we will return 
to the role of indirect effects and the relation between tactics and strategy. The former 
redraws our perspective on the effectiveness of legal mobilisation and recognises how a 
movement’s political objectives are benefitted in ways that extend beyond direct legal 
protections. And, by distinguishing between tactical engagements with law and a 
movement’s wider political strategy, we can see how a labour movement’s political 
objectives are not exhausted by or dependent upon the outcome of litigation. In fact, the 
conditions under which labour can maximise the effectiveness of legal mobilisation and hold 
onto their political intent will be dependent upon a concurrent mobilisation of both law and 
politics. 
1 Tenet one: Effective legal argument 
In chapter two we considered the tension between law’s excess of meaning and deficit of 
task that defines the opportunity and limitation of legal mobilisation by social struggles. In 
this tenet I build upon this understanding by considering how social struggles manage this 
tension and engage effectively with law to meet their strategic and tactical objectives. In 
order to determine what we might mean by an effective engagement with law, I will make 
two claims. First, I draw on Michael McCann’s distinction between direct and indirect 
effects to provide a pragmatic understanding of the potential benefits that legal mobilisation 
presents to labour movements. The aim of this section is to present an understanding of the 
potential effectiveness of legal mobilisation and the reasons why law is engaged strategically 
and tactically. Second, I will consider the act of engagement and the importance of 
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formulating effective legal arguments. It is not enough to say that engaging in legal 
argumentation is potentially effective, what is at stake in legal mobilisation is the effective 
articulation of a claim that the legal system can both recognise and respond to affirmatively. 
I will argue that effective engagements with law are premised on competently framing 
arguments as legal claims that can be recognised as belonging to the legal system. This two-
stage argument will provide a conception of the type of benefits that legal mobilisation can 
deliver and a practical understanding of the form of effective legal argumentation. 
1.1. Evaluating effective legal mobilisation: In/direct effects 
Michael McCann’s legal mobilisation framework has provided important insights about how 
social movements use law from the bottom-up230. The legal mobilisation approach, as it is 
presented by scholars such as McCann and Sally Engle Merry, recognises that law can be 
both a resource for social struggles and a constraint on it231. These legal mobilisation 
scholars accept the critical insights about the limitations of legal mobilisation but hold onto 
its potential importance as a tool in social struggles. This approach is important for our 
present purposes because it accepts the potential effectiveness of legal mobilisation. It does 
not blindly endorse law as a site of social transformation, but it recognises that, under certain 
conditions, law provides opportunities to social struggles seeking to realise their political 
objectives. I will draw on McCann’s distinction between the direct and indirect effects of 
legal mobilisation as a means to comprehend the types of opportunities that can be sought 
through strategic and tactical engagements with law. 
In order to better comprehend the importance of McCann’s nuanced approach and how this 
draws out the strategic and tactical reasons behind legal mobilisation, let us briefly situate it 
within the socio-legal mobilisation, or ‘social movement and law’ literature232. As we shall 
see, there have been staunch criticisms of legal mobilisation’s effectiveness as a tactic that 
positively contributes to social struggles’ political objectives. I will emphasise and endorse 
a more nuanced approach that keeps open the importance of legal mobilisation and will 
enable a detailed concern for the strategic and tactical opportunities presented by litigation’s 
in/direct effects. Indeed, a common thread that runs through each tenet is an approach to 
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legal mobilisation that is alive to its limitations but insists on the potential effectiveness of 
law as a tool for political struggles. 
In the post-Brown vs. Board of Education era socio-legal scholars evaluated the effects of 
different judges on litigation and their propensity to support different legal arguments233. As 
the initial progressive activism of the United States Supreme Court shifted toward 
conservative restraint in the 1980s, scholarly positivity about tactical litigation’s capacity to 
deliver socially progressive strategic goals drifted from optimism to scepticism. For 
instance, Gerald Rosenberg dismissed the Brown court’s importance in the struggle for 
desegregation and argued that cause-lawyering could do more harm than good to a political 
movement, citing low implementation rates for litigation compared to legislation and the 
threat of a strong political counter mobilisation against judicial activism.234 Moreover, Stuart 
Scheingold has argued that cause-lawyering was a good tool for mobilising political 
discussion about rights but that ultimately it was legislators that were needed to effect 
meaningful change235: 
Without support of the real power holders… litigation is ineffectual and at times 
counterproductive. Without that support litigation is unnecessary.236 
For Scheingold, legislation and the political support required to pass it, were more likely to 
implement the social transformation desired by movements than litigation. In addition, 
Scheingold claimed that lawyers relied on the ‘myth of rights’237 in liberal legal orders that 
all victims can have their day in court and resolve their perceived rights infringement. The 
problem with this approach, for Scheingold, was that in practice litigation misrepresented 
social struggles’ claims and often failed to deliver meaningful redress or social change238. 
Other scholarship began to document the specific barriers that made litigation a difficult 
terrain for social movements to negotiate. For example, Marc Galanter’s seminal study of 
structural inequality in the legal system that privileged ‘repeat players’ and undermined the 
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effectiveness of tactical litigation for parties with few resources and little experience239. 
These critical accounts of legal mobilisation provided important insights by highlighting 
limitations to the idea that rights or justice were owed and that injured parties would 
necessarily ‘have their day in court’. For our purposes, Michael McCann’s Rights at Work240 
shifted the focus from scepticism or rejection to recognise the continued potentiality that 
resides in legal mobilisation for social struggles. 
[T]he prevailing critical posture has provided important insights about the social 
control functions of law that impede justice and democratic change in modern 
America; yet, I do fear that such a view may too easily ossify into a cynical “myth of 
non-rights” that is neither justified by historical experience nor helpful for confronting 
present political challenges.241 
While Michael McCann concurs with earlier criticisms about legal mobilisation, he insists 
that criticism must not result in a reactionary dismissal of litigation as a potentially effective 
site of struggle for social movements. The problem with scepticism about law’s capacity to 
deliver social transformation, according to McCann, is that such a position not only denies 
law’s historical role in grassroots social struggles, it would also deny the same opportunities 
to contemporary political struggles. 
McCann’s study of the pay equity movement’s use of law in the United States endorsed a 
textured approach to the relation between law and social movements. A key contribution of 
his empirical findings was that the effectiveness of litigation lies in its direct and/or indirect 
effects on a social struggle. The direct effect of litigation can provide “short-term remedial 
relief for victims of injustice or to develop case law precedents capable of producing long 
term institutional change.”242 In this respect social struggles can harness the potentially 
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direct effects of law by drawing on legal remedies, new precedents that contribute to their 
political objectives, or indeed, any direct legal protection that stems from litigation. 
McCann also claims that there are indirect effects, or secondary effects, of tactical litigation 
that can positively contribute to a social struggle in three ways. First, legal mobilisation helps 
to build a social movement through organisational expansion and the articulation of specific 
demands. Following insights from legal consciousness studies, the deployment of rights 
claims is understood to increase a movement’s awareness of legal obligations and an 
entitlement to certain rights claims243. Therefore, by mobilising legal arguments and framing 
their perceived injustices in the language of rights, a movement both builds its identity and 
develops legal claims that serve its political aims. 
This builds on our insight from Santos in chapter two that the strategic and tactical 
importance of legal mobilisation extends far beyond the outcome of one case, or even one 
line in a judgment. Santos focused on the need to politicise any legal engagement so that its 
effect on political objectives might extend beyond legal processes and legalistic decisions. 
McCann’s approach expands this insight and recognises the range of legal mobilisation’s 
potential effects on political objectives. We will return to the role of political mobilisation 
and indirect effects in tenet 3 where we will consider how they enable social struggles to 
avoid the dangers of co-optation by law. 
Second, litigation can generate public support for a social struggle. McCann emphasises the 
fact that “legal mobilisation does not take place in a social vacuum”244 and a movement 
gathers momentum (or not) when its legal arguments have traction with the social experience 
of others. The publicization of a legal struggle is directed toward generating support from 
other social struggles, the common bonds of solidarity between social groups are critically 
important245. For instance, the support of other social struggles at demonstrations, picket 
lines, and in the provision of financial or other assistance can be essential to the political 
mobilisation and survival of a movement. 
Third, litigation, or the threat of taking it, can provide leverage to support other political 
tactics and wider strategy246. The leveraging role of legal mobilisation seeks to compel 
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concessions from other government institutions and from private parties such as employers 
or other dominant social actors247. For McCann, the discursive capacity of rights means that 
leverage does not require winning and it may not even require going to court248. Instead, 
there is an interplay between the formal act of initiating litigation and the informal 
bargaining that occurs between parties. Thus, law is an important resource for political 
struggles because the threat of potentially damaging legal action can be used as a bargaining 
chip in negotiations. 
The recognition of indirect effects provides a textured account of the ways that legal 
mobilisation can be effective for a social struggle249. The key claim in McCann’s conception 
of direct and indirect effects is that the effectiveness of legal mobilisation must be evaluated 
broadly, which means taking into consideration its varied contributions to a political 
struggle’s objectives. In reference to criticisms of legal mobilisation, the courts’ limited 
enforcement capacity or issues of resource mobilisation are not, according to McCann, the 
sole arbiter of litigation’s effectiveness250. For McCann, litigation is used tactically and 
provides ‘judicial endowments’ that are used by social struggles for either short or long-term 
gain. The insight provided by litigation’s in/direct effects encourages a more nuanced 
approach to critical accounts of legal mobilisation’s negative effects, one that recognises its 
limitations but does not discard the effectiveness of such engagements altogether. 
Rather than viewing ‘winning’ at litigation as the strategic or tactical reason for engaging 
with law, we can now see that engaging law for the purpose of enforcing an existing rule 
and drawing a ‘direct effect’ may not serve a movement’s long-term strategic aims. For 
example, if a labour movement’s political objective is to re-constitute the legal rules relating 
to capital-labour relations, its tactical engagements with law might challenge current judicial 
precedent and/or the content of a legal rule. And, while it is possible that a direct effect could 
flow from an effective legal argument it is also possible that the benefit of legal mobilisation 
for more radical strategic objectives reside in indirect effects. For instance, indirect non-
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legal factors such as politicisation or the formation of a political identity around normative 
demands can positively contribute to a movement’s political objectives. 
I will work from a conception of effective legal engagement that is based on the idea that 
social struggles can draw both in/direct effects. And, that strategic and tactical engagements 
with law will be organised around and directed at attaining these effects. Indeed, the in/direct 
effects of legal mobilisation will define the extent to which legal strategy can shape the 
content of legal rules and have a wider effect on the constitutional relation between labour 
and capital. In other words, the constitutive potential of legal mobilisation can be understood 
within the framework of in/direct effects because it provides the tools to explain the range 
of possible outcomes and their relative effectiveness. I will return to this distinction 
throughout the tenets to provide a more nuanced account of the ways that law can be engaged 
by labour movements and as a means to comprehend certain strategic and tactical decisions. 
Having set an understanding of the potential effectiveness of legal mobilisation, we will 
build on this conception by considering, in realistic and pragmatic terms, the form and 
content of effective legal claims. 
1.2. A sober consideration of the relation between labour movements and legal 
argumentation 
In the remainder of this tenet I will examine how labour movements articulate claims in law 
in search of in/direct effects. In what follows, I will consider how social struggles draw on 
the opportunity to frame their normative claims in law and the role of recognition in the 
effectiveness of a given argument. I will argue that, where direct effects are the objective of 
legal mobilisation, the legal recognition of a social struggles’ claim is essential; whereas, 
social struggles that have more radical political demands may weigh the importance of legal 
recognition against their strategic objectives. Moreover, the issue of legal recognition will 
shed light on the opportunity and limitation of legal mobilisation. Returning to concepts 
from chapter two we will consider how the effectiveness of a legal claim is reliant on 
managing the tension between excess of meaning and deficit of task. The final insight about 
effective argumentation will acknowledge how labour movements present their arguments 
in practice, and therefore, in response to available legal rules, political aims, the material 
necessities of workers, and a range of contextual contingencies that will affect a legal claim’s 
effectiveness. 
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The idea that legal argument can be used as part of a social struggles’ political strategy is 
nothing new, although, as we have seen in chapter two, some scholars have sometimes 
overlooked its potential importance. Law provides a universal language in which a group’s 
specific normative demands can be generalised and subject to judicial adjudication. Michael 
McCann has argued that law is useful for social struggles because it enables communication 
between dominant and oppressed groups251. For example, McCann shows how the pay 
equity movement “drew its very normative logic as a rights claim from the evolution of 
antidiscrimination law in the postwar era.”252 As such, existing rights and laws will present 
an opportunity for movements to articulate their perceived injustices and normative demands 
as a justiciable claim. Legal rules provide an important opportunity to labour movements 
because they provide a framework within which legal claims can be presented. For instance, 
an argumentative approach targeting direct effects will be predicated on the successful 
articulation, or framing, of political demands as rights claims and/or other legal arguments 
directed at a legal rule’s remedies. 
At the same time, the use of law to frame political demands may not be aimed at delivering 
direct effects. For Alan Hunt, the use of rights claims by counter-hegemonic struggles is 
important because they serve as both the “articulation and mobilisation of collective 
identities”253. Hunt views rights claims as a means for a social movement to formulate and 
put into action its political struggle. And, the universal nature of rights language enables a 
movement to attract wider support for its normative claims. As per the first type of indirect 
effect detailed by McCann, effective framing can help to build a movement’s identity around 
certain legal claims and galvanise a wider political struggle.  
Before we continue, I acknowledge that there is a wider debate about whether social 
struggles ought to ‘frame’ their claims in legal terms254. This debate returns legal 
mobilisation scholarship to first principles by questioning whether the use of law and rights 
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discourse is beneficial to social struggles or, if it undercuts their aims by transposing their 
struggle into the legal sphere where they lack ‘experiential knowledge’255. I do not intend to 
replay debates about whether social struggles should or should not engage with law here, I 
will return in tenet three to the potential limitations of legal mobilisation. For now, I will set 
out a detailed conception of the conditions in which the framing of claims in law can be 
effective. Toward this end I engage with the framing debate to describe what it means to 
draw on law’s excess of meaning in practice. 
The act of framing involves the articulation of a legal claim. In this regard, framing is the 
practical instantiation of law’s excess of meaning as it involves presenting interpretations of 
law and drawing on constitutional values. At stake in the articulation of a legal claim is the 
capacity for a labour movement to receive legal protections or not. Law recognises256 some 
claims as legal and worthy of protections whilst others are illegal, excluded, and even 
punished. This transforms the recognition of legal claims into an essential battleground for 
labour movements seeking to impose legal obligations or win new rights protections257. I 
argue that the key factor in the articulation of a directly effective legal claim is that the 
content of that claim can be recognised as belonging to the legal system. In what follows, I 
will examine how certain content is included and excluded in the process of recognition, and 
how strategic objectives will also determine the content of a labour movement’s claim. 
To aid our understanding here, we can turn to the effect of legal recognition in Hans 
Lindahl’s account of normative boundary-setting in a legal system. Hans Lindahl has 
presented a phenomenological account of the process of legal recognition that shows how 
something appears as law in a legal system258. For Lindahl, something that appears as legal 
is included within the legal system and that which is illegal is excluded. This is important 
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for Lindahl because it explains how the determination of something as (il)legal is a process 
that sets the normative boundaries of a legal order. Lindahl’s argument is about the authority 
of legal orders in globalisation, it is beyond our present task to develop the issues that 
surround collective self-identification or reciprocity that motivate and inform his thesis. For 
our purposes, it provides insights about what is at stake in the recognition of a something as 
(il)legal. Moreover, Lindahl’s phenomenological approach assumes the law’s perspective of 
the practice of legal ordering. My perspective on this practice is taken not from law, but 
outside law, from the perspective of a grassroots labour movement. This develops our 
understanding of law as a tool of social struggle by identifying the fundamental role 
recognition will play in successful engagements with law. 
Legal understanding is re-understanding, is re-cognition; legal interpretation, re-
interpretation. A fuller formulation of legal intentionality is, therefore, the following: 
we [ought to] jointly disclose something as something* anew.259 
Lindahl identifies how each legal determination involves the re-iteration of something as 
legal. The cognition of an action as legal is a process that re-cognises something as belonging 
to the normative structure of the legal order. For Lindahl, what is at stake in the identification 
of something as belonging to the legal order is the collective self-identification of a legal 
order. In the determination of what is legal, law re-inserts claims into law that re-identify its 
normative content. This process of determination is the self-identification of a legal orders’ 
collective identity and is simultaneously a process of setting the normative boundaries of 
law. In other words, a legal order’s normative aims are continually re-affirmed by the 
inclusion and exclusion of certain acts as legal. This means that an effective legal argument 
is one that is capable of being recognised by law as belonging to the normative structure of 
the legal order. If a movement manages to have its claims recognised as legal its normative 
interpretation is included within the legal system, but if it is rejected its normative claims 
are excluded and law provides no direct effects. 
For our purposes, Lindahl provides three pairs of terms that guide our conception of effective 
legal argumentation: Recognised/unrecognised, included/excluded and legal/illegal. This is 
important because it provides a means of understanding how claims that are not recognised 
are excluded and are therefore illegal. This sense of illegality refers to the fact that claims 
do not belong to the normative structure of the legal order. Rather than referring to the 
infringement of a rule, illegality is the exclusionary effect of a claim that cannot be re-
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cognised in law. In other words, an unrecognisable claim cannot be re-identified by law as 
belonging to the legal order. As we shall see, this is of practical importance to social 
struggles whose legal strategy is premised on winning legal protections. 
Lindahl’s insights sharpen our understanding of the tension between law’s excess of 
meaning and deficit of task. As we know, the former highlights the opportunity for social 
struggles to re-interpret law’s meaning and the latter identifies the limits on the normative 
claims that law can recognise due to its commitment to certain entrenched interests. It has 
been our task to comprehend what determines whether a claim will successfully draw on 
law’s excess of meaning or fall victim to its deficit of task. The issue of recognition 
highlights the importance of a legal claim’s content and that, in the struggle over what ought 
to be legal, a movement must pay attention to law’s normative boundaries. The lesson for 
labour movements is that, while legal ordering is a continual process of re-cognition that 
presents an opportunity for labour movements to challenge the present content of law, claims 
that challenge law’s normative commitments (entrenched interests) cannot be recognised by 
law as legal. To put it otherwise, if the opportunity of legal mobilisation lies in the 
articulation of legal claims whose content is recognisable as something in law, labour 
movements must draw selectively on legal rules, rights and values that are capable of 
eliciting a positive response from law. 
Let us consider an example where a social struggle did manage to win legal protections but 
its legal claims were not recognisable. Drawing on the example of the U’wa people’s 
confrontation with Colombian Law, we will demonstrate two issues relating to recognition 
in the articulation of effective legal arguments. First, what happens when the content of a 
legal claim cannot be recognised by law. Second, how a social struggle’s decision about the 
content of their claims will not be determined solely by what is recognisable in law but will 
also be subject to political calculations. 
The U’wa people, an indigenous group whose lands fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Republic of Colombia, brought a case against both the Colombian Government and 
Occidental Petroleum opposing their decision to pursue oil drilling within the U’wa’s 
territory260. The U’wa’s opposition to oil drilling was grounded in their alternative 
conception of collective land rights. This involved a normative claim that land is central to 
U’wa culture, not as property or a productive resource but, because environmental 
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preservation is important for their indigenous identity and culture261. The U’wa’s principal 
legal argument claimed that oil drilling was a violation of their collective indigenous rights 
to their lands.  
The Constitutional Court rejected the administrative decision to allow exploratory drilling 
rights on the grounds of article 330 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution that requires 
indigenous peoples to be involved in any decision relating to the exploitation of natural 
resources in their territories262. While the U’wa found it difficult to understand why their 
radical reconstruction of rights could not be heard, the Colombian Constitutional Court’s 
decision was taken on the grounds of their constitutional right to participate in a consultation 
process before any oil exploration licenses can be issued263. The Court was unable to 
acknowledge the U’wa’s normative claim because this would require the Court to step-
outside of itself and abandon the constitutional rules relating to indigenous groups. To accept 
the U’wa’s claims would have required the Court to accept the wider implication of the 
U’wa’s normative demands that the application of Colombian Law over U’wa land is 
illegitimate264. As such, the Colombian Constitutional Court could only take a decision on 
the basis of existing Colombian Law or values that were consistent with the Colombian 
Constitution. 
The first issue that the U’wa case demonstrates is what types of claim can and cannot be 
recognised in law. It shows the effect of presenting normative claims that are not framed 
using existing legal rules and/or rights that belong to the legal system. I have argued above 
that recognition is important in effective legal argumentation because, if a claimant wants to 
receive direct legal protections the content of a claim needs to be recognisable in law. 
Returning to the three pairs of terms given by Lindahl, we can see that the U’wa’s claim is 
not recognised and is excluded as a something that cannot be identified as legal. In the U’wa 
case the recognisable claim was the one that referred to the constitutional rule about 
indigenous rights in the consultation process (i.e., article 330). The U’wa sought to expand 
the meaning of law but the content of its claim was not recognised as belonging to the 
Colombian legal system. Of course, the U’wa did receive direct legal protections but, 
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importantly, the legal response of the Colombian Court referred to the available provisions 
in Colombian Law and not to the U’wa’s claims. 
This provides a practical insight into the relation between the opportunity in law’s excess of 
meaning, the limitation in law’s deficit of task, and how (un)recognisable claims by social 
struggles determine the tension between them. The U’wa presented an alternative 
interpretation of what law ought to be (excess of meaning), but it could not be recognised 
because it challenged the Republic of Colombia’s entrenched interest (deficit of task) in 
ownership and control over U’wa land. In this regard, legal argumentation presents an 
opportunity to deliver legal protections only in so far as it does not confront law’s normative 
interests. As we know, law is engaged in a process of re-identifying its collective identity by 
including and excluding certain claims. This means that labour movements must be aware 
of law’s normative boundaries and ensure that in the articulation of a claim it is capable of 
being re-cognised in law as the re-articulation of a legal claim. In sum, the lesson for labour 
movements is that there is a threshold for what can and cannot be done in law, and in the 
articulation of directly effective legal claims they must avoid confronting law’s normative 
commitments. 
The above should not be read as an argument against the U’wa’s legal strategy. On the 
contrary, the U’wa’s legal claims provides a second insight about the important role of 
strategic and tactical decisions in the articulation of an ‘effective’ legal claim. The U’wa’s 
decision to insist on its normative claims about collective rights to land serve as an example 
of a tactical decision to hold onto long-term strategic objectives. Rather than cede to the 
existing parameters of ‘indigenous rights claims’ set by law, the U’wa’s legal arguments are 
not framed in Colombian Law but insist on its own normative demands. This means that the 
U’wa’s argumentative strategy explicitly rejects any guidance about how law re-cognises 
claims and re-affirms the collective identity of law. On the contrary, the U’wa’s strategy 
explicitly challenges the collective identity of Colombian Law as not including the identity 
of the U’wa. This, of course, means that the U’wa’s normative claims are not recognised, 
are excluded and are illegal but, this does not mean that their argumentative strategy is 
ineffective. It means that it cannot realistically expect direct legal effects to flow from its 
legal claims, but, as we shall see, its approach ensures the normative integrity of the U’wa’s 
struggle and may elicit indirect effects. 
We have briefly considered in chapter two and will expand in tenet three the reasons why 
holding onto normative demands resists the co-optive effects of law. For now, we can see 
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that if the U’wa had abandoned their more radical claims and simply invoked their rights 
under the Colombian Constitution this would have amounted to an acceptance by the U’wa 
people that they are rights-holders subject to Colombian Law. And, would have served to 
legitimise Colombian Law’s jurisdiction over U’wa land and contradict the U’wa’s 
normative claims. In short, the U’wa’s legal claims were articulated not on the basis that 
their content would be recognisable to Colombian Law, but for the purpose of insisting on 
its normative rejection of Colombian Law. Following from the U’wa’s example, we cannot 
take a zero-sum approach to what constitutes an effective legal claim. On the contrary, the 
content of a legal claim will be the product of a labour movement’s strategic decision about 
the perceived benefit of either winning legal protections or confronting law on its own terms. 
Returning briefly to indirect effects, we must remind ourselves that a movement’s legal 
arguments may not intend to deliver direct legal protection but seek publicity and/or to 
mobilise a general movement for legal reform. In certain circumstances, there may limited 
scope for registering a claim in law or, a movement may perceive that challenging the present 
content of law better serves their struggle. Where such conditions exist, a labour movement 
may decide against formulating legal arguments that will have legal traction and aim to 
benefit from the indirect effects of legal mobilisation. 
The final issue to recognise is the role of non-legal factors and how a conceptually effective 
legal claim might be ineffective in practice. The point here is that, while this tenet can 
provide a guide to effective legal arguments, the ultimate outcome of legal mobilisation will 
be subject to factors outside of a movement’s control. In order to comprehend the role of 
contextual contingencies, let us consider an example of a labour movement whose legal 
argument was recognisable but ineffective due to an unexpected judgment. 
In Wards Cove v Atonio 1989265 a class action was brought against an Alaskan Salmon 
Cannery on the basis of their discriminatory employment practices in the United States of 
America. The case was presented under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964266 and argued 
that the employers’ hiring practices discriminated against workers on the basis of race. At 
the time of initiating proceedings (1974) the precedent in cases brought under Title VII were 
generally favourable to workers. Cases were decided on the basis of ‘disparate impact’ and 
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the burden of proof lay with the employer. Following the precedent set in Griggs267 (1971), 
discrimination was proven where practices had a disparate impact on a racial minority which 
meant that employees had to show statistical evidence of racial disparity in an employers’ 
practices. 
In Wards Cove, the workers presented evidence that low-paid canning positions were filled 
almost exclusively by non-whites and skilled positions were filled by white workers. The 
Supreme Court rejected the evidence as unsuitable evidence of prima facie discrimination 
and did not pass the burden of proof to the employer. Instead, the Court argued that 
discrimination could only be proven in the case by comparing the number of non-whites in 
the skilled non-cannery jobs with the percentage of appropriately skilled non-white workers 
on the labour market. Discrimination could only be proven where evidence was presented 
of non-white applicants being disproportionately rejected or where practices deterred skilled 
non-whites from applying. In addition, the Court ruled that the ‘burden of persuasion’ always 
lay with the plaintiff and they must prove a causal connection between disparate impact and 
the accused employment practices. This changed the longstanding precedent that where a 
prima facie discrimination was demonstrated the burden of proof lay with the employer. 
Rather than applying existing case law, the Supreme Court in Wards Cove decided to close 
down the use of Title VII by workers in antidiscrimination cases. As Lovell et al claim, the 
jurispathic nature of the Wards Cove decision contributes a “sober scepticism”268 about the 
capacity for courts to close off legal opportunities. Importantly, Lovell et al argue, the 
decision in Wards Cove could not be blamed on poor legal tactics, instead two factors 
contributed to the change in precedent: The macropolitical changes of the late 1970s and 
1980s which resulted in a conservative majority on the Supreme Court bench, and the legal 
mobilisation of business interests to counter progressive legal precedent269. Notwithstanding 
the specifically political composition of the Supreme Court in the United States of America 
and its effect on legal precedent; we can draw the general conclusion that favourable legal 
precedent does not guarantee that future legal mobilisation by social movements will be 
effective. A labour movement may construct a legal argument that would have previously 
been accepted but, in some cases contingent factors will determine legal mobilisation’s 
effectiveness. Therefore, a labour movements’ use of available legal resources needs to be 
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understood as a complex process determined by tactical and strategic objectives but are 
equally subject to the potentially jurispathic nature of judicial decision-making. 
In sum, I have argued that registering cognisable, or justiciable, claims in law is central to a 
labour movement’s engagement with law. From the perspective of providing direct effects 
an effective claim is one that is recognisable to law as belonging to the legal system. I have 
sought to show how recognition reveals a threshold for what claims can and cannot be made 
in a given legal system. A recognisable, or cognisable, legal claim is one that is compatible 
with the scope of existing legal rules, guaranteed by the constitution and/or does not 
contradict entrenched interests. Labour movements seeking to benefit from direct legal 
protections must competently articulate claims within these parameters. In addition to 
concerns about recognition, social struggles will need to accommodate their strategic and 
tactical objectives in the articulation of an effective legal argument. While a certain legal 
argument might deliver legal protections and be legally effective; it might be politically 
ineffective should it contradict or harm longer-term strategic aims. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of a legal argument will be determined by the issues of recognition, political 
objectives, in/direct effects and contextual contingencies. 
2 Tenet two: Law’s institutional capacity and effective legal 
mobilisation  
Having argued in tenet one that the effectiveness of a legal strategy will be contingent on 
legal claims that have the ability to generate in/direct effects, tenet two turns to the role of 
institutional capacity in legal mobilisation. In what follows, I will highlight the institutional 
capacity of State law as a central tenet of legal mobilisation ‘from-below’ and, importantly, 
a key site of action for labour movements. Under conditions of globalisation and pluralism 
it is necessary to reiterate the continued importance of State law as a tool of social struggle. 
Institutional capacity refers to law’s material and symbolic power to issue and enforce 
normative claims in society. National legal system’s supreme authority over such power 
means that it has the capacity to impose legal obligations and constitute social relations. By 
identifying the supremacy of State law’s institutional capacity, we can see that in spite of 
globalisation and pluralism the Nation State still determines the relation between capital and 
labour270. Therefore, for labour movements, the State is a strategically important site of 
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action because labour’s strategic objectives will often involve either the imposition of legal 
obligations on employers or the re-articulation of the legal relation between capital interests 
and labour. 
The general rule presented in this tenet is that effective legal mobilisation ought to engage 
with legal institutions that have the capacity to enforce its claims. However, we must 
acknowledge that in certain circumstances national legal systems may offer limited means 
of redress. In order to present a textured account of the effective contexts of legal 
engagements, it is necessary to consider the role of alternative sites of struggle. In 
circumstances where the institutional capacity of State law is inaccessible or unhelpful, the 
effectiveness of a labour movements’ tactical decisions will be contingent on engagements 
with plural legal institutions or in the taking of political action, each of which may provide 
indirect effects to their strategic objectives. In the second part of this tenet I will set out the 
role of such alternative types of action and how they indirectly engage the State’s material 
and symbolic power. 
2.1. Institutional capacity 
Since modernity national legal systems have been the principle legal authority in their 
jurisdiction and continue to be chiefly responsible for regulating working conditions that 
occur within national boundaries. The modern State has monopolised law for the purpose of 
maintaining control over social conflicts within its territorial boundaries271. While the rise 
of legal pluralisms and a turn to more radical autonomous forms of social organising272 
present a challenge to State law’s capacity to order social conflicts and determine social 
relations, I argue that social struggles must not lose sight of law’s material and symbolic 
power. In spite of supposed alternatives, State legal systems still hold the institutional 
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capacity to set labour’s regulatory standards and order social relations between capital and 
labour. In what follows, I will set out an understanding of ‘institutional capacity’ and why it 
ought to be a key concern in labour movements’ strategic and tactical decision-making. 
Scott Veitch succinctly captures the capacity of State law when he states that “legal 
normativity brings with it a socially effective institutionalised force and the claim that this 
force is right or just”273. For Veitch, institutional force and a claim to right enables law to 
set the terms of legally-enforceable responsibility and the ascription of legal responsibility, 
or not, that shapes the various legal obligations owed by different social groups and 
individuals274. In other words, the institutional capacity of law determines legal obligations 
and social expectations about how someone or a definable group of persons ought to act. For 
our purposes, the implementation and enforcement of labour standards and the means of 
legal redress will determine the relation between employers and employees, and the relation 
between capital and labour generally. The distribution of legal responsibility and how this 
constitutes social relations ensures that State law remains a key site of struggle for social 
movements whose strategic aims seek to insert new legal protections, impose duties and/or 
re-constitute certain legal relations. 
In order to develop these claims about the capabilities of modern law and the role of 
institutional capacity in effective legal mobilisation, I will follow Veitch’s account275 of the 
three characteristics of the juridical architecture: Coercion, correctness and social priority. 
The first guarantees law’s efficacy by exercising the ‘basic functions’ that ensure rules are 
implemented according to the rule of law. 
[Coercion] is that which makes law socially efficacious. It does this by channelling 
force through the form of authorised legal institutions, thereby differentiating it from 
other forms of normative or physical coercion or social forces.276 
We can understand this process as guaranteeing law’s social function by ordering 
interactions and managing expectations. The coercive aspect of institutional capacity has 
also been referred to as the material power of law and highlights its monopoly over legitimate 
violence277. Legal coercion is distinguishable from other forms of coercion owing to law’s 
legitimate authority to forcibly implement and enforce its rules. In practice, the material 
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power of a legal order means it is capable of enforcing its normative claims. A well-
resourced legal institution will have associated enforcement bodies, such as the police and 
prosecution services, that aid legislatures and judiciaries in ordering society. In the Nation 
State legal institutions will be the supreme authority with a monopoly over the legitimate 
exercise of violence due to an efficient co-ordination between the legal system and 
enforcement agencies. Compared to transnational or supranational legal institutions who 
lack the material power to enforce their claims and must rely on the political and legal 
acceptance of their judgments at the State level for enforcement278. 
Correctness refers to the inherent ‘truth’ of legal declarations. Law is not merely the 
embodiment of power, but it makes a claim about what is ‘right’. As such, law is not merely 
an instrument of violence but a declaration of correctness. The claim to correctness is central 
to Alexy’s understanding of what distinguishes a mere norm from a law279, borrowing from 
Veitch’s analysis: 
The nature of the status of this ‘truth’ – that it [law] ‘must be taken for established 
truth’- captures precisely the nature of the claim to correctness: that it is a combination 
of the normative and the factual, according to which the legal norm’s implicit claim to 
correctness stands as correct, and impacts as such on the wider normative and factual 
world.280 
Law is implicitly right because its claims are not mere norms but the ultimate arbiter of 
social normativity. Law’s correctness underpins its socially symbolic power which exists 
where the State’s authority is perceived socially as the supreme ordering force. And, law is 
relied upon to determine and guarantee social expectations not because they will be 
physically coerced but because its claims are viewed as the right-ordering of social relations. 
[The] state’s monopoly on force is not as important in terms of menace and dissuasion 
as it is in terms of people’s perception of something as law. In other words, a pivotal 
element for a normative ordering to be legal is the general perception of its pre-emptive 
character.281 
As Goldoni and Croce emphasise, the social priority of law is key to the distinguishing the 
supremacy of a legal order from other normative orders.282 There are a plurality of normative 
 
278 Přibáň (n 24) 2. 
279 Robert Alexy, ‘A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula’ in David Dyzenhaus (ed), Recrafting the Rule of Law: 
The Limits of Legal Order (Bloomsbury Publishing 1999). in Veitch (n 257) 25. 
280 Veitch (n 257) 25. 
281 Croce and Goldoni (n 272) 14. 
282 See also Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 869, 879. 
  
Chapter 3. Labour movements and the potential effectiveness of legal strategy: Three tenets 
101 
orders in society but only a national legal system’s normative output assumes the status of 
right conduct sine qua non. The third characteristic flows from the effects of the first two: 
The capacity of law to make and enforce normative claims about correctness elevates it to a 
level of social priority or prominence283. Legal normativity sits at the top of a hierarchy of 
social norms, and legal institutions maintain social order by enforcing its declarations of 
right. These three characteristics underpin an understanding of law’s institutional capacity  
The supremacy of State law’s institutional capacity makes it an essential site of struggle for 
labour movements whose strategic aims centre around regulatory standards and the social 
relation between capital and labour. The material and symbolic power of national legal 
systems means that they have the capacity to determine social relations unlike other 
normative orders or social practices. The institutional capacity of law can provide direct 
effects that no other normative order has the material power to deliver, and the symbolic 
power of national law remains a central arbiter of right conduct. In spite of the challenges to 
legal mobilisation at the national-level, see Rosenberg, Scheingold and Galanter above, and 
the existence of legal pluralisms that may be more accommodating of a labour movement’s 
normative claims; the national legal system’s role in constituting social relations, enforcing 
legal decisions, and deciding regulatory standards makes it an essential site of action for 
effective legal strategy.  
A key strategic and tactical decision ought to be whether a legal system has the capacity to 
provide effective legal remedies. A labour movement whose strategic aim requires direct 
legal effects, such as the imposition of legal obligations on employers, will need to engage 
with legal systems that can draw on the material and symbolic power required to satisfy its 
strategic objectives. For example, in the context of struggles for economic and social rights, 
Katherine Young encourages movements, and scholarship, to take seriously law’s capacity 
to institutionalise socially transformative regulations and impose certain minimum 
standards. 
[A]n antistate, antilaw agenda provides no resources with which to counteract the 
further evisceration of the state. Indeed, the relegation of the aspiration to material 
security to an “extra-legal” space would do nothing to halt the diminishing access to 
certain goods and services and would probably accelerate it.284 
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Katherine Young captures the important role law plays in guaranteeing rights protections. 
For Young, State legal systems have the capacity to guarantee economic and social rights 
and regulate relations between private actors285; whereas, alternatives to law lack the 
necessary resources to challenge current trends toward deregulation or provide direct legal 
protections. This draws out the link between legal strategy that aims to impose obligations 
and/or re-constitute social relations and the importance of law’s institutional capacity to the 
achievement of such objectives. Pluralism and autonomy may promise a more receptive 
normative landscape and engaging with the State may involve certain compromises but, 
State law’s institutional capacity remains necessary for the implementation and enforcement 
of legal obligations in society. For instance, engaging with State law will mean operating 
within a structure that upholds existing power relations, not least the subordination of labour 
to capital; but labour engages State law because wages, pensions, employment and dignified 
working conditions are at stake. Labour movements will have to make pragmatic decisions 
that weighs their radical structural critique of liberal constitutionalism’s protection of 
entrenched property title and economic individualism against the importance of legal 
protections and the potential effect of labour reforms. In sum, an effective legal mobilisation 
will involve pragmatic engagements with the State because of its institutional capacity to 
deliver in/direct effects. 
Thus far, I have sought to establish the strategic opportunity of State law owing to its 
institutional capacity. The next step of my argument is that the opportunity of State law is 
not something that labour movements choose to engage with because it is potentially 
effective. On the contrary, the context of labour’s engagement with law is inextricably tied 
to the institutional capacity of State law. This means that passing over State law as a key site 
of legal mobilisation ‘from-below’ risks not only excluding tools of struggle but 
misunderstanding the reality of labour movements’ strategic engagements with law. I will 
highlight two reasons why labour’s engagements with law are emplaced at the national level.  
The first reason follows from what we have already established about the role of national 
law in setting labour standards and adjudicating disputes. Labour is always already situated 
within the context of a Nation State’s jurisdictional competence which limits a labour 
movement’s ability to choose their scale of legality. A dispute about the legality of working 
conditions is justiciable in the relevant national legal system and, in order to draw on law’s 
material and symbolic power, labour must engage at the national scale. Accordingly, a labour 
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dispute in Manchester will be the responsibility for the English courts, in Guadalajara the 
Mexican legal system and Thessaloniki the Greek courts. Notwithstanding the potential 
opportunity to appeal decisions to a supra-State court to compel compliance to certain 
standards at the national level; the dispute is, first and foremost, the competence of the 
national legal system. 
Moreover, the immediacy of a legal dispute in the national context means that labour may 
not be free to choose the site of legal action, instead it must deal with the legal parameters 
(possibilities and limitations) of the jurisdiction in which a conflict occurs. By immediacy 
of a legal dispute, I mean that a labour movement that challenges legal rules will be brought 
into conflict with the legal system that is immediately responsible. For example, if a trade 
union in the United Kingdom organises ad hoc industrial action outside the parameters of 
the Trade Union Act 2016 an employer will likely initiate legal proceedings against them, 
and the trade union will have a case to answer in the national courts. Labour movements 
occur within a given jurisdiction and will have to engage with the legal system that their 
normative demands confront, either by initiating litigation or being summoned. 
Second, labour does not enjoy the same degree of mobility as those social groups that might 
engage in ‘forum-shopping’. Forum shopping refers to the practice of searching for legal 
systems that are more likely to provide claimants with a favourable judgment286. The idea of 
choosing between jurisdictions has often been discussed in relation to well-resourced actors 
(such as corporations) seeking to avoid excessive regulation287. The ways that labour and 
capital benefit from the plurality of legal systems is not analogous. Grassroots labour 
struggles are characterised by a lack of financial resources288 that are required to take 
advantage of legal mobilisation in different forums. However, the key distinction refers to 
the rationale that lies at the heart of ‘forum-shopping’ and the opportunity that it offers 
compared to national law. While corporations will ‘shop-around’ for low-regulatory 
 
286 The idea of forum-shopping was initially coined in private international law, see Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann and Bertram Turner, ‘Legal Pluralism, Social Theory, and the State’ (2018) 50 The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 255, 260. 
287 Cf. Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing in a 
Minangkabau Village’ 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 117. A case study of the 
overlapping jurisdictions of distinct legal institutions in one location in Malaysia. The study exemplifies a 
unique setting wherein different legal authorities interact, providing a non-Western account of ‘forum-
shopping’. 
288 Sandra R Levitsky, ‘To Lead with Law: Reassessing the Influence of Legal Advocacy Organizations in 
Social Movements’ in Austin Sarat and Stuart A Scheingold (eds), Cause lawyers and social movements, vol 
145 (Stanford University Press 2006); Galanter (n 239). 
  
Chapter 3. Labour movements and the potential effectiveness of legal strategy: Three tenets 
104 
standards and minimal legal obligations, labour movements challenge capital’s flagrant 
avoidance of legal responsibility. 
The aim of labour’s legal mobilisation will seek to enforce existing regulations or impose 
higher-standards against capital interests that demand limited legal responsibilities. For 
labour, the institutional capacity of national law offers an opportunity to fix capital in one 
place and enforce legal obligations on it. The stake for labour when deciding in which scale 
of legality to pursue its legal strategy is whether a given legal system has the capacity to 
enforce either short-term legal protections or re-constitute the relation between capital 
interests and labour. Labour’s legal strategy is tied to the national level precisely because it 
offers the opportunity for effective engagements that satisfy its objectives. 
I make these claims about struggling over the content of law with all the necessary caveats 
about the limitations of this practice. Certain claims about responsibility cannot be heard and 
labour will be unable to draw on law’s institutional capacity without encountering its deficit 
of task289. In this regard, institutional capacity is emblematic of the opportunity and 
limitation of legal mobilisation that has run throughout this thesis because its effective 
ordering of social relations cuts both ways for labour movements. On the one hand, it 
presents the opportunity for strategic engagements to challenge the present constitution of 
social relations and increase the legal protections enjoyed by labour. On the other, the 
institutional capacity of law can either set regulatory standards that offer limited protections 
or favour certain social groups/interests to the detriment of labour. Indeed, the absence of 
regulation, Veitch has warned, means the absence of precisely the sort of legal responsibility 
that will be the object of labour’s legal strategy. Law’s dis/avowal of legal responsibility 
means that it has both the capacity: 
[T]o operate as a key mode of organising responsibilities, but simultaneously allow 
for and legitimise the proliferation of their clandestine counterpart: irresponsibility.290  
For Veitch, this reveals the ways that law legitimises the production of suffering in society. 
For our purposes, the tension between legal ir/responsibility represents a strategic 
battleground for labour between the legality of undignified work practices and the 
transformation of current legal protections to reflect labour’s interests. The importance of 
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legal responsibility in society means that State law remains a key site of struggle for labour 
movements. 
2.2. Institutional capacity: Exceptions to the rule 
There will be circumstances where labour is unable to take action at the State level. If there 
are no mechanisms of legal redress or the legal system has already rejected its claims, a 
labour movement will have to take alternative strategic and tactical decisions. In this final 
part of the tenet, I will introduce nuance to the general rule that effective legal strategy will 
be reliant on law’s institutional capacity by recognising the potential effectiveness of 
alternative legal systems and the role of political action in achieving strategic objectives. 
A national legal system may have superior institutional capacity but, where its rules and 
remedies offer no realistic mechanism for redress a labour movement will search for the next 
best option. Labour movements may take the tactical decision to engage with legal orders 
with limited institutional capacity because it represents a more effective route to legal 
protections than directly engaging at the national level. The reduced institutional capacity of 
legal pluralisms mean they cannot have a direct effect on strategic objectives but they can 
indirectly affect them. Importantly, by highlighting the potentially effective role of 
pluralisms, I am not dismissing the role of State law but highlighting both the in/direct effects 
of alternatives and identifying an alternative means of engaging with the State.  
For the avoidance of confusion, I do not endorse pluralism along the lines of a societal 
constitutionalism that identifies pluralism as a means to comprehend the constitutional 
features of social autonomies, and their capacity to sustain normative distinctness through 
functional reproduction291. This description of the self-constitutionalisation of societal 
groups has presented a paradigmatic shift in recent constitutional theory292, but I do not view 
the fragmentation of legal authority as a phenomenon that benefits labour293. In other words, 
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I do not suggest that, in response to limited means of redress at the State level, labour 
movements ought to retreat from the State. On the contrary, I have insisted that labour’s 
prospects of addressing its legal, political and economic conditions are dependent on 
successfully confronting national legal systems. Far from approaching pluralism as an end 
in itself, I will highlight how pluralism represents an opportunity to engage with and draw 
concessions from the State, albeit indirectly. 
Although the transnational level lacks enforcement mechanisms it can mobilise a political 
struggle around certain demands and generate international political pressure. Therefore, 
while transnational political and legal action may not deliver direct legal protections at the 
national level, it can indirectly contribute to the strategic aims of social struggles. By 
drawing on the indirect effects of post-national legal mobilisation, a labour movement can 
potentially draw on the institutional capacity of national law as legislators, the executive, or 
relevant authorities succumb to international and domestic political pressure. 
For instance, appealing a decision at the national level to a European court may result in a 
favourable judgment but it is not enforceable at the supra-national level, to satisfy the 
strategic objectives the judgment needs to be implemented at the national level. In addition, 
there may be political pressure or symbolic value in targeting transnational legal institutions 
in spite of their limited institutional capacity. A decision by a supra-national and/or 
transnational court may not create direct legal obligations in a labour movement’s national 
jurisdiction but, it can generate indirect effects through publicity and international political 
pressure that encourages national legislators or executives to accommodate labour’s 
demands at the national level. 
If we return to the U’wa’s struggle we recall that the Colombian Constitution provided a 
right to include the U’wa in any consultation about actions taken in indigenous territories. 
This provided a mechanism of redress against proposed oil-drilling but did not satisfy the 
U’wa’s demands to exercise control over the territory. Given the ineffectiveness of the State 
in relation to the U’wa’s normative demands, alternative forms of action such as 
transnational advocacy have become effective tools. For example, a speaking tour in the 
United States of America that sought to generate NGO support and, legal action that 
involved presenting a formal complaint against the Colombian government to the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights294. Importantly, this mobilisation of a transnational 
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advocacy network is cited as having been pivotal in the decision by Oxy Petroleum in 2001 
to abandon its planned drilling on U’wa land295. For Rodriguez-Garavito, the sustained 
cross-border coalition of support for the U’wa over a period of four years had an inevitable 
impact on their corporate image and such pressure precipitated into a decision that 
contributed toward the U’wa’s objective. Similarly, workers at a Nike factory in Kukdong, 
Mexico, whose strategic aim was the establishment of an independent trade union and 
improved working conditions drew on transnational advocacy mechanisms. These included 
demonstrations at Nike stores in the USA and inviting international sweatshop monitoring 
organisations to the site296. These actions generated sufficient pressure on the factories’ 
management and their clients to provide the Kukdong workers with a new labour contract 
guaranteeing improved conditions and a wage increase. And, in response to heavy 
international pressure the Mexican labour authorities agreed to recognise their trade union. 
If we recognise the potential role of the transnational level and other plural legal systems 
capable of generating indirect effects, we must also expand our horizons and recognise the 
role of non-legal actions that might aid legal strategy. The final caveat to the central claim 
about institutional capacity’s role in effective legal strategy is that: Legal pluralism and 
political action can be profitably deployed in pursuit of strategic objectives where 
institutional capacity at the State level cannot be directly engaged. Having already 
acknowledged the potential role of legal pluralism and transnational political advocacy, I 
will draw on an insight from the CfB literature that recognises the importance of ‘non-
institutional’ action by social movements. 
Gavin Anderson’s non-institutional constitutionalism looks to the practices of social 
movements that transcend the form and nature of institutional constitutionalism297. For 
Anderson, constitutional practices are not reducible to the range of institutional possibilities 
given by legal and political systems. Instead, Anderson encourages an approach to 
constitutionalism that moves beyond the formal functions of legal and political systems.  
[T]he absence of social movements from the constitutional literature is not 
coincidental, but can be attributed to the potential difficulties they pose to some core 
elements in constitutional thought. In particular, bringing social movements into 
proximity with constitutional theory calls into question assumptions that 
 
295 ibid 258. 
296 Rodríguez-Garavito (n 138) 68. 
297 Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (n 13) 884. 
  
Chapter 3. Labour movements and the potential effectiveness of legal strategy: Three tenets 
108 
constitutionalism is inherently institutional, Western in origin, and normatively 
positive.298 
This analysis emphasises how social movements may not adhere to institutionally prescribed 
practices and presents a sociological approach to the relation between social movements, 
law and politics. Anderson argues that constitutionalism has been dominated by institution-
centric analysis that excludes social struggles’ practices that cannot be accommodated by 
existing constitutional functions. In order to recover the informal constitutional practices of 
social movements, Anderson identifies two insights about the ‘non-institutional’ ways that 
social struggles engage with constitutionalism ‘from-below’. The first concerns the form of 
constitutionalism and highlights the construction of non-Western legal and political 
formations299. For example, indigenous forms of social organisation that may lack the formal 
characteristics of Western constitutional but, nonetheless, exercise functions that order and 
maintain social relations. For our purposes, the second insight is more relevant because it 
says something about the non-institutional ways that social struggles interact with existing 
constitutional structures. 
The second part of Anderson’s non-institutional constitutionalism challenges the nature of 
political power300. In the Western constitutional tradition, the nature of political power in 
constitutionalism is understood to operate via a power relation between constituent power 
and constituted power. The former is active during foundation and the latter exercises 
political power on behalf of and according to the prescriptions of the former. Under these 
institutional arrangements the means of redress by civil society are located in the legal and 
political system. For Anderson, once we begin to explore the experience of social 
movements, we can recognise that political power is also exercised outside of the traditional 
conception of political power. Rather than comprehending the relation between 
constitutionalism and social movements through the dichotomy of constituent power versus 
constituted power and its threat of radical structural transformation; a social movement 
“prioritizes pragmatic, often incremental, strategies of change”301 and a range of innovative 
practices that transcend traditional constitutional knowledge. The types of action envisaged 
by Anderson include alternative political formations but also a broad range of political 
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actions that will interact with and support legal mobilisation. For example, strikes, protests 
and whichever actions that might aid a groups’ strategic goals. 
The ‘non-institutional’ perspective provided by Anderson invites a reflexive consideration 
of the nature of power relations and how labour movements might draw on both legal and 
political tools to achieve their strategic objectives. The key insight from Anderson to an 
understanding of effective legal mobilisation is that constitutionalism is made up of practices 
that are not limited to the formal mechanisms of law and politics documented in the 
constitution. In light of this, we can present a more textured conclusion that, as a general 
rule, the effective sites of legal mobilisation are those that have the institutional capacity to 
enforce legal obligations and determine social relations. However, in certain circumstances, 
when State law’s institutional capacity cannot be engaged directly, social struggles will draw 
upon the capacities of plural legal forms and take political actions in an attempt to satisfy 
their strategic objectives. 
This tenet has argued that the institutional capacity of State law means that it remains the 
key site of legal mobilisation for labour movements. The material and symbolic power of 
the State enables it to impose legal obligations and constitute social relations. Missing the 
point of institutional capacity risks underestimating the role of material and symbolic power 
in ordering social relations and overstating the capacity of alternative arrangements to 
enforce a social struggles’ strategic aims. By recognising what is at stake when determining 
the strategic effectiveness of a legal system, we can see the key role of the national level in 
effective legal mobilisation. Indeed, labour movements engage with national legal systems 
because its supreme ordering capacity presents an opportunity to enforce legal obligations 
on capital that would otherwise benefit from the absence of regulation. 
Under certain conditions the context of legal strategy may be unable to effectively engage 
with the mechanisms of redress at the State level. Although legal pluralisms and political 
action may have limited institutional capacity and will be unable to deliver direct legal 
effects, tactical engagement with alternative sites of action may provide indirect effects that 
contribute toward their strategic objectives. In sum, effective legal mobilisation ought to 
target State law’s material and symbolic power; but, where legal opportunities at the State 
level are closed off the effectiveness of a legal strategy will be dependent on the use of more 
innovative legal and political practices. 
3 Tenet three: Political objectives and legal mobilisation 
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In this tenet I will set out a nuanced account of the relation between legal engagements and 
political objectives that insists on the potential effectiveness of legal mobilisation in spite of 
its unavoidable limitations. To do so, we must return to the tension between opportunity and 
limitation in legal mobilisation and consider how labour movements manage to engage with 
law without compromising their political objectives. This tenet argues that effective legal 
engagements have the potential to contribute to a movement’s political objectives and evade 
the dangers of co-optation. To set out the conditions under which labour movements can 
hold onto their nomos, we will return to the distinction between tactics and strategy and 
recognise the productive interaction between legal and political mobilisation. 
In order to comprehend the limitations that legal mobilisation might have on a labour 
movement’s long-term aims, we will begin by setting out the supposed dangers of co-
optation. This will provide a candid insight into the potential threat that ineffective 
engagements with law can pose to a political movement. While it is important to accept that 
legal mobilisation presents challenges to labour movements and may even, in certain 
circumstances, be an unsuitable form of struggle; we must also critically analyse the 
assumption that engagements with law will necessarily co-opt a movement’s political 
objectives. I draw on scholarship that questions the understanding that legal mobilisation is 
politically ineffective and proposes a ‘multifaceted’302 and pragmatic approach to the ways 
that political struggles engage with law. By introducing counter-evidence that reveals the 
effective ways that political movements have engaged with law in practice, we will critically 
evaluate the tension between law’s potential effectiveness and the dangers of co-optation. 
In the second part of the tenet I will present an understanding of the conditions under which 
a labour movement can maximise law’s potential effectiveness and protect its political 
objectives. This will involve a return to two insights that we have already considered. First, 
the indirect effects of legal mobilisation expand our conception of legal mobilisation’s 
potential effectiveness and limits those instances that can be defined as having had a co-
optive effect.  The insight about indirect effects redraws our perspective on effectiveness by 
understanding how political objectives are not necessarily exhausted by an unfavourable 
court judgment. On the contrary, the productive relation between legal mobilisation and 
social struggles extends beyond direct effects. In other words, we must first better 
comprehend the distinction between a legal engagement that wins no direct effects and is 
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co-opted from one that wins no direct effects but whose political objectives are benefitted 
by indirect effects. 
Second, we will distinguish between legal tactics and political strategy so as to place legal 
mobilisation within the context of a wider political mobilisation. Importantly, the separation 
of political objectives from legal tactics reveals how a movement’s long-term objectives are 
not exhausted by, or entirely dependent upon, the outcome of legal engagements. To 
demonstrate how a labour movement might engage with law and hold into its political 
objectives, I will conclude the tenet by considering the role of organisational support. The 
organisation of a labour movement by trade unions brings into plain view the distinction 
between law as tactic and its broader political struggle. I will demonstrate how a labour 
movement will be better placed to avoid the dangers of co-optation where it has the capacity 
to mobilise and co-ordinate both its legal and political mobilisation. By distinguishing 
between legal tactics and political strategy, we can comprehend legal mobilisation as a 
strategic opportunity that serves labour’s objectives and that these objectives are not 
reducible to the outcome of tactical engagements. 
3.1. The danger of co-optation? 
The danger of co-optation and the extent to which social struggles can resist it are a central 
issue for the potential effectiveness of legal mobilisation. The danger that co-optation 
presents to the effectiveness of legal mobilisation is the potential loss or subversion of a 
movement’s political objectives in the act of engaging with law. In this section I will set out 
the concerns that fall under the category of co-optation. I will take a broad definition of these 
concerns and include critical accounts of legal mobilisation that range from a general critique 
of legal reformism to practical concerns about the limitations of tactical litigation. These 
criticisms present both a rejection of legal mobilisation as an effective tool for radical 
political struggle and an internal critique of the practice of legal mobilisation. I have already 
responded to the first concern by insisting on the continued role of legal mobilisation at the 
State level, however I will draw on both types of critique as an opportunity to better 
comprehend the potential pitfalls of legal engagement and shed further light on the threshold 
between what can and cannot be done in law. The former provides an opportunity to 
understand the threats that legal mobilisation poses to a movement’s political objectives. 
The latter returns to the threshold that we identified with the concept of law’s deficit of task; 
however, rather than assume that there is a pre-determined limit on what can be done in law, 
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I seek to hold onto the capacity of effective legal mobilisation and explore the ways that 
social movements might challenge the perceived normative boundaries of law. 
Having documented the concerns about co-optation and legal mobilisation’s negative impact 
on political objectives, we will introduce some critical readings of these supposed 
limitations. This will show that, while there will be certain limitations on the effectiveness 
of legal mobilisation, there are also rebuttals to these limitations that hold onto the 
opportunity in law and reveal a more textured interaction between effective engagements 
and co-optation. The point of this section is to recognise that effective engagements with 
law will be those that manage to draw in/direct effects for its political objectives and avoid 
the danger of co-optation. 
Traditional criticisms of legal mobilisation at the State level have centred around debates 
about either reformist or revolutionary forms of action. Reformism refers to the objective of 
incremental change to existing structures and describes the process of using law to advance 
a political aim through social reforms. A reform movement operates within the framework 
of legal and political action made available by the State. In contrast, a radical political 
movement is one that acts outside the scope of law due to concerns about the limitations 
legal rules might impose on political action. According to this distinction, legal mobilisation 
sits squarely within the reformist camp and, for this reason, is subject to criticism by political 
and legal scholarship that demands radical social transformation. The concerns raised are 
critical of the potential for radical change through legal reform and, presupposes that any 
attempts to pursue a transformational political struggle in law would be thwarted, or co-
opted, by legal structures. To better comprehend this criticism of legal mobilisation let us 
move from an abstract summary to a concrete example. 
The traditional ideological position has been that radical political aims, of labour for 
example, that are incompatible with the liberal legal systems will not be able to achieve their 
political objectives through social reform. Antonio Negri’s early scholarship was quite clear 
that the demands of the worker’s struggle could not be satisfied by liberal 
constitutionalism303. Against counter-productive constitutional methods that would account 
to nothing more than inadequate socio-economic labour reforms304; Negri argued for 
alternative planes of action outside of the liberal constitution305 that could harness the 
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political potential of the multitude306 and liberate all, not just workers, from oppressive social 
conditions under capitalism307. 
At the risk of caricaturing Negri’s position, I draw on his proposals as an example of the 
ideological dismissal of legal reformism as inimitable to a radical political agenda. There is, 
on Negri’s account, an insurmountable disagreement between the demands of worker 
autonomy, communism and liberal constitutionalism’s fidelity to capitalism that will always 
mitigate against reformist efforts at internal transformation of liberal constitutional 
structures.308. In other words, Negri identifies law’s deficit of task and concludes that, as a 
result, law is not an effective site of struggle. This sets a high-water mark for the limitations 
of legal mobilisation and what labour movements can and cannot achieve by engaging with 
law.  
Although Negri provides an understanding of the ultimate limitation upon legal mobilisation 
at the State level, this thesis has insisted on examining the ways that labour movements 
continue to challenge this limit. Rather than follow Negri toward the supposed opportunities 
of post-State solutions, we will remain focused on the ways that labour movements engage 
with State law and unpack the socio-legal concerns about co-optation. While Negri’s insights 
serve an important warning about the normative boundaries of law, the opportunity 
presented by the State’s institutional capacity combined with the practical reality of struggle 
at the State level means that scholarship must analyse the effective practices that might 
enable unlikely legal protections for radical political movements. We will return to this 
distinction between reformist and revolutionary practices and expand on the opportunity to 
challenge entrenched legal interests in section 3.2 below. 
If the reformist critique is concerned largely with the structural limitations upon normative 
change within legal and political systems, the internal critique of legal mobilisation in socio-
legal scholarship highlights the ways that legal systems neutralise, distort or adversely affect 
the political objectives behind legal mobilisation. In other words, by engaging with legal 
functions, it is supposed that a movement’s “focus on legal reform narrows the causes, 
deradicalizes the agenda, legitimises ongoing injustice, and diverts energies away from more 
effective and transformative energies.”309 Orly Lobel has categorised the co-optation 
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criticisms as including concerns about: Resources and energy, framing and fragmentation, 
lawyering and professionalism, institutional limitations, crowding out and the 
unsubstantiated legitimation of existing social arrangements310. In order to better 
comprehend the danger of co-optation when engaging with law, I will follow Lobel’s 
identification of these six criticisms and summarise their potential effects on movements’ 
political objectives. This will provide an understanding of both limitations to the potential 
effectiveness of legal mobilisation and a basis from which we can begin to understand the 
conditions that might mitigate against law’s co-optive effects. 
First, litigation is an expensive process that could consume a movement’s available 
resources at the expense of other potentially effective political tactics311. The concern here 
is that the demanding and resource-intensive nature of litigation may detract from the aims 
of social movements by diverting organisational resources away from the more immediate 
concerns of its members. And, the returns from litigation may not be worth their high cost, 
should legal mobilisation fail to deliver direct or indirect effects a movement may have been 
better placed to deploy non-legal tactics312. In addition, the relative inexperience of 
grassroots struggles will put movements at a disadvantage against parties with vast resources 
and tacit knowledge of legal proceedings313. For example, a criticism of the NAACP’s 
litigation strategy has been that its fixation on pursuing workplace discrimination cases 
under the Civil Rights Act delivered benefits to only a restricted class of African-Americans, 
and these victories came at the expense of wider and more immediate concerns about poverty 
and education that could have been addressed through community investment314. By 
concentrating on a litigious strategy, the NAACP has been accused of becoming alienated 
from the interests of African-American communities which contributed to reduced 
movement energy outside the courtroom315. Movement energy, as we will see below, is a 
critical factor in a movement’s successful political mobilisation. 
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Second, legal mobilisation involves framing a political dispute in legal terms316. It is argued 
that framing threatens to distort a movement’s political objectives by replacing political 
demands with legal proposals. As I set out in tenet one, effective engagements with law will 
involve framing political claims as an argument about a particular right or regulation. For 
the sake of legal intelligibility, a movement’s normative nuances and specific demands may 
not be represented in legal arguments317. On the one hand, the limitation imposed by framing 
is one that needs to be accepted and seen as a necessary effect of legal engagement. As we 
have already considered, labour movements that engage with State law will have to work 
within the paradigm of law’s excess of meaning and deficit of task. And, the decision to 
engage on law’s terms means ceding to its structural relationships. For labour, this means 
attempting to shift the balance of power within the capital-labour relations as opposed to 
overthrowing that relation altogether. 
On the other hand, framing can neutralise more radical political demands by responding to 
their demands with piecemeal, not structural, reform. And, at worst, framing can fail to 
represent political demands and lead to ineffective or even counter-productive legal 
responses. The danger that can result from ineffective framing is it can cause movements to 
fragment318 owing to disagreements about the gap between political objectives and the 
chosen approach to legal argumentation. In the final part of this tenet I will return to the 
tension between the necessity of framing in legal mobilisation and its co-optive effects to 
consider how a labour movement might manage the opportunity and danger of framing. The 
key issue that will be analysed is the extent to which the use of law as a tactic can be deployed 
effectively for the purpose of a movement’s political strategy. Or, to put it otherwise, how 
can movements hold onto their political objectives given the danger of law’s co-optive 
effects? 
Third, lawyers have been understood to contribute to the co-optation of a movement’s 
political objectives319. Due to the specialised nature of the legal field a movement must 
assume ‘high-dependency’ on their lawyers. The role of lawyers in translating political 
demands and representing a movement in law introduces the risk that their legal 
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engagements misrepresent their political aims320. As with legal framing, the language in 
which political demands are presented by their lawyers may be unrecognisable to a 
movement’s constituents and could alienate members and have de-mobilising effects321. 
Fourth, the limitations of legal institutions to deliver reforms have also been the subject of 
critical analyses of tactical litigation. Courts may issue favourable judgments and legislation 
may promise certain reforms, but this does not guarantee immediate enforcement or 
substantial reform in practice322. The judiciary’s lack of an enforcement function means that 
the effectiveness of tactical litigation is contingent on a synchronicity between all branches 
of government. For instance, a court may rule that certain working conditions are unlawful 
and call for new legislative measures, but this does not determine what the content of any 
new law ought to be. The danger for labour movements is that movement energy and 
financial resources expended in the judicialization of their conflict may be thwarted by the 
limitations of the judicial decision. In these instances, labour movements will have to ensure 
that they are able to transfer movement energy from the legal arena into a sustained political 
campaign aimed at legislative reform. 
Fifth, legal mobilisation has been understood to dominate a movement’s strategy once it is 
chosen as a tactic of struggle. At issue here are two concerns, first that forms of political 
action will be assumed to be ineffective and that all mobilisation efforts will be concentrated 
into legal engagements. Law’s authoritative role in social ordering means that alternative 
political forms of action may be viewed as deviant323 or less effective324, which might skew 
a movements resources toward legal mobilisation when political actions may be more 
effective. Second, the juridification of political conflicts can have a de-mobilising effect on 
the wider political movement. This is particularly acute where legal processes come to an 
end and it is assumed that the political conflict has been resolved. For example, the New 
Deal and its restructuring of collective bargaining rules is cited as having had a 
demobilising/deradicalising effect on associated labour movements that had encouraged 
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more radical forms of political action325. For Karl Klare, the New Deal labour law reform 
(The National Labor Relations Act 1935) represented “a prospect or aspiration for 
democratic and, to some degree, anti-capitalist social change, as well as a buttress of the 
institutional system for State administration and containment of class struggle.”326 Klare’s 
evaluation refers to the legislation’s shift away from more radical social change as a result 
of successful lobbying by pro-business interests that mitigated against the aims of the 
militant labour struggle of the 1930s.327 The challenge for labour movements engaged in 
legal mobilisation is to insulate its trajectory from legal decisions, although, as the example 
details, this may be unavoidable where new legislative provisions directly confront a 
movement’s aims. 
Sixth, legal mobilisation that challenges the perceived injustices of a legal system may only 
serve to reinforce social understandings of law’s legitimate authority328. As we know, law 
monopolises material power through coercive means but, symbolic power is the product of 
a broad societal understanding that law is a legitimate source of authority. The legitimacy of 
such authority is reproduced where it performs legal functions in a manner that is expected 
by society. For instance, in Loughlin legitimate government is contingent on its capacity to 
maintain the political unity of the State which requires the legal and political system to 
manage social conflicts and satisfy social expectations329. Accordingly, the efficient 
functioning of a legal system is understood to have reproduced its legitimate authority to 
rule. The danger of co-optation occurs when social struggles engage law with the aim of 
challenging social injustices and/or entrenched interests and law issues a response that does 
not satisfy the movement’s aims but does reproduce the legal system’s legitimate authority 
to order social relations. The claim by critics of legal mobilisation is that; by engaging with 
a legal system that creates the conditions of social injustice, social movements often fail to 
tackle the root cause of these injustices and legitimise the offending legal system in so 
doing.330 Therefore, a labour movement may expend vast financial resources and energy in 
critiquing the legal system only to receive limited tangible legal protections and, 
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simultaneously, provide an opportunity for the legal system to ‘resolve’ a conflict and 
confirm its social legitimacy as the supreme ordering authority. 
3.2. A rebuttal of co-optation’s pervasive effect 
In response to these concerns about legal mobilisation we must recognise the potentially 
negative impact on the effectiveness of legal mobilisation. However, we will reflect on 
whether, and to what extent, issues of co-optation preclude litigation’s effectiveness as a 
political tool. As Lobel puts it: “The contemporary truism about the limits of legal change is 
thus that law defangs radical demands and should not be the chosen path to transformative 
politics.”331 Lobel’s criticism captures the need to recognise the limits of legal mobilisation 
without abandoning it as a potentially effective practice for social struggles. 
Rather than assume all legal mobilisations will be ineffectual owing to the danger of co-
optation, we need a nuanced approach that recognises both its potential maleffects and its 
capacity to deliver in/direct effects. This thesis has argued that labour movements ought to 
engage in legal mobilisation because it remains, both in theory and practice, a potentially 
effective tool in workers’ struggles for legal protections. Arguments about co-optation 
threaten to derail, or at least marginalise, this claim. Therefore, this section argues that legal 
mobilisation is not inherently de-mobilising and that the limitations detailed above can, in 
some cases, be turned into positives. In the next section we will consider how labour 
movements might reduce the potentially co-optive effects of legal mobilisation. Before that, 
we will introduce some rebuttals to the danger of co-optation and provide a more balanced 
conception of the relation between legal mobilisation and a movement’s political objectives. 
Reform activists sometimes do overestimate the benefits of litigation and 
underestimate its financial and organisational costs, of course. But my point is that 
critics often inflate their case with inadequate evidence and faulty logic regarding the 
inherently crippling effects of reform litigation. There simply is little direct evidence 
that reform activists are routinely duped by either myopic lawyers or the liberal myth 
of rights. Quite the contrary, much interview-intensive evidence confirms that many – 
perhaps most – cause lawyers and other reform activists alike are quite politically 
sophisticated in their use of legal tactics.332 
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In light of his analysis of the pay equity movement, McCann suggests that supposed 
limitations may be tempered in practice and even transformed into positives. For our 
purposes, McCann introduces an important rebuttal to the co-optation critiques that 
considers not just the potential effectiveness of legal mobilisation, but how the perceived 
causes of co-optation have in fact been deployed effectively in the context of a struggle. For 
example, rather than lawyers dominating proceedings and limiting political mobilisations; 
there is evidence that suggests lawyers have recognised and embraced the role of political 
mobilisation. 
[O]ne of the central conclusions of my equity movement study has been that the total 
positive impact of a diversified tactical approach is often far greater than the sum of 
all the tactics viewed separately. Moreover, if litigation is deployed as just one of 
several co-ordinated tactics, there is no necessary reason why it must be a divisive, 
atomising force.333 
McCann details how contemporary social movements are more likely to be characterised by 
“tactical diversity” than be dominated by lawyers334. And, in response to concerns about the 
resource-intensity of legal mobilisation, McCann insists that, in certain circumstances “legal 
tactics can produce as well as consume financial resources.”335 In some high-profile cases 
awards for court costs have covered all legal fees and cost movements ‘little to nothing’. In 
addition, we can recognise that the financial cost of legal action might be invaluable relative 
to the positive effect of legal reform on a movement’s strategic objectives. 
Finally, rather than assuming that legal language necessarily dominates a political 
movement, legal consciousness studies have revealed how social movements will combine 
critical approaches to law with a tactical use of it336. Indeed, Ewick and Silbey’s seminal 
study of legal consciousness has shown that movement participants will engage ‘with, 
before, or against the law’337, and far from mere domination social struggles have 
demonstrated a more complex interaction with legal structures. By assuming that law 
infiltrates, narrows and determines the scope of political thought, McCann argues that critics 
have often patronised and underestimated the innovative ways that political movements 
engage with law338. Indeed, McCann’s approach to legal mobilisation emphasises the ways 
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that social struggles will manage the dangers of co-optation and engage productively with 
law. 
The insight from McCann’s rebuttal of co-optation’s pervasive effects is that: While legal 
mobilisation can impose limitations on a movement’s political objectives, these effects are 
just one part of the pragmatic calculations that need to be made when formulating an 
effective engagement with law. Indeed, concerns that ‘State law has co-optive effects on 
political objectives’ need to be balanced against the potential opportunity that such legal 
engagements present to a labour movement. Legal mobilisation at the State level is a 
potentially effective practice for social struggles and the presence of limitations does not 
contradict this claim. On the contrary, it provides a position from which to comprehend those 
actions that can benefit a strategic objective and those that threaten to neutralise or de-
stabilise a movement. 
We can take this insight further and recognise that pragmatic decision-making about 
potential opportunities and limitations on political objectives is not unique to actions taken 
at State level. In fact, whichever type of action and/or site of action in which it is taken will 
demand pragmatic calculations about potential effectiveness. This applies to legal 
mobilisation at the State level or within a local, non-Western legal system, and to forms of 
political mobilisation. This is an important insight for our purposes because it frees legal 
mobilisation at the State level from the terminal criticism that its co-optive effects 
necessarily limit its usefulness as a tool of political struggle. Rather than assume that the 
State level is an inferior site of action because alternative institutional forms are capable of 
realising political objectives free-from negative externalities; a more realistic conception of 
political struggle recognises that each site of struggle will present similar challenges. Thus, 
the challenge is for social struggles to effectively engage with available legal tools and make 
pragmatic calculations that weigh opportunities and limitation together with strategic 
objectives. To substantiate this claim, let us consider three brief insights from Orly Lobel’s 
critical analysis of legal pluralism as a means to confront the dangers of co-optation at the 
State level. 
First, civil society organisations and legal pluralisms have been identified as alternative sites 
of organising to traditional State-based legal systems339. In theory, civil society groups are 
identified as a means to directly address social concerns without having to engage with legal 
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systems that mediate, and potentially distort, their political ambition. However, Lobel 
cautions that in practice such engagements with civil society can be co-opted by more 
conservative agendas. For example, the civil society movement’s central premise of 
‘decentring’ social programmes by limiting the role of the State in social transformation 
aligns with a conservative agenda that prefers privatisation programmes and implementation 
of non-State supervisory bodies. Rather than acting as a defence against deregulation and 
neoliberal globalisation that thrives on the absence of legal obligations, civil society 
organising can unwittingly endorse a structural framework with few checks and balances.  
Second, Lobel argues that, by vacating the space of law and assuming an extra-legal position, 
activists assume a false position in which they no longer exert pressure on legal structures 
but remain subject to them. Activists must assume a more complex relationship that 
recognises the opportunities and limitations involved with legal mobilisation. Indeed, 
abandoning the State means losing a legitimate authority with the capacity to enforce legal 
obligations. As I have argued in tenet two above, the institutional capacity of the State is 
especially important for labour because it imposes regulatory standards and coerces 
employers to abide by its obligations. Third, pluralism and/or localism can lead to a 
fragmentation of a political movement. The move to extra-legal forms of organisation and 
pluralism leads to a fragmentation of energies that prevents any cooperation or the collective 
strength needed to deliver wide-ranging social transformation. 
We have drawn on insights that legal mobilisation at the State level is not uniquely afflicted 
by the danger of co-optation and McCann’s rebuttal of the co-optation critique as a means 
to insert a doubt into the received understanding that legal mobilisation has a negative impact 
upon political objectives. Accordingly, it is not possible to write-off legal mobilisation as a 
tool of social struggle because its positive contribution to social struggles will be a matter of 
contextual contingency. As McCann has stated, a movement’s “specific situational 
dynamics”340 will determine the effectiveness of engagements with law. This re-affirms the 
need for a pragmatic approach to the tension between legal mobilisation’s effectiveness and 
the dangers of co-optation. In order to better comprehend such pragmatic calculations, the 
remainder of this tenet will develop our nuanced approach to legal mobilisation’s 
effectiveness and provide an understanding of the conditions in which the danger of co-
optation might be avoided. 
 
340 McCann, Rights at Work (n 231) 296. 
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3.3. Tactics, strategy and in/direct effects: Limiting the danger of co-optation 
In this section I will present an understanding of the ways that engagements with law can 
enable a movement’s political objectives whilst limiting the potential danger of co-optation. 
To comprehend how movements manage this tension I will return to two guiding insights: 
The in/direct effects of legal mobilisation and the distinction between tactics and strategy. 
The first stage of my argument encourages a broader perspective on the relation between 
legal mobilisation and strategic objectives. If we return to the insight about in/direct effects 
from tenet one, we can begin to redraw our understanding of the tension between effective 
engagements and co-optation of political objectives. This will recognise the extended 
benefits of effective legal mobilisation to a movement’s aims and insists on the potential 
effectiveness of legal tactics over-time. The second insight centres on the distinction 
between legal tactics and political strategy. I will argue that, the key to limiting the co-optive 
effects of law lies in the capacity of a movement to distinguish between its legal and political 
mobilisation. The danger of co-optation appears when political objectives become over-
reliant on legal tactics and political demands are subordinated to law’s determinations. In 
order to exemplify the relation between tactics and strategy, I will draw on the important 
role of organisational support that enables movements to manage the tension between the 
potential effectiveness of tactical engagements with law and the danger of co-optation. 
We have already considered the types of limitations that are contained within the general 
danger of co-optation; the concern here is how to determine when an engagement with law 
does or does not contribute to a movement’s political objectives. The danger of co-optation 
will appear more likely when we take a narrow approach to effectiveness. For instance, if a 
movement’s political objectives are only understood as receiving a benefit when legal 
mobilisation delivers direct effects, all other outcomes can be registered as an example of 
law mitigating against – or co-opting – a movement’s political intentions. 
I have argued above that a more realistic approach to the effectiveness of legal mobilisation 
is one that recognises indirect effects. If we return to these insights, we can see that even 
engagements with law that do not deliver direct effects can provide important externalities 
for a movement’s political objectives. This shifts the balance between law’s potential 
effectiveness and the danger of co-optation by reducing the instances in which engagements 
with law will have a de-mobilising effect on a social struggle. The insight from indirect 
effects encourages a textured account of legal mobilisation’s effectiveness by taking a 
comprehensive approach to the relation between law and social movements. 
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In response to the charge of co-optation, McCann builds on his insights about in/direct 
effects and suggests that we must consider the long-term effects of legal mobilisation on a 
political struggle and suggests distinguishing between legal reform that ‘contained’ a 
political movement and legal engagements that have ‘expansionary’ capacity341. 
Accordingly, a ‘contained’ legal reform is one that achieves short-term results but does not 
result in widespread social transformation. An expansionist movement is one that builds on 
short-term gains and develops into a larger counterhegemonic struggle. In other words, 
McCann emphasises how a political struggle that achieves legal reform should not 
necessarily be understood to have had its political intent contained; legal reforms or 
mobilisation can provide the platform for a continued struggle for social transformation. By 
looking at whether a legal reform contained a political movement or facilitated the expansion 
of a political struggle provides a more textured account of the relation between a political 
movement and legal reform. 
Large-scale social movements rarely begin with grand architectonic designs and 
radical social agendas, as structuralists often suggest. Rather, counterhegemonic 
movements most often evolve incrementally through a series of more limited local 
struggles over quite concrete, often trivial ends….Small-scale acts of quiet resistance 
or simple demands for reform thus are not simply a coopted alternative to 
transformative politics.342 
Rather than evaluating legal mobilisation according to its ability to achieve grand social 
transformations, McCann insists on a position that recognises the importance of incremental 
developments. A legal engagement that does not deliver legal protections or constitute a 
reform is not necessarily an example of a political use of law that has been co-opted. In fact, 
according to McCann, a failed attempt at legal reform can serve to generate political support 
and mobilise resources before launching an effective long-term struggle. A sociologically 
informed approach to the relation between legal mobilisation and social struggles recognises 
the importance of incremental steps, and how small-scale actions can serve more 
fundamental long-term ends.  
Returning to the critique at the start of this tenet that drew sharp distinctions between 
reformist and revolutionary struggles, we can begin to recognise the interaction between the 
two practices and objectives. There will be a fluid interaction between strategy and tactics. 
At certain times, tactical engagements may not appear to deliver a radical critique of the 
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legal order but might deliver important legal protections that contribute to a social struggle’s 
longer-term objectives. On the other, constitutional values will enable workers to present 
arguments that challenge the current content of law in pursuit of their strategic aims. We can 
draw on David Harvey’s succinct summary of the practical relation between tactical actions 
and strategical goals:  
[T]he difference between a reformist and a revolutionary is not necessarily that you do 
radical things all the time, but it is that at a given moment, you may all do the same 
thing, i.e. demand living wage, but you do it with a different objective, and that is a 
long-term transition.343 
The insight here is that so-called reformist practices may be used as part of a wider struggle 
for a ‘revolutionary’ political transformation that cannot be currently accommodated within 
law’s deficit of task. The potential effectiveness of using legal tactics for political ends is 
the central preoccupation of this thesis and the importance of the interaction between tactics 
and strategy will be subject of the remainder of this tenet. I will build on the role of tactics 
and strategy to provide a conception of the ways that movements can limit the co-optive 
effects of litigation and hold onto their political objectives during legal engagements.  
The aim of this discussion is to situate tactical engagements with law within the context of 
political struggle as a response to claims that law necessarily co-opts a movement’s political 
objectives. Effective legal mobilisation will be composed of two elements: There is tactical 
use of legal tools and a wider political strategy with normative demands. If we were to 
narrow our view of legal engagement to the use of law as a tool, we might easily conclude 
that a political movement’s effectiveness and ultimate trajectory is entirely reducible to legal 
processes. 
As we know, a politics of legality is viewed by Santos as a key element in an effective 
engagement of law by a political struggle as it ensures that any legal action is concurrently 
debated and mobilised in the political sphere344. For Santos, this ensures that an issue is not 
 
343 ‘A Conversation with David Harvey’ (2006) 5 Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Culture in Knox 
(n 28) 219. 
344 Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (n 35) 469.; The politics of rights is both the idea that rights 
can be used in politics to make a claim and form a group, but also that rights claims are political because the 
scope of a right or its interpretation can be changed or reapplied. The politics of rights was a term used by 
Scheingold (1974; 1986) to describe how the elevated status of legal rights claims benefitted political 
mobilisation. Political struggles were organised or ‘constituted’ around a rights claim and could claim 
support from social groups or from State institutions.; On a politics of law as a counter-hegemonic strategy 
see also, Hunt (n 253). 
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contained within legalistic categories that limit the scope of analysis345. By politicising the 
subject of litigation, the present boundaries of legality are no longer subject to solely 
juridical analysis but become part of a wider political discussion. My argument about the 
importance of political strategy draws on politicisation as a practice that holds onto the 
normative aims of a social struggle. A labour movement ought not to engage with law 
exclusively but ensure that such engagements are paired with and contribute to their political 
struggle. The question that remains is: How do labour movements organise their tactical 
engagements with law so that their efforts contribute to their political strategy? In what 
follows I will expand upon the assumption that co-optation can be avoided by drawing on a 
dedicated account of the ways that social struggles politicise the terms of legal engagement. 
Honor Brabazon has distinguished between movements that use ‘law for politics’ and ‘law 
as politics’ to comprehend the different ways that social movements engage with law346. The 
principle aim of this distinction, for Brabazon, is to provide a more rigorous account of law’s 
role in political strategy. 
When law is used for politics, law is used as a tool or vehicle for a (subversive) political 
pursuit. When law is used as politics, the use of law itself is a (subversive) political 
pursuit as well. Law is still being used as a tool for a political pursuit, but this 
substantive political pursuit (such as a favourable court decision) is subordinate to the 
procedural political pursuit of using the law in a subversive way to achieve it. More 
specifically, in instances of law for politics, law is used unquestioningly in order to 
legitimise and institutionalise the political goal being sought. In contrast, in instances 
of law as politics, law is used not to enjoy but to exploit the legitimising and 
institutionalising characteristics of law….As such, the use of law as politics might 
appeal to movements that contain elements which would prefer more radical change 
than would be possible using law for politics, but which are unable to do so at that 
time.347 
Law as politics highlights the distinction between a movement’s political and legal 
mobilisation. And, in these circumstances, the mobilisation of legal tools does not 
subordinate a social struggle to the outcome of engagements with law because, where there 
is a wider political mobilisation a movement is not exhausted by the outcome of legal 
engagements. For our purposes, Brabazon’s concept of ‘law as politics’ neatly captures the 
relation between legal tactics and political strategy and provides a more textured account of 
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legal mobilisation’s strategic opportunity than one preoccupied with the dangers of co-
optation. In order to better comprehend how labour movements can engage with law 
effectively and hold onto their political objectives, we will work through Brabazon’s 
distinction between law as politics and law for politics. 
Law for politics describes legal engagements that do not carry a wider political objective, 
such as the subversion of the legal system’s legitimacy or the wider reform of constitutional 
provisions. For Brabazon, the absence of a wider political agenda means that the aims and 
effectiveness of law for politics is contingent upon the outcome of law’s determination of its 
claims. In other words, an engagement with law that is not linked to a wider political 
mobilisation should be understood as a purely strategic use of law. In the terms set out in 
chapter two, the absence of a long-term political objective means that any such use of law is 
not tactical but strategic. For example, we can understand a group of workers whose sole 
aim is to challenge their dismissal and be reinstated at work as having a legal strategy whose 
effectiveness is tied to the achievement of a legal decision that satisfies its stated objectives. 
If we suppose that these workers have no wider political objectives outside of these 
objectives, the danger of co-optation will be realised where their claims are rejected on the 
grounds that their dismissal was legal. The group’s engagement with law would be 
categorised as law as politics if their legal challenge was part of a wider political challenge 
to the current regulations about unfair dismissal from work. Therefore, law for politics is 
aligned with internal legal strategy that lacks a wider political critique and law as politics 
draws out the relation between tactical engagements and their contribution to a political 
strategy. 
The ‘law as politics’ approach is built on three principles: Law is one aspect of political 
struggle; Law is always already political; and the social legitimacy of law is at stake in the 
politics of legality. According to Brabazon, it is within these principles that we can identify 
the separation between law as a tactical opportunity and its wider political aims that are not 
co-opted by legal functions. Let us summarise these principles to better comprehend how 
legal mobilisation can be deployed to the benefit of political objectives. 
The first principle is a belief that legal change is not sufficient348. Legal engagements are 
seen as “an opportunity to move towards a resolution” of certain issues but a political 
movement will aim toward more radical systemic changes that legal mobilisation alone 
 
348 ibid 7. 
  
Chapter 3. Labour movements and the potential effectiveness of legal strategy: Three tenets 
127 
cannot deliver. As such, when law is used as a tool by a radical political movement it does 
so, from the start, with a theoretical understanding of law’s limitations in relation to social 
transformation. From Brabazon’s perspective, these limitations do not make legal 
mobilisation ineffectual but are simply markers of what can and cannot be done in law. 
Following Brabazon’s insights, legal tactics will seek to contribute to a political objective 
but may be incapable of delivering its ultimate goals. Therefore, a movement need not be 
understood as having been co-opted just because it relies on legal decisions that do not attain 
more radical political reforms; on the contrary, such engagements with law may contribute 
to a longer-term political aim. 
Second, Brabazon argues that radical political movements approach law as an already 
politicised forum349. Any decision about the content of law is understood as a political 
process because it determines the (il)legality of certain social, political and economic actions 
and orders social relations. Therefore, a social movement will engage with law to the extent 
that it serves its own normative account of what law ought to be, and where legal 
mobilisation serves no such purpose it may choose to engage other tactics. In other words, 
legal mobilisation is always a part of the wider political struggle, and law will not be engaged 
where it does not serve these objectives. 
Third, the social legitimacy of law will be targeted by movements whose engagements with 
law seek to expose its injustices and contradictions. By questioning both the content of laws 
and presenting alternative interpretations of existing rules, Brabazon argues that political 
movements can invite a reflexive consideration of the vested interests that underlie the legal 
system and its rules350. In practice, attempts to disrupt law’s present normative order may be 
rejected by judges but, the act of revealing such biases in law is capable of generating public 
support for a struggle351. For our purposes, we can see that the indirect effect of publicising 
a political struggle’s objectives will ensure that tactical engagements with law serve a 
political strategy. Law may not present any means of direct redress where the political 
objectives present a challenge to law’s entrenched interests and/or question law’s legitimacy, 
however, there are ways to engage with law effectively in pursuit of such ends. 
Brabazon’s law as politics brings together our previous analysis from Santos’ conception of 
grassroots legal mobilisation to in/direct effects and the productive interaction between 
 
349 ibid 30. 
350 ibid 31. 
351 ibid 32. 
  
Chapter 3. Labour movements and the potential effectiveness of legal strategy: Three tenets 
128 
tactics and strategy. The abiding insight from the concept of law as politics is that law will 
be engaged by political movements with a wider critique of law’s current content for the 
purpose of advancing its political objectives. This is important for our conception that labour 
movements can engage effectively with law because we can identify the separation between 
their use of law as a tactic and its intended contribution to labour’s wider political objectives. 
As Brabazon has put it: “Law is used as a strategic opportunity and not as a determinant of 
strategy.”352 In order to expand upon this conception of effective tactical engagements and 
how they are deployed for strategic purposes, I will set out the role of organisational 
structures in ensuring that a movement is capable of managing the relation between legal 
and political mobilisation. In other words, I will provide an understanding of the conditions 
under which a movement can engage effectively with law and minimise the danger that law 
will co-opt its political objectives. 
Before we move on, it is important to acknowledge that the means that a movement might 
employ to hold onto its political objectives will be numerous and the product of innovative 
practices that I cannot begin to pre-determine. Brabazon provides a final insight here about 
the types of political practice that will protect strategic objectives against law’s attempts to 
dismiss or distort political demands. Brabazon notes how the MST (Bolivia) and ERT 
(Argentina) movements have engaged in a ‘radical legal praxis’ that has protected their 
political aims. The MST and ERT have taken actions that are illegal (the occupation of 
private property) and engaged law to legalise their use of property and protect their long-
term aims. This introduces the idea that a labour movement can hold out against law’s co-
optive effects by deploying forms of political action that may involve illegal practices. I will 
not analyse this phenomenon further as the role of such ‘radical legal praxis’ will be subject 
to further discussion in the next chapter.  
3.3.1. Labour movements and Trade Unions: Organising the relation between legal 
tactics and political struggle 
This final subsection will demonstrate how the organisational role played by trade unions is 
key to the productive relation between political strategy and legal tactics. A trade union is a 
key factor in building a successful labour movement353. A trade union will both mobilise 
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political strength and provide the structures required for an effective use of legal and pollical 
tactics. It is beyond our current task to wade into the vast and disparate literatures on trade 
unionism, labour struggles, and political organising354. For our present purposes, we will 
introduce labour’s organisation to our discussion and make the modest claim that, a 
determining factor in the construction of an effective labour movement will revolve around 
a movement’s organisational capacity to manage the relation between legal tactics and 
political strategy. The aim of organisational structures, I will argue, is to ensure that there is 
an adequate political mobilisation and that a movement does not become defined solely by 
its engagements with law. 
I will refer to ‘trade unions’ as representative of an organisational structure that is capable 
of mobilising both legal and political practices. Of course, in certain circumstances, this 
function may not be performed by a trade union. Instead, an alternative institutional structure 
or the movement itself will be responsible for synchronising their legal and political 
mobilisation. Nonetheless, I will refer to ‘trade unions’ in what follows as emblematic of a 
labour movement’s need for robust organisational structures that effectively mobilise tactics 
that serve strategic objectives. 
Political mobilisation will involve the formation of a movement’s identity around normative 
demands and recruiting workers to build political strength355. The solidarity of members is 
a key part of a union’s organisational efforts and ensures that legal mobilisation is always 
taken on behalf of and is backed by a political movement. The point of solidarity here is it 
provides collective strength owing to the commitment by workers to the achievement of their 
collective demands. Importantly, such political mobilisation can buttress legal mobilisation. 
For instance, a labour movement’s ability to apply political leverage, and not rely solely on 
the result of legal decisions, is contingent on there being a mobilised collective that is willing 
to take political action. As such, the organisation of a labour movement is a prerequisite for 
any political strategy and provides important tools in the form of political action, such as 
industrial action or other forms of protest. In the absence of an organised political struggle, 
the outcome of any engagement with law would be reducible to law’s determinations and 
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such a movement would have failed to heed the advice about law as politics and, as a result, 
would be open to the threat of co-optation. 
The mobilisation of workers in support of a particular cause has been cited as an important 
factor in co-ordinating effective engagements with law. As Bronfenbrenner et al have noted, 
the decade post-1945 saw high rates of worker unionisation and a growth in legislative 
regulation as trade unions exercised political leverage. However, in the following decades 
periods of low/decreased unionisation in the United States have been accompanied by 
deregulation, a reduction in progressive labour law reforms and weakened trade unions 
incapable of arresting the slide356. This process of unionisation is the product of political 
mobilisation that is key to labour movements. 
For instance, the organisational strength of trade unions enables a movement to benefit from 
a range of tactical resources such as lobbying for legislative protections, leveraging in 
employer negotiations, publicising of a particular demand or injustice, and building a 
successful industrial action campaign that generates public support. These political actions 
may include public campaigns to generate political support for proposed legislative reforms, 
but it can also be focused on workplace organising357 that seeks to build a labour movement’s 
membership base and develop movement consciousness. 
For our purposes, the key issue is that a trade union is capable of co-ordinating resources 
and knowledge into an effective use of legal tactics that provide in/direct effects to a labour 
movement’s political objectives. My argument has been that a labour movement is not 
reducible to its engagement with law, so long as its engagements with law are tactical and 
deployed as part of a wider political strategy. A precondition of this claim is that a movement 
is not lead solely by labour lawyers but has an organisational structure that mobilises the 
necessary resources, exercises competent political expertise (bargaining, leveraging and 
strategizing) and maintains the support of its members. Under these conditions a labour 
movement will be best placed to manage the tension between effective legal mobilisation 
and the danger of co-optation. Although the precise conditions of effective legal mobilisation 
will vary in different contexts, the overriding factor is that a labour movement is built upon 
strong political foundations and engages law in pursuit of political objectives. 
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For labour movements from-below it may be that specific trade unions are required, those 
that are able to better represent their specific demands. Traditional trade unions may be 
insufficiently responsive and/or unwilling to represent the political demands of different 
groups of workers. There are vast issues relating to the effectiveness of trade unions, 
especially in response to more recent changes in work and employer/employee relations358. 
Not all trade unions will provide a suitable organisational structure to support grassroots 
labour movements. For instance, if a labour movement demands radical reform to the 
employer-employee relationship an established trade union may be unwilling to provide 
organisational support due to the damage such an affiliation would cause to their working 
relationship with employers. And, even in more modest scenarios trade unions may be ill-
equipped to mobilise and represent workers whose working practices diverge from more 
traditional forms of work. For example, the organisational needs of workers in the so-called 
‘gig economy’ are not analogous to those of factory workers that have a culture of 
unionisation. As such, the type of labour organisation representing and organising a 
movement may vary from traditional trade unions to disparate forms of association that 
manage a labour movement359. The key issue is that an organisation exercises a range of 
functions from mobilising a collective of workers, developing workers’ political 
consciousness, and co-ordinating legal tactics with political objectives. 
The central claim of the third tenet is that engagements with law can contribute to a labour 
movement’s political aims, and not simply threaten to co-opt their political demands. While 
there are certain insuperable limitations that prevent more radical political demands from 
receiving direct effects; the innovative interplay between tactics, strategy and in/direct 
effects reveal how such radical political movements may still engage effectively with law. 
For instance, while law may be unwilling to recognise legal claims that threaten to infringe 
private property rights, the publicization of a labour movement’s demands may generate 
political support for their specific case or even mobilise wider societal movements against 
such perceived injustices. Therefore, I have encouraged a pragmatic approach to the danger 
of co-optation that recognises the potential limitations of legal mobilisation, but also 
comprehends that social struggles will weigh any potential threats against the potential 
effectiveness of legal engagement. Rather than concede that law necessarily has a negative 
effect on political aims, I have encouraged a textured approach that recognises the conditions 
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under which labour movements will limit the dangers of co-optation and benefit from the 
potential effectiveness of legal mobilisation. 
4 Conclusion 
These tenets have sought to provide a detailed conception of the potential effectiveness of 
engagements with law at the State level. We began by highlighting the various innovative 
ways that labour movements will engage with law and encouraged a textured account of 
legal mobilisation’s effectiveness. Michael McCann’s conception of the direct and indirect 
effects that legal engagements can provide to social struggles has provided a detailed account 
of the opportunity that State law continues to present to labour movements. I developed our 
conception of the ways that labour movements will engage law by analysing the role of 
framing in the articulation of effective legal arguments. The central concern was the extent 
to which movements can draw on law’s in/direct effects for the purpose of realising their 
political demands. On the one hand, labour movements that seek direct legal protections or 
structural reforms will need to frame their political claims in a legally cognisable form. This 
means that effective engagements with law rely on a competent re-presentation of political 
demands into a legal claim that can be accommodated within law’s normative boundaries. 
On the other hand, labour movements may actively refuse to frame their claims in law in 
order to politicise the current state of legal regulations and mobilise a wider movement for 
social transformation. 
In tenet two we addressed the reason why State legal systems are an effective site of struggle 
for labour movements. Notwithstanding the recent proliferation of innumerable legal 
pluralisms, the State’s monopoly over coercive mechanisms and claims to correctness mean 
that it is able to both issue normative claims and enforce them. I proposed that the general 
rule for the effective context of legal mobilisation will be that movements ought to engage 
legal systems with sufficient institutional capacity. Indeed, labour movements’ effective 
engagements with law will have to be attuned to the institutional capabilities of different 
legal systems, they must not engage with a legal system and expect certain remedies that it 
is institutionally incapable of delivering. For labour, a group that seeks to impose legal 
responsibility on employers and capital owners within a given jurisdiction, only the 
institutional capacity of State law can enforce its legal demands. However, there may be 
tactical reasons for engaging with legal systems that are capable of issuing normative claims 
but lack an enforcement capacity. A nuanced conception of the effective context of legal 
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mobilisation will recognise both institutional capacity and the potentially effective role of 
legal pluralism and/or political action. 
The final tenet confronted concerns about the maleffects of legal mobilisation on social 
struggles’ political objectives. I argued for a textured approach that recognised the dangers 
of co-optation but rejected claims that legal mobilisation would necessarily co-opt a 
movement’s political nomos. In order to comprehend how movements might hold onto their 
political objectives, I returned to earlier insights about the range of in/direct effects that 
benefit political objectives and the productive relation between tactics and strategy.  
The productive relation between labour’s political and legal mobilisation can be grasped 
when viewed as the tactical mobilisation of legal resources for the benefit of strategic 
objectives. This provides a conceptual understanding that tactical engagements with law are 
oriented toward the achievement of strategic objectives. By broadening our perspective on 
the effectiveness of legal mobilisation to include the role of political mobilisation, we are 
able to comprehend how labour movement’s political strategy remains intact even where 
legal tactics do not deliver immediate returns. The distinction between tactics and strategy 
means that legal actions will be deployed when opportunities arise without hedging the long-
term future of a political movement to the outcome of those legal engagements. 
In order to build on these insights about the potential effectiveness of legal mobilisation, the 
next chapter will turn to a case study of a labour movement’s engagement with law. The aim 
of the case study is to place our conceptual analysis in a practical context. I will chart the 
trajectory of a movement and analyse how it encountered opportunities to engage with law 
and managed potential limitations on both its legal tactics and political strategy. Moreover, 
the practical context of struggle provides an opportunity to identify the effect on legal 
mobilisation of variables other than a movement’s political objectives. By recognising the 
role of contextual contingencies and the material demands of labour movements, we can 
build a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that will shape the effectiveness of 
legal mobilisation ‘from-below’.
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 Chapter 4. Worker-recuperated factories: An empirical study 
of labour and legal strategy 
You’re the one who goes to the court and tells the judge the workers have the right to 
take over a factory they didn’t buy. What are the legal arguments you use so they’ll 
allow this? 
What you do is look for legal rights in some law, some rule, even in nature itself, and 
try to breathe some life into that right that was left there for dead back in the history 
of Argentina, or of the world. Put into practice today, that means that the workers have 
a concrete and functional right to work, which is more important morally and 
politically than the right to property. And then, from there, you look for legal shortcuts, 
knowing full well that – I mean, let’s not kid ourselves. With talk that’s just political 
and moral, obviously, you’re not going to get anywhere, and with a constitutional right 
that might as well be dead, you’re not going to get anywhere, either. So, it’s very 
important to also know the rules of the system. Above all, a lot about commercial law, 
because the trap is in their own laws, so you look for the loophole to recover the jobs. 
Diego Kravetz, worker-recuperated factory/enterprise lawyer360 
1 Introduction to an Argentinian labour movement and its strategic 
engagements with law 
I have presented a theoretical account of effective legal strategy in chapter three, but I have 
insisted throughout the thesis that any engagement with law by labour will occur in practice 
and cannot be properly understood outside the contextual realities of a legal and political 
struggle. Legal strategy is unlikely to unfold according to ideal scenarios as presented ‘in 
the books’. A labour movements’ engagements with law will be determined by pragmatic 
decision-making in response to a legal system’s available remedies, political circumstances, 
and the material necessities of workers. In order to develop our conception of legal strategy 
and its potential to deliver legal protections and/or have a wider constitutional effect, I will 
analyse the trajectory of a labour movement’s engagement with law and consider the 
contextual complexities that shaped their legal and political mobilisation. This will provide 
a sobering account of the practical factors that will affect a labour movement’s legal strategy. 
In order to comprehend how a legal strategy ‘from-below’ is mobilised and the factors that 
determine its effectiveness, we will analyse: The legal rules and remedies that presented a 
 
360 An interview with Avi Lewis in Esteban Magnani, The Silent Change: Recovered Businesses in Argentina 
(Teseo 2009) 75. 
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strategic opportunity; how legal arguments were framed in relation to these opportunities for 
legal protection; and, the impact of non-legal factors. 
As we have seen in previous chapters there is an extensive literature analysing social 
movements and legal mobilisation and multiple case studies considering how social 
struggles have engaged with law ‘from-below’. However, there is limited dedicated analysis 
in both literatures of labour’s use of law to confront their social, political and legal 
experience of exclusion. The labour movement that will be the focus of our analysis are the 
worker-recuperated factories (empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores, hereafter ERTs) 
in Argentina. This grassroots labour movement was formed by groups of workers that 
resisted the condition of unemployment and sought to recuperate their workplaces. A factory 
or enterprise is recuperated361 by its workers when they: (i) Occupy and take control of the 
production of goods or the provision of services and, (ii) establish a model of worker self-
management and/or form of cooperativism and resume the production or provision or 
services. The ERT movement continues to be an important labour movement within the 
country with the number of worker-recuperations having grown exponentially since 2001, 
from a modest 36 pre-2001, 251 by 2010 and 384 in 2018362. 
The key legal challenge to the ERT movement has been the legality of the workers’ control 
of property. In pursuit of legal protections for their control over property, the ERTs’ 
engagements with law have been directed at both short-term rights to use property and a 
long-term constitutional aim to re-balance the constitutional right to work vis-à-vis 
entrenched rights to private property and owners of capital. Given the duration and 
complexity of the ERTs’ engagement with law and the radical nature of their political aims, 
its experience presents an opportunity to put our conceptual account of effective legal 
strategy into a practical context and examine the trajectory of a labour movement’s 
 
361 For Ruggeri, recuperation is preferred to ‘autogestión’ when defining the ERTs because their realisation 
involved the ex-employees of the capitalist company ‘recuperating’ their abandoned workplaces and it refers 
to the workers’ actions as an occupation of a previously existing company. While the ERTs are an example 
of worker self-management, ‘recuperation’ is preferred to ‘autogestión’ because it refers directly to the 
defining feature of the ERT movement. Andrés Ruggeri, ¿Qué Son Las Empresas Recuperadas? Autogestión 
de La Clase Trabajadora (Peña Lillo : Ediciones Continente 2014) 18. 
362Andrés Ruggeri, ‘Las Empresas Recuperadas Por Los Trabajadores En El Gobierno de Mauricio Macri. 
Estado de Situación a Octubre de 2018.’ (Programa Facultad Abierta/Centro de Documentación de Empresas 
Recuperadas 2018) 6 <http://www.recuperadasdoc.com.ar/VI-Informe-Situacion-ERT-2018.pdf> accessed 4 
December 2019.; They also boast a high mortality rate of 10.67%, meaning only one in ten ERTs fail after 
initiating the process of recuperation. As of March 2016, there have been a total of 411 Argentinian ERTs 
meaning only 44 have failed. In addition, for every ERT that closes another ten will be opened compared to 
the modest ratio of 1:1 in private capital enterprises. Andrés Ruggeri, ‘Las Empresas Recuperadas Por Los 
Trabajadores En Los Comienzos Del Gobierno de Mauricio Macri. Estado de Situación a Mayo de 2016.’ 
(Programa Facultad Abierta/Centro de Documentación de Empresas Recuperadas 2016) 12 
<http://www.recuperadasdoc.com.ar/informe-mayo-2016.pdf> accessed 4 December 2019. 
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engagement with law. I argue that the present case study captures the practical reality of 
legal strategy as a process and provides unique empirical insights about the opportunity and 
limitation of legal mobilisation that expands our conceptual analysis. The following 
examination of the ERT’s strategic engagement with law will reveal how this labour 
movement used innovative argumentative practices that seized upon existing legal 
protections, presented new interpretations of what law ought to be, and manipulated the 
application of existing constitutional rules. 
The ERTs have been analysed in sociology, economics and political theory. Recent studies 
of Argentina’s worker recuperated factories have focused upon their struggle to provide an 
alternative to the general economic programme of neo-liberal globalisation363. The workers’ 
rejection of the command model of work and the primacy of private property rights has been 
interpreted as evidence of a challenge to contemporary capital-labour relations364 and that 
an alternative to capitalist dictates at work is possible365. Indeed, the survival of these 
worker-controlled enterprises has been described as an example of the “capacity of 
Argentine worker cooperatives to maintain alternative norms of producing under capitalist 
economic constraints.”366 In response, socio-economic analysis has examined how this 
alternative politico-economic model of work can sustain itself against the political and 
economic structures of liberal constitutionalism367. 
A neglected account of the ERTs is their engagement with law. The ERTs’ use of legal 
concepts and commitment to their political struggle is a resource from which we can better 
comprehend the strategic and tactical engagements with law by a labour movement. Honor 
Brabazon has argued that the ERTs’ use of existing law and awareness of law’s limitations 
 
363 For example, Peter Ranis, Cooperatives Confront Capitalism: Challenging the Neoliberal Economy (Zed 
Books Ltd 2016); Dario Azzellini, An Alternative Labour History: Worker Control and Workplace 
Democracy (Zed Books Ltd 2015). 
364 Peter Ranis, ‘Argentine Worker Cooperatives in Civil Society: A Challenge to Capital–Labor Relations’ 
(2010) 13 WorkingUSA 77. 
365 Dinerstein, The Politics of Autonomy in Latin America (n 140). 
366 Ranis (n 364) 77. 
367 See, Mezzadra and Neilson (n 270); David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban 
Revolution (Verso Books 2012).; For Dania Thomas, the cooperativism of the recuperation movement 
intends to buffer the social consequences of the self-regulating credit market. Thomas warns that the credit 
market demands a form of corporatism that is “inimical” to cooperatives and represents a substantial threat to 
the ERT movement’s capacity to challenge the dictates of the market without a political renegotiation of the 
market. Thomas’ analysis concludes that cooperatives cannot sustain themselves long-term in the current 
self-regulating credit market. This is sobering analysis that contrasts with academic studies that view the 
political struggle of ERTs, and their realisation of self-management and cooperativism, can buffer the social 
and economic effects of markets and protect workers. Dania Thomas, ‘Cooperativism in a Credit Crisis: 
Lessons from the Argentine Worker Takeovers’ (2011) 62 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 505. Cf. Daniel 
Ozarow and Richard Croucher, ‘Workers’ Self-Management, Recovered Companies and the Sociology of 
Work’ (2014) 48 Sociology 989. 
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is an example of a “radical legal praxis”368 that reveal the opportunities that strategic 
engagements with law present for emancipatory resistance against neoliberalism. While 
providing an enlightening discussion of the interaction between legal and political tactics, 
Brabazon’s conceptual analysis stops short of detailing the specific legal and constitutional 
rules targeted by the ERTs. The aim of this case study is to consider the types of legal 
argument presented and the contextual factors that shape their pragmatic legal strategy. 
Before moving to our legal analysis, it is necessary to detail the exact nature of the ERT 
movement and introduce the subject of our analysis. In what follows I will consider the 
methodological aims of the ERT case study, and the extent to which an Argentinian labour 
movement provides generalizable conclusions to an inquiry into labour movements and legal 
strategy ‘from-below’. I will contextualize our legal analysis by providing a detailed 
background to both the ERT movement generally and the specific conflict that shapes the 
legal strategy of the ERT – Hotel BAUEN Cooperative - that will be the subject of our 
analysis. 
1.1. The ERT movement: Formative conditions 
In this section I will establish the contextual factors that were the catalyst for the ERT 
movement. Before we consider the movement’s specific circumstances, I will address two 
pressing issues: First, the relativity of case study analysis and the generalisability of our 
conclusions. Second, the extent to which the phenomenon of worker-recuperation is specific 
to the Argentine or Latin American context. 
In relation to the relativity of ERTs’ legal strategy I argue that, while the relative social, 
political and economic conditions in Argentina shaped the emergence and survival of a 
context-specific labour movement; the important lesson for comprehending the potential of 
legal strategy ‘from below’ is not the precise conditions of the ERT movement, but that all 
labour movements and their legal mobilisation will be shaped by their social, political and 
legal context. I approach case study analysis and legal strategy from the perspective that all 
instances of legal engagement ‘from-below’ will be determined by specific conditions. I 
have insisted throughout that a realistic socio-legal analysis of legal strategy by grassroots 
labour struggles must eschew an over-reliance on the explanatory capacity of theoretical and 
conceptual analysis; instead, we must recognise the pragmatism and contextual 
 
368 Brabazon (n 346) 24. 
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contingencies that will determine any movement’s strategy. In other words, our conceptual 
analysis has provided an invaluable framework from which to comprehend effective legal 
strategy but the precise ways that movements will apply legal tools in practice and the 
outcome of such engagements cannot be pre-determined. Therefore, the ERT movement 
provides an opportunity to build upon our conceptions of effective legal argument and the 
dangers of co-optation by assessing how a labour movement has confronted these 
opportunities and limitations in the context of localised political, economic and legal factors. 
An inevitable methodological limit to our conclusions is that not all labour movements will 
share the same formative conditions for action. By acknowledging the unavoidable relativity 
of case study analysis, we also identify the generalisable trend that labour movements’ legal 
strategies will occur in response to its social context. Effective legal strategy is not one-size 
fits all; its trajectory will be shaped by pragmatic decisions that can only be explained in 
relation to the context in which they were taken. Therefore, any attempt to evaluate tactical 
actions in relation to strategic objectives ought to take into consideration the role of 
contextual factors. Our present task is to comprehend an Argentinian labour movement’s 
legal strategy and this will require an understanding of the contextual factors that caused the 
ERT’s to make pragmatic decisions about their engagements with law. Indeed, we will begin 
by considering what it was about Argentina around the turn of the millennium that laid the 
ground for such an extensive labour struggle. In the second part of the case study, we will 
return to provide a detailed account of the non-legal factors that affected the ERT’s legal 
struggle. 
The ERT movement is the product of specific circumstances that occurred in Argentina and 
Latin America but, it should not be seen as a phenomenon that is unique to the Argentinian 
or Latin American experience369. There is a history of occupations in Latin America but, the 
2001 ERTs are not seen as analogous to previous instances. For Ruggeri, the social and 
political frameworks are markedly different between previous occupations and the current 
phenomenon370. Previous instances were either the result of trade union organised actions 
that demonstrated the power held by workers in their negotiations with employers about pay 
and other demands371 or, they were encouraged and arranged during periods of politically 
 
369 We can see examples of worker recuperation in Italy, Greece, Chile, and in many other parts of the globe. 
Their specific emergence are all subject to factors relating to their own circumstances. None are as prolific 
and extensive as the ERT movement in Argentina. For examples, see Azzellini (n 363). 
370 Ruggeri, ¿Qué Son Las Empresas Recuperadas? (n 361) 56. 
371 Dinerstein, The Politics of Autonomy in Latin America (n 140) 130. 
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radicalised trade union action372. In each case, Ruggeri argues that occupation was the result 
of a combination of political, social and economic factors unique to a specific period in 
time373. 
The same conclusion is applied to the post-2001 ERT movement. The ERT movement arose 
due to the extreme and specific social, political, legal and economic conditions brought about 
by the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s that reached a crescendo in 2001. As such, 
occupation and recuperation of enterprises by workers was not premised on previous 
instances of worker occupation, but the formative experiences of: Precarious and undignified 
work; economic recession; a rapid decline in household income and living standards; and, 
widespread political opposition to the idea that there is no alternative to the dictates of 
neoliberal globalisation. The material necessities of workers left unemployed by the 
financial crash was a catalytic factor in the establishment of the ERT movement and its 
engagement with law374. In this regard, the ERT movement needs to be understood within 
the context of a broader mobilisation of civil society in post-2001 Argentina. 
The Argentine economy entered recession in 1998, from there the neoliberal policies of the 
1990s that had facilitated free market enterprise and hollowed out social protections began 
to backfire. In the decade leading up to the crisis Argentina had diligently implemented the 
suggested economic policies of the ‘Washington Consensus’ and was considered a reliable 
partner of the IMF and the World Bank.375 A series of shocks to the economy caused the 
collapse of the Argentine peso (at that time pegged to the US dollar) and liquidated the assets 
that had been accumulated on credit during the preceding years of economic boom. 
In late 2001 the streets of Argentina were filled by popular demonstrations and united under 
the common slogan: ¡Que se vayan todxs! This demand - to ‘get rid of them all!’ - was 
directed at those considered responsible for the currency and sovereign debt crisis that 
precipitated the collapse of the Argentine economy. The government resigned and a 
caretaker President installed before new elections were organised. The economic collapse 
 
372 Ruggeri, ¿Qué Son Las Empresas Recuperadas? (n 361) 56. 
373 ibid 57. 
374 Brabazon (n 346) 24. 
375 Andrés Ruggeri and others (eds), Crisis y Autogestión En El Siglo XXI: Cooperativas y Empresas 
Recuperadas En Tiempos de Neoliberalismo (Peña Lillo : Ediciones Continente 2014) 13. 
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was viewed as symptomatic of a wider failure of political and legal institutions to meet the 
social expectations of the people and mobilised a broader anti-institutional movement376. 
This period of social protest lead to a range of innovative social organisations. For example, 
the ‘piqueteros’, neighbourhood assemblies, the Unemployed Workers Associations and the 
ERT movement. The former began as a roadblock protest against mass unemployment. 
Modelled on the traditional industrial strike, groups of unemployed workers gathered in their 
neighbourhoods and closed-off streets in protest at the bleak socio-economic conditions and 
lack of adequate response by the government377. The Unemployed Workers Associations 
(UWAs)378 and neighbourhood assemblies379 took similar action but occurred in different 
geographic locations. These organisations presented demands to government about the need 
for employment and adequate social policies but, in the main, they took direct action to 
create employment and attend to the needs of the community. For example, the UWAs set 
up nurseries, food banks, and organised training programmes for workers380. These projects 
aimed to create a solidarity economy in which the community sought to help itself in 
overcoming widespread unemployment and the post-crisis austerity policies imposed by the 
government. 
As we can see, the ERT movement did not emerge in a vacuum, worker recuperated factories 
are a social movement produced by the socio-economic conditions in Argentina in the 
1990s/2000s. The neoliberal policies of the past decades provided the formative conditions 
for a radical re-conception of work. The crisis was the final straw for a workforce that had 
borne the brunt of a deregulated labour market where employers paid low wages and 
cancelled the contracts of those that threatened industrial action. In search of dignified and 
reliable employment the formation of cooperatives allowed workers to take decisions 
collectively about their future. Rather than a principal concern for profits that encourages 
efficiency savings and the maximization of productivity; the cooperatives are concerned 
principally about the protection of employment. In both the short and long term, this is a 
radical labour movement whose challenge to neoliberal globalisation is not grounded in 
 
376 Dinerstein, The Politics of Autonomy in Latin America (n 140) 113. 
377 ibid 125–6; Sitrin and Azzellini (n 203) 186. 
378 Dinerstein, The Politics of Autonomy in Latin America (n 140) 126–8. 
379 Sitrin and Azzellini (n 203) 184–5. 
380 See further, Dinerstein, The Politics of Autonomy in Latin America (n 140) 125–30; Ana Cecilia 
Dinerstein, ‘Autonomy in Latin America: Between Resistance and Integration. Echoes from the Piqueteros 
Experience’ (2010) 45 Community Development Journal 356. 
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ideology but a pragmatic alternative driven by the material necessity of workers.381 A 2005 
study of the ERTs noted this pragmatic concern for work: 
The underlying message of the study was that workers, whatever their ideological 
predispositions and levels of class consciousness, were essentially resisting 
unemployment to the best of their capacities.382 
The ERT phenomenon did not emanate from a revolutionary or anti-capitalist movement for 
change, rather the ‘fear’383 of being unemployed caused workers to take “purely 
defensive”384 actions in response to their circumstances. The legal system has been the 
principal site of struggle for this labour movement owing to the institutional capacity of law 
to recognize an ERT’s use of property as legal. In the following analysis we will analyse the 
ways that the ERT movement engaged effectively with law whilst also taking into 
consideration the role of its specific sociological conditions. 
1.2. The Hotel BAUEN Cooperative: An ERT’s legal struggle 
The ERT that will be the subject of our analysis is ‘La Cooperativa Hotel Buenos Aires Una 
Empresa Nacional’ (also known as Cooperativa Hotel B.A.U.E.N., hereafter Hotel BAUEN 
Cooperative.) The Hotel BAUEN is arguably the best-known workers’ cooperative in the 
Argentine recuperation movement. The Hotel is a twenty-story hotel situated in the centre 
of Buenos Aires, four blocks from the National Congress. The BAUEN Cooperative has 
sought to legalise their control of property through innovative engagement with Bankruptcy 
Law and by seeking an expropriation law for the hotel and all associated assets on behalf of 
the Cooperative385. Our analysis will consider the extent to which the Cooperative’s legal 
arguments engaged effectively with legal provisions, but also the role of non-legal tactics in 
their control over the property. Before moving to our legal analysis, I will briefly summarise 
the background to the legal conflict over control of the Hotel. 
 
381 Ranis (n 364) 77–8. 
382 ibid 83. 
383 Dinerstein, The Politics of Autonomy in Latin America (n 140) 132. 
384 Ruggeri and others (n 375) 15. 
385 The ERT Documentation Centre at the University of Buenos Aires has categorized the states of 
recuperations as follows: Legally expropriated in favour of the cooperative; Authorised by a judge to 
continue production under bankruptcy law; Occupation; Rented from landowners; Authorised by a judge to 
continue production under new bankruptcy law; Other. See, Andrés Ruggeri, ‘Informe Del IV Relevamiento 
de Empresas Recuperadas En La Argentina: Las Empresas Recuperadas En El Período 2010-2013.’ 
(Programa Facultad Abierta/Centro de Documentación de Empresas Recuperadas 2014) 
<https://www.recuperadasdoc.com.ar/Informe_IV_relevamiento_2014.pdf> accessed 4 December 2019. 
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The hotel was built for the 1978 World Cup finals in Argentina with financial aid from the 
military junta’s National Development Bank (BANADE). The hotel’s initial owner, Marcelo 
Iurcovich, received several loans from governmental and private banks during and after the 
military regime for the purpose of supporting and developing the Hotel.386 The loans, 
including the initial one from the BANADE, were never repaid and the Hotel operated 
against the backdrop of legal proceedings brought by its creditors. 
After a period of firing and (re)hiring its employees the Hotel (officially registered under the 
company name Bauen SACIC) was sold in 1997 to a Chilean company (Solaris S.A.) but, 
by February 2001 the Hotel’s new owners filed for bankruptcy387. At the time of bankruptcy 
Marcelo Iurcovich had received only a third of the $12 million sale price and he moved to 
reclaim ownership with a judicial agreement to make a token payment to the Hotel’s 
creditors. The monies were never paid, bankruptcy took effect, and the operations of the 
Hotel ceased. 
The Hotel was first occupied by ex-workers on 21st March 2003. Following the 
“organizational prodding”388 of Eduardo Murúa, co-founder of the Movimiento Nacional de 
Empresas Recuperadas (MNER), 32 former employees entered the Hotel and began the 
recuperation process. The Cooperative re-started the Hotel’s operations and by 2006 80% of 
the 160 rooms had been refurbished and the Cooperative comprised 150 workers389. The 
Hotel is run as a consumer cooperative according to the principles of self-management which 
means, in the absence of any division between employer/employee or boss/worker, that 
management decisions are taken collectively by an assembly of the Cooperative’s 
workers390. The Cooperative faced initial organizational challenges, the sort common to all 
ERTs, including the need for salary dispersals, low wages, and democratic assemblies to 
decide upon the allocation of any surplus capital. 
At the time of writing, the Cooperative does not have a legal right to retain control over the 
hotel however, it remains in control of the Hotel and its legal and political struggle continues. 
There are other examples of ERTs that have effectively engaged with law and have 
 
386 Ranis (n 364) 92. 
387 ibid; Andrés Ruggeri, Desiderio Alfonso and Emiliano Balaguer, Bauen: el hotel de los trabajadores 
(Callao Cooperative Cultural 2017) 46. 
388 Ranis (n 364) 92. 
389 Ranis (n 363) 71. 
390 I will not refer to the cooperative workers as ‘members’ or ‘partners’, as per the nomenclature of 
cooperativism that distinguishes itself from wage labour and an employment relation between employer and 
employee. In this case the workers refer to themselves as workers and I prefer to follow their lead.  
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permanent legal rights to their enterprises and associated property. For example, the Zanón 
Ceramic Factory and its FaSinPat cooperative were expropriated and given control over the 
factory’s assets by the Neuquén provincial legislature in 2009. As the “bellwether”391 of the 
ERT movement, the Zanón is (for the most part) a tale of legal and political victories. 
However, as a case study the BAUEN will provide a more detailed account of the political 
and legal ‘struggle’ experienced by the ERT movement. Rather than simply receiving the 
right to control the property, the BAUEN experience offers a more textured insight into both 
the opportunities and limitations that have determined the effectiveness of its legal strategy. 
I will, of course, draw comparisons with other ERTs and the movement generally to provide 
context to the BAUEN’s tactical and strategic effectiveness. 
The analysis will be divided into two clear sections. First, we will consider the ERTs’ use of 
constitutional provisions and bankruptcy legislation to acquire the permanent and/or 
temporary legal rights to remain in control of property. In both cases we will begin by 
assessing the legal authorities that represent a strategic opportunity, followed by analysis of 
the BAUEN Cooperative’s specific tactical engagement with them. Having analysed the 
Cooperative’s engagement with law, we will consider the role of non-legal factors in the 
BAUEN’s legal strategy. I will divide these into three key factors: First, the role of political 
action in complementing and buttressing the BAUEN’s legal strategy. Second, the 
importance of organisational support in the political mobilisation of the ERT movement, the 
provision of practical support, and the co-ordination of legal resources. Third, we will assess 
the changing relation with government and the effect of both political disagreements in legal 
processes and the impact of government policy on the ERT movement. 
 
391 Ranis (n 364) 88. 
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2 Legal Instruments: Bankruptcy and Expropriation 
Two legal instruments have dominated the ERTs interactions with law. First, the use of a 
provision of the Bankruptcy Law (La Ley de Quiebras 1995) that has allowed workers to 
remain in control of property for the express purpose of continuing production. Second, 
provincial, regional and national legislatures have passed expropriation laws where they 
have interpreted the worker cooperatives use of property as sufficient to satisfy the test of 
‘public utility’ and trigger an exception to the constitutional right to property. In what 
follows, I will unpack the strategic opportunity presented by both bankruptcy and 
expropriation provisions. 
2.1. Bankruptcy Law 
2.1.1. Introduction to the Bankruptcy Law (Ley de Quiebras 1995)392 
In the event of bankruptcy, proceedings for the sale of assets are brought by creditors, which 
makes an ERTs’ encounter with the Bankruptcy Law unavoidable. Ordinarily, the Argentine 
Bankruptcy Law gives primacy to the rights of creditors; whereas workers’ claims for unpaid 
wages, severance pay, and other social benefits owed by their employer are secondary. As a 
result, bankruptcies favour previous owners, creditors and court appointed trustees (that gain 
12% commission at auction) because property rights and the law’s protection of contractual 
agreements (mean that creditors have a contractual right to recover their credit through sale 
of assets) take priority over claims made by ex-employees. 
However, exceptional provisions in the Bankruptcy Law have allowed applications for the 
temporary continuation of production by third parties. Worker cooperatives have used this 
opportunity to commence commercial litigation and secure a temporary right to control their 
factory or enterprise and resume operations. The strategic importance of the legal protection 
provided by the Bankruptcy Law to an ERT cannot be underestimated for two reasons: First, 
from a practical perspective, orders for continued production halt the sale of property and 
assets and prevent the loss of “basic property, machinery, patents, and copyrights from the 
auctioneers’ gavel.”393 Control over property and the protection of assets is essential to the 
 
392 Ley de Concursos y Quiebras (Bankruptcy Law) 24.522 1995. < 
http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/25000-29999/25379/texact.htm> accessed 04/12/2019 
393 Ranis (n 364) 79. 
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ERTs because, due to their lack of financial resources, it would have otherwise proved 
impossible for workers to start the recuperation process from the beginning.  
Second, the Bankruptcy Law enabled the recuperation movement’s occupation of property 
and aims of re-starting production to have legal traction and provided the necessary legal 
protection for their use of the property. It is the opportunity presented by the Bankruptcy 
Law and its role in the ERT’s political strategy that will concern the remainder of this 
section. Before moving to the BAUEN’s engagement with the Bankruptcy Law, I will 
summarise the articles in the Bankruptcy Law 1995 that have provided the opportunity for 
ERTs to legally protect normative demands for worker-control and secure employment. 
The tactical opportunity begins with Article 21 which legislates for preventative bankruptcy 
proceedings and allows a judge to suspend the usual practice of asset liquidation and 
transform the proceeding into an application for preventative bankruptcy. A preventative 
bankruptcy proceeding is useful to an ERT because they can prevent the sale of assets and 
make an application for the use of property. Subsection two (Art.21(2)) proscribes any 
proceedings being brought against assets that have been expropriated, thus insulating 
expropriated recuperations from the claims of creditors.  
Two articles provided workers with a legal right to control the property against the rights of 
creditors or holders of property title. The Bankruptcy Law enabled bankruptcy judges, acting 
as trustees, to grant short-term lease agreements to third party applicants. Article 187 
stipulates that: 
The trustee may declare that a rental agreement or any other contract applies to the 
assets, as long as they do not dispose of the property totally or partially and do not 
exceed the time provided for in article 205.394 
Short-term leases were usually granted in the first instance which provided a time-frame for 
an ERT to stabilise its operations before granting a contract for use. Article 195 sets out the 
conditions under which mortgage creditors cannot make an order for the return of capital, 
including authorisation for bankruptcy judges to suspend any return of capital for two years.  
Any short-term lease is conditional upon a judge being notified about the intentions of the 
workers to continue production and all evidential conditions being met by the cooperative. 
 
394 Article 205 sets out the ‘Conditions of Sale’ and establishes that a lease agreement does not prevent future 
sale of assets. 
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Article 190 sets out the general conditions for an application to resume production for all 
types of private enterprise, not just those engaged in the provision of public services395. An 
application must satisfy the following conditions: The resumption of production must not 
involve the creation of new contractual liabilities except those strictly necessary in the 
operations of the company and, two thirds of the workforce must be constituted of former 
employees. And, the following information must be presented to the judge for consideration: 
The potential benefit to creditors and effect on third parties; an operations plan including 
budget requirements; current contractual obligations; works required to re-start (recuperate) 
the enterprise and make production economically viable. 
In order to comprehend how the Bankruptcy Law came to provide legal protections to third 
parties, and as a result ERTs, we will briefly summarise the rationale that underpinned the 
1995 Law. At the end of the 1980s Argentina was suffering the effects of hyper-inflation 
and was heavily indebted to foreign parties396. In an attempt to galvanise the economy, 
Argentina’s new democratic governments liberalised market regulations in the hope of 
stimulating growth. The bankruptcy-related consequences of deregulation were that the 
conduct of business-owners was excluded from consideration in bankruptcy proceedings, 
and the ‘cram down’397 technique became a usual escape-route for owners in the event of 
bankruptcy. The ‘cram down’ technique is not specific to the Argentine context. It is a 
mechanism that prevents the failure of large corporations by forcing creditors to accept a 
debt restructuring plan and prevent creditors’ attempts at foreclosure. In the context of 1990s 
Argentina, the technique became a mechanism that enabled business owners to engage in 
the circular practices of stripping assets and/or money laundering, failing to repay creditors, 
declaring bankrupt, and then reaching an agreement to restructure debts and recapitalise the 
corporations. As the conduct of business-owners was not a disqualifying condition for a 
preventative bankruptcy application, the Argentinian legal system was defenceless against 
the caprice of capital owners. 
 
395 Article 189 sets out the conditions for an immediate continuation of production and the conditions that 
must be met by those providing public services. 
396 Fernando Postilloni, ‘Ley de Quiebras y Concursos. Argentina 1995-2011. Recorrido historico de la 
normativa y papel de las empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores’ [2013] Interescuelas/Departamentos de 
Historia. Departamento de Historia de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 
Mendoza. 30. 
397 Postillioni refers to the ‘crowndown’ technique as opposed to the ‘cram down’ technique. The explanation 
and usage of the two techniques appear identical and will be treated as such. I have not recorded Postillioni’s 
usage as a typographical error due to the common usage of ‘crowndown’ in Argentinian newspapers. For the 
avoidance of confusion, I will refer only to the ‘cram down’ technique. 
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The Bankruptcy Law (1995) sought to introduce a regulative framework that would wrest 
back control over unregulated business owners and offer some protections to an Argentine 
economy on the cusp of a financial crisis. The Bankruptcy Law gave debtors the opportunity 
to apply for a preventative insolvency and avoid bankruptcy (article 21). Importantly, third 
parties were listed along with business owners as permitted to present orders to continue 
production. The legislation utilises the cram down technique by giving parties that are 
committed to maintaining a viable business an opportunity to restructure debts. 
While the 1995 Law’s inclusion of the third-party clause appears to give workers an 
opportunity to take legal possession of their workplace; legislators had not intended to 
provide the legal framework for workers to legalise their occupations of bankrupt companies 
and launch a nationwide labour movement committed to establishing the conditions of 
worker control. The 1995 Law was not pro-labour but part of an attempt to kickstart the 
economy by regulating bankruptcy proceedings and encouraging commercial ventures that 
contributed to economic growth. The legislation’s aims were to encourage, in event of 
bankruptcy, viable enterprises through the purchase of obligation free assets398 with the 
purpose of re-starting production; and to discourage creative financial activities that yield 
no benefit to the national economy. 
The Bankruptcy Law has been reformed to extend the protections for third party applications 
and those made by ERTs in particular. A 2011 reform to article 203399 provided an 
opportunity to those controlling property under article 190 to permanently prevent 
liquidation and reach an agreement over the purchase of assets. Article 203 established that 
a worker cooperative can become owner of the assets by offsetting their value against the 
labour credits owed to the workers by the bankrupt former employer400. In the 1995 version 
of the Law, article 203 insisted that assets were liquidated immediately unless the bankruptcy 
proceedings had been appealed under article 21. The 2011 reform inserts a special reference 
to ‘worker cooperatives’ into article 190 and an obligation upon judges to consider an 
application for the continuation of production by an ERT before they can proceed with any 
liquidation of assets. 
 
398 Successors were not bound by previous labour agreements meaning bankruptcy effectively nullified any 
labour regulations and rights held by workers. 
399 Article 203bis and 205 were both reformed. See Postilloni (n 396). 
400 The quantification of labour credits, including unpaid salaries and other benefits, is set out in article 48bis, 
also introduced in the 2011 Act. 
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I will not consider the effects of these reforms, particularly the 2011 reform owing to the 
lack of specific literature documenting the effects of these reforms on the ERT struggle. One 
key reason is that the broader political and economic climate has stalled the progress of the 
ERT movement. There is far more coverage of the ERTs that arose in the aftermath of the 
2001 crisis and, up until the election of Macri, we can see a labour movement mobilising 
and engaging with law. The 2011 reforms appear toward the end of a more ‘positive’ period 
for the ERTs and we cannot account for their specific role in the strategic engagements of 
ERTs, for this reason I will not provide a more detailed analysis of the reforms. 
2.1.2. The Hotel BAUEN and Bankruptcy Law 
Having established the provisions in the Bankruptcy Law that provided a tactical opportunity 
to legally protect the control of property, this section will analyse the BAUEN Cooperative’s 
experience of both effective engagement with bankruptcy provisions and the legislation’s 
limitations. In 2003 the workers occupied the hotel and successfully applied for a 40-day 
tenancy by the commercial court under an article 21 application for preventative bankruptcy. 
The workers were recognised as a third party ‘in training’ and met the conditions for 
continued production (article 190). The Cooperative established production and successfully 
renewed their short-term401 lease for the hotel, by then Cooperativa de Trabajo Callao 
Limitada was operating under its present-day name ‘BAUEN Cooperative’. 
On the expiration of their legal tenancy the cooperative’s occupation came under renewed 
judicial attack from both the former owners and supposed holders of legal title to the property 
and its assets. However, on 11/02/2005 the BAUEN Cooperative was given a further 
temporary order granting the right to remain for two years under article 195402. This was 
granted by a commercial court judge’s injunction in favour of the BAUEN’s appeal against 
a restitution order made by a company, Mercoteles S.A. (hereafter, Mercoteles) that claimed 
to be holders of legal title to the hotel. The judge ruled in favour of the BAUEN Cooperative 
having accepted that closure of the Cooperative would have a high social cost with around 
160 jobs to be lost, and the evidential requirements to continue production under article 190 
were satisfied. 
 
401 The lease would have been for an initial four-month period under article 186 and subject to renewal and 
then a two-year lease under article 190. 
402 Solari SA S/ Quiebra (Indirecta) [2007] Juzgado Comercial N9 Sec N 18 69699 4; Ruggeri and others (n 
375) 157. 
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At the expiration of the two year lease the case returned to the commercial court403. This 
time the judgment considered whether the property should be returned to the legal title 
holder404; if the BAUEN Cooperative should have its lease period for the property extended; 
and, what obligations were owed by all parties – Mercoteles, Bauen SACIC (owner during 
bankruptcy), and the BAUEN Cooperative. 
The case was resolved by ordering the restitution of property to the legal title holder 
Mercoteles under certain conditions. The decision to uphold Mercoteles’ claim for restitution 
of property is based on the following reasoning. The judgment acknowledges that the rightful 
holder of legal title is Mercoteles by reference to the principle of res judicata405 and the 
29/08/2001 judgment that ordered the return of legal title to the original owner Bauen SACIC 
following the bankruptcy of Solaris SA. 
The Cooperative presented a claim to extend their control of the property using provisions 
set out in the Bankruptcy Law to either extend their lease (article 195) or arrange for the sale 
of property (article 203) to the BAUEN. The judgment acknowledged that there was a 
precedent for judicial and legislative protection of ERTs at the expense of legal title holders’ 
right to property406. The Court did not agree with the Cooperative’s claims that there was a 
public interest in preserving their employment that trumped the rights of property owners, 
but it did accept the need to mitigate against the potential effects of restitution. The judge 
was willing to give certain concessions to the Cooperative and impose obligatory conditions 
of any restitution of property to Mercoteles. The judgment arrives at this decision and does 
not extend the BAUEN’s legal rights to control the Hotel for two reasons. 
First, the judgment distinguished the present case from those that have given priority to 
worker cooperatives on the grounds that the legal title holder to the Hotel BAUEN was a 
third party to the bankruptcy. 
 
403 Solari S.A. [2007] (n 402). 
404 The owners of property title Mercoteles increased their legal efforts to remove the Cooperative and to 
reclaim control of the property, see Ruggeri, Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 78. 
405 The principle affirming that a decision has been settled by a competent court. Solari S.A. [2007] (n 402) 7. 
406 ibid 9–10. 
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It is not an occupation of a bankrupt property by its former employees because due to 
a transaction of sale that has already been resolved, the property is currently owned by 
a third party.407 
The judgment argued that the occupation of property did not occur for the sole purpose of 
continuing production and recuperating jobs, its aim was to improve the negotiating position 
of ex-employees with a view to acquiring the failed company408. According to the judgment, 
successful claims to continue production have involved cases where the business subject to 
bankruptcy is also the holder of legal title. The rationale behind previous decisions that 
granted legal protections to ERTs has been “to prioritise the social interest in the 
continuation of an enterprise through a cooperative’s conservation of employment, without 
causing harm to the rights of creditors”409. The judge accepts here that other bankruptcy 
cases have accepted the arguments about the ‘social value’ in the conservation of business 
and protection of work. Therefore, for other ERTs the legislative provisions for continuation 
of production and temporary leases have provided important direct effects. And, the 
application of these provisions in favour of ERTs has been justified by judges citing the 
social importance of work; but it does supersede the constitutional right to property of third 
parties to the bankruptcy. 
The question for a judge considering an application by an ERT under the Bankruptcy Law 
is whether an order for continued production could be made whilst respecting the rights of 
all parties. In the BAUEN case the occupation and any continuation of it would not have 
infringed the rights of a now bankrupt property owner and ex-employer (Bauen SACIC) or 
creditors, but a third party that has legally acquired property title (Mercoteles). The judgment 
stated that any temporary contract of use granted to the Cooperative would be a clear 
violation of the constitutional right to property (article 17 Constitution of Argentina)410, on 
these facts the judgment ordered restitution of property to Mercoteles. 
Second, the judgment accepted that restitution without sufficient protection for jobs would 
be an unsatisfactory outcome and proceeded to find a suitable agreement between both the 
Cooperative and Mercoteles. Restitution was ordered on the condition that Mercoteles 
 
407 “Es que no se trata de la ocupación de un bien de la fallida por sus trabajadores pues en razón de los 
avatares sufridos por una anterior operación de compraventa posteriormente resuelta, el inmueble es 
actualmente de títularidad de un tercero…” ibid 10. 
408 ibid. 
409 “a priorizar el interés social de la continuidad de la empresa a través de las cooperativas conservando la 
fuente laboral, sin perjudicar los derechos de los acredores.” ibid. 
410 ibid 17. 
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agreed to the following obligations411: To remunerate the costs of recuperation to the 
BAUEN Cooperative, hire members of the cooperative that are ex-employees of Solaris SA 
and maintain their employment for 36 months with a salary that accords to the 
recommendations of the relevant government authority, to remunerate all members of the 
Cooperative for work done in the past 12 months according to the appropriate salary rate, 
and submit to the mediation of all conflicts by the City of Buenos Aires Legislature412. 
It is possible to conclude that on account of the conflict’s outcome [acceptance of 
conditions by Mercoteles], the rights of workers appear today to be sufficiently 
protected.413 
For the bankruptcy judge the above agreement represented a sufficient guarantee for the 
workers’ rights414. As secondary creditors, ex-employees’ claims for payment of unpaid 
wages and other work-related benefits would not usually have been met following the 
reimbursement of primary creditors. Moreover, the imposition of obligations on the holder 
of property title was seen to accommodate the social interest in employment that had been 
central to previous cases. 
The BAUEN Cooperative appealed the decision to reject its claim to continue production 
and remain in control of the hotel. Despite an amicus curiae brief from the Secretary for 
Human Rights, Eduardo Luis Duhalde in support of the Cooperative’s use of the property 
and concerns about the social effects of their eviction415, the Commercial Court of Appeal 
rejected the appeal and upheld the first instance decision416. The only remaining avenue for 
redress was an appeal to the Supreme Court, but this was blocked by the Court of Appeal 
citing an absence of sufficient constitutional grounds. Nonetheless, the Cooperative lodged 
an extraordinary complaint with the Supreme Court. 
 
411 ibid 10–12. 
412 A further issue considered in the judgment was that any previous orders for continuation of production 
were invalid due to the Cooperative’s failure to adhere to the legal standards relating to hygeine. Their 
contract for ‘continued production’ was dependent on the Cooperative meeting all necessary legal standards 
in the delivery of services. For details of the violation in the judgment see further, ibid 16–17. The details of 
the BAUEN’s supposed breach are contested by the Cooperative, see Ruggeri, Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 
83–85. 
413 “Cabe concluir entonces que en razón de la evolución del conflicto aparecen hoy prima facie 
suficientemente resguardados los derechos de los trabajadores […]” Solari S.A. [2007] (n 402) 12. 
414 ibid 18. 
415 The support for the Cooperative’s continued control of property provided by government minister 
Duhalde did not claim that the right to work ought to permanently supersede the priority of property rights; 
the Cooperative received support for its temporary lease of property due to the grave social consequences 
that would result from its eviction. Ruggeri, Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 108. 
416 Solari SA S/ Quiebra 323-4028 (La Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo comercial, Sala C); Ruggeri, 
Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 107. 
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The appeal presented the following three arguments: First, the Cooperative argued that there 
had been insufficient judicial examination of the proposed holder of legal title. The 
Cooperative asked for further investigation into whether the owner of the asset (Mercoteles) 
was sufficiently different to the company that declared bankrupt (Bauen SACIC). Given that 
the central pillar of the first instance decision to order restitution and refuse any extension 
to the Cooperative’s lease was that Mercoteles had not been involved in the bankruptcy, the 
Cooperative’s appeal argued that there should have been a more detailed examination of 
both the transfer of ownership from Bauen SACIC to Mercoteles, and the extent to which 
these entities are practically separate417. 
Second, the Cooperative challenged the proposed remedy and argued that restitution of the 
asset would have a disproportionately negative effect on the Cooperative, because it would 
both transfer the ‘good will’ built by the Cooperative to the owners and result in the loss of 
150 jobs418. This argument does refer to the constitutional right to work (article 14 
Constitution of Argentina), but it is less an appeal to constitutional rights and more of a claim 
about the public interest in protecting a source of employment and the effects further mass 
unemployment would have on both workers, their dependents and public services. In this 
regard, it is an appeal to the social interest in the protection of employment that previous 
bankruptcy judgments had recognised and moved to protect the ERT’s use of property. 
Third, the Cooperative argued that the judge failed to properly consider proposals for the 
continuation of production419. The judicial decision was considered to be arbitrary in so far 
as it failed to properly consider the Cooperative’s proposal before deciding that Mercoteles’ 
right to property trumped all other claims. The Cooperative’s argument relies on a procedural 
claim under the Bankruptcy Law that the judge must take into account any claim for 
continued production before liquidating or redistributing the asset (article 203 bis). 
On the 5th July 2011, the Supreme Court rejected the Cooperative’s complaint and upheld 
the first instance decision.420 The appeal failed because it lacked sufficient grounds to 
challenge the first instance decision. For the Supreme Court, the doctrine of arbitrariness 
 
417 As reported in Solari SA Y Otro S/Quiebra [2009] Suprema Corte 898/901. 
418 ibid 2; Ruggeri, Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 108–10. 
419 Solari S.A. [2009] (n 417) 1–2. 
420 Solari SA Y Otro S/ Quiebra [2011] Suprema Corte 993. The extended dictum draws on judgments no.893 
and 901 by the Supreme Court cited above. 
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prevented the Court from re-considering the grievances raised, namely, questions of fact, 
evidence, and procedural law. 
The doctrine of arbitrariness has an exceptional character and it is not to be used for 
the purpose of correcting allegedly wrong pronouncements about non-federal issues - 
in this case, the grievances refer to the examination of matters of fact, evidence and 
procedural law; in order to proceed the case would require an unequivocal departure 
from the normative solution or an absolute lack of legal foundation, which disqualifies 
the judgment appealed as a valid jurisdictional act.421 
The Court reasoned that the Cooperative’s appeal had sought to transform its grievance 
about the content of a judicial decision into an appeal about procedural error that amounted 
to an affront to due process, but the Court found no evidence that the judge had committed 
any such error and that the judgment had been grounded in law. The Court reiterated that its 
function was to hear extraordinary cases, those that involved either a ‘gross logical 
deficiencies in their reasoning’ or a ‘total absence of normative foundation’.  
Having upheld the decision to decide the case in favour of the title holder’s right to property, 
the Cooperative had no further legal recourse under the Bankruptcy Law or the Constitution 
and was left waiting for an eviction order to be enforced. Two eviction notices, one for 21st 
August 2007 and another for 10th September 2014, were issued by the bankruptcy court 
neither have been enforced. Despite the legal validity of these orders they have not resulted 
in the eviction of the Cooperative. Enforcement of the eviction orders proved impossible due 
to mass demonstrations of public solidarity with the Cooperative outside the hotel. We will 
return to the role of political action in the Cooperative’s long-term strategy later. For now, 
we can see that the Cooperative exhausted all possible legal avenues under the Bankruptcy 
Law that included a reliance on legislative protections and challenges to judicial reasoning. 
In the concluding section we will evaluate the BAUEN’s tactical engagement with the 
Bankruptcy Law and its strategic effectiveness. 
2.1.3. Conclusion: Evaluating the Bankruptcy Law’s effectiveness 
Between 2003 and 2007 the Cooperative’s applications for short-term control over the 
property were effective. They met the evidential requirements and the Bankruptcy Law 
 
421 “La doctrina de la arbitrariedad posee carácter excepcional y no tiene por objeto corregir 
pronunciamientos presuntamente equivocados en orden a temas no federales -en el caso, los agravios remiten 
al examen de cuestiones de hecho, prueba y derecho procesal-, pues para su procedencia, se requiere un 
apartamiento inequívoco de la solución normativa o una absoluta carencia de fundamentación, que 
descalifique la sentencia apelada como acto jurisdiccional válido.” Solari S.A. [2009] (n 417) 2. 
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provided direct legal protections. The framing of the BAUEN’s activities within the 
legislative requirements represents an effective engagement with the Bankruptcy Law’s 
available remedies. However, since 2007 the supremacy of title holders’ rights to property 
have been recognised and prioritised ahead of the rationale of protecting viable businesses, 
the right to work, or the public interest in securing the continued employment of Cooperative 
members. In sum, the Bankruptcy Law provided temporary legal protections to the BAUEN 
Cooperative, but the Cooperative ultimately ran out of mechanisms under the Law or the 
Constitution to continue to legally control the property. To conclude, I will consider some 
general problems that have been identified with the Bankruptcy Law as an effective strategic 
engagement before considering the role of judicial disagreement in shaping the outcome of 
the BAUEN case. And, what the BAUEN’s response says about a selective engagement in 
tactical opportunities and a refusal of law’s co-optive effects. 
Despite the opportunity for legal protection, the Bankruptcy Law has also presented 
challenges to the recuperation movement. A 2014 report into the ERTs identified four 
limitations of the Bankruptcy Law for the recuperation movement422. First, the legislation’s 
evidential requirements that worker cooperatives are made-up of two-thirds of the previous 
workforce represents a significant practical challenge. Unemployed workers will seek new 
employment and ex-employees may be unwilling to take a risk and trust in the recuperation 
process. The threshold set by the legislation is such that a majority of ex-employees may be 
engaged in the recuperation but they still fall short of protections under the Law. 
Second, even though it sets out a dedicated means for the purchase of property by an ERT, 
the total cost of property makes a purchase agreement by a cooperative, even with the 
deductions for labour-related debts detailed in article 203, a considerable hurdle to surmount. 
Third, workers’ claims have been stuck in a slow-moving judicial process that can take up 
to eleven months to present an initial claim under article 21 for preventative bankruptcy and 
continuation of production. The Bankruptcy Law promises ERTs a potential route toward 
legal protection and an escape from precarity, but the route is itself precarious with only 
20% of all ERTs receiving legal protection using this route423. 
 
422 Ruggeri, ‘Informe Del IV Relevamiento de Empresas Recuperadas En La Argentina: Las Empresas 
Recuperadas En El Período 2010-2013.’ (n 385). 
423 In 2013 the figures were as follows: 16% had been expropriated, 20% had legal rights to continue under 
the Bankruptcy Law, 16% were illegal occupations, 16% leased property from former owners, and 32% 
registered as ‘other’. ibid 11. 
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Fourth, the Bankruptcy Law has had the effect of judicialising the process of ERT legal 
protection424. This has led to national and devolved legislatures avoiding engagement in this 
volatile political process which leaves decisions with the judiciary, who, as unelected actors, 
are not responsive to political demands or pressure. An important factor in the effectiveness 
of the Bankruptcy Law as a tactical opportunity for protecting the ERTs is the role of judicial 
reasoning in determining the facts and applying the law to them. Florencia Kravetz, a MNER 
lawyer and one-time lawyer for the BAUEN Cooperative has highlighted the potentially 
negative role of judicial discretion and a lack of concrete obligations upon judges for factory 
recuperations to draw upon: 
It doesn’t provide deadlines or a solid legal base, so it’s not a very good tool. Without 
these things, certain judges won’t take it into account. Still, when you can use it, you 
do.425 
Recuperations are subject to judicial influence through their interpretation of facts and 
application of legal rules. For example, in March 2013 the graphics cooperative ‘Mom’ (Ex 
Lanci) were evicted following the rejection of their claims by the bankruptcy judge.426 The 
judge questioned the factual evidence that the cooperative was constituted by 2/3 of Lanci 
workers and issued an eviction order. While the Mom Cooperative resisted eviction, their 
precarious status had a negative impact upon their capacity to continue production and a 
second application under the Bankruptcy Law was rejected on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence of a capacity to establish a viable business (article 190).  
We can see that legal strategy is not simply determined by how an ERT formalises its legal 
arguments but that judicial reasoning will also have a decisive impact on effectiveness. The 
failure of the Bankruptcy Law to be applied in a manner desired by the ERTs reveals the 
difference between the strategic goals of the ERT movement and the limits of available legal 
tools. The Bankruptcy Law does represent a strategic opportunity but an unfavourable 
judicial interpretation of the Law’s applicability and/or the existence of a constitutional right 
to the property will negatively affect an ERT’s legal strategy. 
In the BAUEN case, the first three challenges were surmounted but, the issue of judicial 
interpretation of the normative boundaries of Argentine Law defined the outcome of the 
 
424 ibid 24. 
425 Magnani (n 360) 111. 
426 Ruggeri, ‘Informe Del IV Relevamiento de Empresas Recuperadas En La Argentina: Las Empresas 
Recuperadas En El Período 2010-2013.’ (n 385) 22. 
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Cooperative’s engagement with Bankruptcy Law. There was a disagreement between the 
Cooperative’s legal arguments and the judgment’s aim to respect the rights of all parties to 
the bankruptcy. Having established the existence of a property right by one of the parties, 
the judge’s reasoning proceeded by considering how to realise the restitution and mitigate 
the effects for the Cooperative. The existence of a constitutional right represented the limited 
application of the Bankruptcy Law by an ERT, or any third-party application to continue 
production and control property for those purposes. While provisions may be applicable to 
ERTs in cases where the holder of legal title has declared bankrupt and a suitable agreement 
can be reached with creditors to continue production; its legislative remedies will be less 
effective in cases where the an ERT struggles to meet the conditions for continued 
production, or a party to the bankruptcy proceedings presents a legal claim that takes 
precedence over third party claims to continue production. In the present case the judicial 
identification of Mercoteles’ constitutional right to property weakened the direct 
effectiveness of the BAUEN’s use of the Bankruptcy Law. 
A final issue with the judgment was its failure to comprehend the aims of an ERT, or the 
workers’ material and political commitment to recuperation. The judgment worked towards 
a negotiated eviction that both parties would respect. The bankruptcy judge did not consider 
that the Cooperative may not accept the terms agreed to by Mercoteles. From the judicial 
perspective, the agreement is suitable because it promises to protect the workers’ rights. 
However, the ERTs’ intentions were to realise an alternative model of work that cannot be 
squared with the return of property to Mercoteles, and any piecemeal offer that ‘protects’ 
workers’ rights ceded too much ground to the legal protection of private property over work. 
From the BAUEN’s perspective, any deviation from worker control of property, including 
the employer’s lease of property to the workers, would undermine the security of the 
worker’s employment. The BAUEN, and other ERTs, sought to draw on law’s institutional 
capacity to defend its use of property for the ends of worker-control but, where law’s 
solutions threatened to dismantle the political telos and material aims of these worker 
cooperatives they could no longer engage with but against the law. This explains why the 
Cooperative resisted the eviction order as opposed to accepting the terms of the restitution 
agreement. It also reveals the distinction between the BAUEN’s tactical engagement with 
law and strategic refusal to be co-opted or extinguished by an unfavourable legal decision. 
The BAUEN recognised an opportunity for, and benefitted from, the legal protection 
contained in the Bankruptcy Law. However, the BAUEN’s engagement was tactical and 
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deployed in the service of wider strategic objectives. As such, the Cooperative did not entrust 
the outcome of their control of property to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law. They 
sought to draw on its potential to provide direct legal protections but, the political and 
material commitment of workers to recuperation has meant that their political strategy was 
not contingent on the outcome of such tactical engagements with law. At the point that the 
Bankruptcy Law no longer represented an opportunity but a threat, the Cooperative’s tactics 
withdrew from and turned to resisting against law. The effectiveness of the BAUEN’s legal 
strategy here can be summarised as providing important legal protections from their 
competent framing of legally recognisable claims, and a selective withdrawal from the 
tactical use of law to protect its long-term strategy. 
In general, the Bankruptcy Law has provided multiple ERTs with short-term legal rights to 
continue to production. However, it has proved less adept at providing long-term rights 
protections. The BAUEN’s engagement with the Bankruptcy Law ultimately failed because, 
while its provisions presented an opportunity for legal protection the Cooperative’s claims 
could not supersede the constitutional right to property of other parties to the case. Kravetz 
captures the opportunity and limit of the Bankruptcy Law in the refrain, “Still, when you can 
use it, you do.” The direct effects of legislative provisions are limited by the scope afforded 
by their express content and their application within the normative boundaries of the legal 
system. Nonetheless, in the case of the Bankruptcy Law, its tactical opportunity to provide 
legal protections was too important to ignore. 
2.2. Expropriation laws: An Introduction 
A number of ERTs have been granted the legal rights to permanently remain through 
expropriation legislation passed by provincial, regional and national legislatures427. The 
expropriation laws are an important opportunity for ERTs to attain legal protection and to 
continue their operations.428 The expropriation route is viewed as a more secure and 
favourable opportunity for legal protection than the Bankruptcy Law. An expropriation law 
is definitive and provides a permanent legal right to remain, meaning ERTs no longer need 
to rely upon legislative instruments that provide only temporary use agreements. For 
instance, the Bankruptcy Law explicitly excludes creditors from bringing proceedings for 
property that has been expropriated or property that is subject to an expropriation bill (article 
 
427 The last available figures provided in 2014 show that of the 311 ERTs (at that time) 16% had been subject 
to an expropriation law. 
428 Ranis (n 364) 82–3. 
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21(1)). Post-expropriation a creditor must apply to the courts about repayment of debts and 
municipalities or provinces deal directly with creditors as opposed to burdening the worker 
cooperatives. Moreover, Ruggeri explains that an expropriation law is a preferable legal 
route for ERTs because the cost of expropriation is subject to a negotiation process which 
means that a Cooperative’s particular circumstances can be taken into account. Whereas, a 
purchase of property via the Bankruptcy Law involves an arbitrary judicial demand for the 
immediate repayment of costs. This is based on a strict calculation of the property’s value 
minus monies owed to the Cooperative as ex-employees, the costs involved in recuperation, 
and any value the Cooperative may have since added to the property and/or business. 
The detail of each expropriation order is unique, including the financial obligations owed to 
primary creditors, and the conditions for a cooperative’s contract of use. For example, on 
25th November 2004 the municipal council of Buenos Aires passed legislation giving 
thirteen worker cooperatives the rights to control their enterprise and all associated assets 
(e.g., machinery, trademarks, and the patents)429 on the condition that they pay the value of 
the enterprise at the time of expropriation. The payments were staggered over twenty years 
and suspended for the first three years following expropriation. In comparison, when the 
provincial legislature of Neuquén decided to expropriate the Zanón ceramic factory in 2009 
on behalf of the FaSinPat cooperative (established in 2002) it was decided that the local 
government would be responsible for reimbursing the factory’s creditors430. In what follows 
I will set out the legal grounds for an expropriation and the necessary steps that an ERT must 
satisfy in any effective engagement with it. 
2.2.1. Expropriation of private property as strategic opportunity: Constitutional 
and legislative grounds 
The legal test for expropriation is grounded in article 17 of the Argentine Constitution: 
Article 17 – Private property is inviolable, and no inhabitant of the Nation can be 
deprived of it except as defined by law. Expropriation for reasons of public utility must 
be determined by law with prior indemnity. 
 
429 Carlos Martínez and others, ‘Las Empresas Recuperadas En La Argentina’ (Programa Facultad 
Abierta/Centro de Documentación de Empresas Recuperadas 2005) 49–50 
<http://www.recuperadasdoc.com.ar/Informes%20relevamientos/Empresas%20Recuperadas%202005.pdf> 
accessed 4 December 2019. For the full text of Law 1529, 
http://www2.cedom.gob.ar/es/legislacion/normas/leyes/ley1529.html accessed 04/12/2019. 
430 Ranis (n 364) 89. 
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This establishes the right to property and the protection holders of legal title enjoy from State 
interference but, it also inserts an exception to the rule. As a result, article 17 has provided 
the basis for a strategic engagement with the Constitution and legislative provisions that 
aims to expropriate occupied property on behalf of an ERT. While the ultimate legal 
authority for the expropriation of property is rooted in the Constitution, the requirements for 
any such action is set out in legislation. The process for an authorized expropriation by the 
National Congress of Argentina is detailed by La Ley de Expropiaciones 21.499, 1977.431 
The test for expropriation set out in article 1 of the statute is: 
Public utility is the legal foundation for expropriation, it includes all cases that the 
common good is sought, whether it be material or spiritual in nature.432 
The normative basis for an expropriation is defined by the legislative test of ‘public utility’. 
The determination of something as of public utility and the satisfaction of the legal test 
requires answering two questions: What actions provide utility? And, who is the beneficiary 
of those actions? As we shall see, the contested nature of public utility presents an 
opportunity for the ERTs’ to frame their actions in a manner that contributes to the common 
good. 
Article 3 defines those authorised to expropriate property as the Nation State (national 
executive and legislature of Argentina), the city of Buenos Aires government, and both 
public enterprises and individuals that are given legal authorisation to expropriate. Article 4 
 
431 Ley de Expropriaciones (Expropriations) 
21.499.<http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/35000-39999/37292/norma.htm> accessed 
04/12/2019. Originally established in 1948 (Ley 13.264) the current Law of Expropriation was derogated by 
Ley 21.499 in 1977. The Law was established pursuant to the powers conferred by article 5 of the National 
Reorganisation Statute (Estatua para la Reorganización Nacional) as presented by the military junta in 1976. 
This statute was one of four legal instruments that did not replace but assumed a supra-legal relation to the 
Argentine Constitution 1853 (For the four legislative instruments, see 
<http://www.bnm.me.gov.ar/giga1/documentos/EL000162.pdf >(last accessed 04/12/2019). These 
instruments set out a number of basic objectives that ought to guide the junta’s exercise of power. For 
example, article 5 of the National Reorganisation Statute transferred, with a few exceptions, legislative 
competencies from the bi-cameral Argentine Congress to the President of Argentina, as well as establishing a 
new Advisory Legislative Commission. These norms were promulgated by the junta with the express 
intention of returning the Argentine Republic to ‘greatness’ and to enable the junta to effectively exercise the 
constituent power. All four of these legislative instruments were abandoned on 10 December 1983 with the 
return to democratic rule in Argentina. Although the return of democracy stripped the instruments of their 
supra-constitutional role; the laws that were passed under its influence remain on the statute book, albeit with 
their advisory introductory note. 
432 “La utilidad pública que debe servir de fundamento legal a la expropiación, comprende todos los casos en 
que se procure la satisfacción del bien común, sea éste de naturaleza material o espiritual.” 
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establishes that any class of persons, public and private, may be subject to an expropriation 
of their property: 
All assets suitable or necessary for the satisfaction of the public good, whatever their 
legal nature, whether they belong to the public domain or private domain, whether they 
are things or not, may be the object of expropriation. 
The Law of Expropriation also sets out that an indemnity must be paid to the owners by the 
expropriating authority. According to the general rule, expropriation is only effective once 
the indemnity has been paid because it is obliged by the expropriation law433. However, in 
certain circumstances art.51(8) allows the expropriating authority to cede the asset without 
payment. 
The test for public utility and the conditions that satisfy it - materially and spiritually - is not 
predefined by objective standards. Constitutional rights are an important tool in proving the 
public utility of an expropriation. By framing the expropriation as ensuring the protection of 
employment, the ERTs’ lawyers have drawn heavily on the constitutional protection of 
work. The right to work is set out in article 14 and 14bis of the Constitution of Argentina434: 
Article 14 – All the inhabitants of the Nation enjoy the following rights in accordance 
with the laws which regulate their use; namely, the right to work, and to engage in any 
legal industry… 
Article 14bis – Work in its different forms shall enjoy the protection of the laws, which 
shall guarantee the worker dignified and equitable labour conditions; a limited work 
day; paid rest and vacation time; fair remuneration; an adjustable minimum wage; 
equal pay for equal work; a share in company earnings with control of production and 
collaboration in management; protection from arbitrary dismissal; stability for public 
employees; free and democratic union membership by simple inscription in a special 
registry. 
The rights listed in the Constitution provide a repository of ‘goods’ that can be utilised in 
legal arguments that attempt to frame something as providing benefit to the public. The 
rationale behind using constitutional rights in effective legal argument is that, where 
something can be recognised as contributing to the common good it is afforded protection 
 
433 For an example of an expropriation without repayment see Ley 13037 that expropriated ‘La Baskonia’ 
Cooperative on the grounds of public utility, <https://normas.gba.gob.ar/documentos/VwvQzu5B.pdf> 
accessed 04/12/2019. 
434 Constitución de la Nación Argentina 24.430 1994. < 
http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/804/norma.htm> accessed 04/12/2019 
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by the Constitution. Drawing on Cover, we can understand the varying interpretations of the 
Constitution presented by the ERTs as jurisgenerative, or an exercise in presenting 
alternative legal meaning. As we shall see, the ERTs’ lawyers have drawn on the 
Constitution’s excess of meaning and presented claims about what it ought to recognise as a 
public utility. 
The legal provisions above represent resources in the ERT’s strategic attempt to legalise the 
factory recuperations and recognise their actions as a worthy exception to the inviolable 
constitutional right to property. The qualification of an action as a public utility is overtly 
political because it requires an act to be determined as a common good. While the 
constitution might provide the grounds for interpreting the occupation, recuperation and 
expropriation of property for workers as legal; the challenge is to present a claim that is both 
recognisable to law as legal and politically acceptable. The satisfaction of a legal test of 
‘public utility’ imports political arguments into legal reasoning, because the legal test 
requires legislators to engage in decision-making that has overtly political consequences. 
Unlike the Bankruptcy Law that set a list of conditions that needed to be satisfied, the 
determination of an action as a public utility is open to future determinations about its 
content. Therefore, an expropriation bill for the BAUEN could only be deemed legal where 
enough legislators accepted the public utility of expropriation. In the next section I will 
document the BAUEN’s strategic attempts to pass an expropriation law and analyse the legal 
and political challenges that shaped the competing legal arguments that the hotel BAUEN is 
(not) a public utility and does (not) satisfy the test for expropriation by the government. 
2.2.2. The Hotel BAUEN’s struggle for expropriation 
There have been several legislative attempts to expropriate the BAUEN using innovative 
arguments about its public utility and the legality of expropriation435. The first expropriation 
 
435 The first legislative step for the BAUEN was a bill introduced in 2005 to the City of Buenos Aires 
Legislature that sought to establish the public utility of the hotel’s recuperation. Ruggeri, Alfonso and 
Balaguer (n 387) 86.; The BAUEN is the first factory recuperation that sought expropriation in the National 
Congress. Expropriations had only previously been undertaken by provincial legislatures. This is important 
in terms of the effects of a decision upon the national legal system and the additional political complexities at 
the national level. Provincial legislatures can be more receptive to local public opinion owing to both 
proximity and their shared interest in the community; compared to the National Congress which is composed 
of members that do not share local pressures but instead bring a diverse range of interests. For example, the 
decision of the Neuquén legislature to expropriate FaSinPat was heavily influenced by the presence of strong 
local support for the recuperation and the positive effects of employment in the local area. A decision not to 
expropriate would have been a politically toxic move by local representatives. See Ranis (n 364) 89. At the 
local level, the BAUEN faced a less favourable and uncertain legislative reception due to elections that 
swung the composition of the City of Buenos Aires legislative chamber between majorities for right-wing 
and left-wing parties. Ruggeri, Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 86. 
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bill presented to the National Congress (20th July 2006)436 claimed that the Hotel was in fact 
already owned by the State. The supporting evidence highlighted that the Hotel’s former 
owners owed debts from unpaid taxes to the City of Buenos Aires Government and that the 
Hotel was built using an unpaid loan given by the now extinct National Development Bank 
(‘BANADE’). The proposal failed to gain traction and was unsuccessfully re-presented on 
several occasions to members of Congress.437 
New legislation was initiated by Carlos Heller, a member of the House of Representatives 
(Camara de Diputados) - one chamber of the bi-cameral Argentine Congress - and President 
of the congressional party Partido Solidario. On 30th November 2016 the bill passed in 
favour of expropriation in the Senate438. 
The Bill declared the hotel building and all of its fixtures to be of public utility and therefore 
subject to expropriation by the State of Argentina (article 1)439. The expropriated assets were 
to be transferred to the Cooperative BAUEN on the basis of a gratuitous bailment that is 
conditional upon the obligations set out in articles 7, 8, and 9: The Cooperative’s cultural 
activities must continue; They should reach agreements with public universities for the 
provision of career training programmes related to tourism, gastronomy, cooperativism, and 
event management; And, 30% of the hotel should be made available for social-tourism.  
The legislation asserted that the hotel was a public utility because it was a source of 
employment and it provided a range of other public services. The utility of the Cooperative’s 
activities was grounded not only in the constitutional importance of work and the ERTs’ 
contribution to the Argentine economy, but also having a direct and positive influence upon 
 
436 Ruggeri, Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 94. 
437 ibid 95. 
438 ibid 120–1.; Denise Kasparian and Julia Rebón, ‘La Expropiación Del Bauen’ Pagina12 (1481167035) 
<https://www.pagina12.com.ar/7583-la-expropiacion-del-bauen> accessed 5 December 2019. 
439 All tangible and intangible property, including trademarks and patents, that are related to the touristic, 
social, and community activities that occur in The Hotel Bauen are of public utility and the subject of the 
expropriation, with the exception of property acquired free of charge or at a price by the registered 
Cooperative BAUEN (article 2). The financial costs for the expropriation were to be quantified by the Court 
of Taxation and the value based on the general condition of the assets as of 20th March 2003, so as not to 
include any added value already contributed by the recuperation process (article 3). Any fee for expropriation 
owed to the previous owner ought to take into account any claimable debt that the State owns against the 
property subject to expropriation and adjusted accordingly (article 4). Article 10 stipulates that the executive 
must make the necessary funds available so that the process of expropriation can begin and to pay the 
indemnity as set out by article 4. The details of the expropriation bill are set out in Ruggeri, Alfonso and 
Balaguer (n 387) 120–1., and in the Presidential veto cited below. 
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the local community. For the purposes of the legislative test this was understood to provide 
sufficient evidence of material and spiritual satisfaction of the common good.  
The shift away from legislative proposals relying on claims about debts and State-ownership 
was premised on a more robust expropriation claim that satisfied both prongs of the public 
utility test. In order to answer both parts of the public utility test affirmatively, the 
Cooperative defined the utility of its actions and its beneficiaries beyond the narrower remit 
of the importance of work and the benefit of employment for the Cooperative’s members. 
Given the ‘inviolability’ of property rights and the Cooperative’s previous failures, they 
were unlikely to evidence a sufficient material and spiritual contribution to the common 
good by simply pitting the right to work against the right to property. Therefore, they 
bootstrapped a range of other public services that are listed as constitutional goods to their 
claim that the BAUEN Cooperative’s actions represented a public utility that trumped the 
private property rights of Mercoteles. 
In its legal claims the BAUEN did not argue that the model of worker control and self-
management contributed to the public good. The Cooperative had to present its actions in 
accordance with an exception – expropriation for public utility - to the constitutional right 
to property. Recuperation and self-management are not legally recognised as defensible 
values, recuperation and self-management’s provision of employment became legally 
relevant only as part of a wider claim about constitutional rights. In order to satisfy the legal 
test of public utility the BAUEN represented its actions as contributing to common good 
through its provision of employment plus its educational, cultural and social contribution to 
the community. The effectiveness of the BAUEN’s legislative proposal was grounded in its 
framing of the Cooperative’s actions in a legally and constitutionally re-cognisable form and 
by making political claims that could receive broad support from different constituencies. 
The BAUEN could have presented their claim by accentuating how public service provision 
is part of the intrinsic importance and ideological superiority of factory recuperations. 
Indeed, as part of the recuperated movements’ conception of work, its actions do extend 
beyond providing only those services that are necessary to sustain a given workplace. The 
recuperations are not simply hotels that provide accommodation to guests or ceramic 
factories that make tiles, but social enterprises that are inextricably engaged in their local 
communities. However, to have legal traction the Cooperative needed stay within the 
boundaries of what is comprehensible to the legal system and politically defensible for 
elected representatives. Therefore, the Cooperative relied on the Constitution’s own 
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conception of public goods – employment, education and healthcare. Rather than dispensing 
entirely with the normative foundations of the Argentine legal system it framed its actions 
legally and satisfied the requirement that an expropriation contributes to the common good, 
either materially or spiritually. These public goods could be broadly supported by a centre-
left majority in the Senate that did not explicitly support the ERTs’ more radical conception 
of work but defended its provision of employment and public services at a time of financial 
crisis. 
Expropriation was not simply the tactical instrumentalisation of law to acquire the legal 
rights to continue their operations, these actions contained a wider strategic aim to re-balance 
the constitutional hierarchy of work vis-à-vis property. The key issue for the BAUEN was 
to frame their actions in a way that satisfied the legal test and in so doing draw on the 
Constitution’s protection of work. This means that the Cooperative’s claims about public 
service provision were not purely instrumental, disingenuous or short-term; their effective 
claims were premised on the Constitution’s promises and contributed to a long-term strategic 
objective. 
While members of the recuperation movement may be offended at the apparent 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of their movement. I suggest that this broad 
interpretation of the BAUEN exemplifies how, if a political movement is to have legal 
traction and set its strategic aims in motion, political support for recuperation must be 
translated into claims that satisfy the legal test. 
For those opposed to the expropriation, the BAUEN was a private group and any 
expropriation by the State would mean the use of taxpayer’s (public) money for the benefit 
of a private group. Despite having passed the final legislative hurdle in the Senate the Law 
of Expropriation for the Hotel BAUEN was vetoed by President Mauricio Macri. The 
executive order stipulated three objections to the legislature’s expropriation order: For 
Macri, (1) the expropriation would not benefit the community in general, on the contrary it 
would benefit an exclusive group. (2) The ‘obligations’ that would arise from the purchase 
of the Hotel would be burdensome for the State. (3) The expropriation would prejudice the 
national executive’s ability to allocate economic resources for other basic needs of the entire 
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population, and instead provide a benefit only to those engaged in the activities of the 
Cooperative.440 
The executive order makes repeated reference to a disagreement between the legislative and the 
executive over the contribution of the Cooperative’s activities to the “common good”. For Macri, 
the Cooperative and its members are an exclusive group and would be the sole beneficiaries 
of expropriation. According to the veto: “The expropriation would not benefit the 
community in general, on the contrary it would be to the benefit of an exclusive group”. This 
exclusive group is defined as those engaged in the Cooperatives’ activities. Therefore, the 
opposition to the legislation is premised upon a dismissal of the claim that the beneficiary 
of the Cooperative’s actions is the public. This stands in contrast to and challenges the 
legislation’s claim that the public services provided by the Cooperative contribute either 
materially or spiritually to the common good. The veto does not expand on why the public 
services do not contribute to the public; instead, it concentrates less on the public services 
argument and focuses on the Cooperative as the beneficiary of expropriation.  
The veto challenges the legislature’s interpretation and application of the legal threshold of 
‘public utility’ and inserts an additional argument about the financially burdensome nature 
of the legislature’s proposal441. At the time of writing, the legislation remains at this stage. 
According to the Argentine legislative procedure, the veto is not the last word, the bill must 
pass back to the Senate who have the possibility to overturn the veto. 
The central issue here was not the BAUEN’s actual contribution to the common good and 
more about whether there should be an exception to the right to private property grounded 
in the right to work. The Cooperative framed its actions so that it satisfied the issue of utility 
and public beneficiaries, but its legislative project ultimately failed due to the President’s 
rejection of its political and financial implications. Unlike the bankruptcy legislation, the 
satisfaction of the public utility test was not a formality dependent upon the provision of 
evidence that satisfied the legislative conditions. Instead, it was subject to creative 
 
440 The veto in full, see <http://www.saij.gob.ar/1302-nacional-veto-total-proyecto-ley-27344-declara-
utilidad-publica-sujetos-expropiacion-inmuebles-todas-instalaciones-componen-edificio-hotel-bauen-
dn20160001302-2016-12-26/123456789-0abc-203-1000-
6102soterced?&o=14&f=Total%7CTipo%20de%20Documento%7CFecha%7CTema/Derecho%20administr
ativo/dominio%20del%20Estado%7COrganismo%7CAutor%7CEstado%20de%20Vigencia%7CJurisdicci%
F3n%5B5%2C1%5D%7CTribunal%5B5%2C1%5D%7CPublicaci%F3n%7CColecci%F3n%20tem%E1tica
%5B5%2C1%5D&t=10742> accessed 04/12/2019. See also, 
<https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/#!DetalleNorma/156616/20161227> accessed 04/12/2019 
441 The financial burden had always been a challenge with the BAUEN (BAUEN lawyer Kravetz in Ruggeri, 
Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 86.); The cost of expropriation is high because the hotel building is located in 
central Buenos Aires City. 
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interpretation of the legal test and political contestation over the evidence provided. 
Therefore, the satisfaction of the legal test for public utility by ERTs was and will be 
contingent upon generating political support for that interpretation of the legal test. This tells 
us something further about legal strategy that relies not on judicial interpretations but on the 
agreement of political representatives. In these cases, we must recognise the politicisation 
of a legal test, which means that the threshold of sufficient evidence to satisfy a legal test is 
not legally determined but subject to political conflict. 
3 Legal strategy and non-legal factors 
In this section we will consider the non-legal factors that reveal something about the 
BAUEN’s legal strategy. The opportunities and limitations of legal rules only tell part of the 
story about the trajectory of the BAUEN’s strategic and tactical decisions. For instance, the 
pragmatic decision to engage with law can be understood better when we acknowledge that 
the catalyst for the ERTs’ mobilisation was workers’ material necessities for subsistence to 
support their families, and not simply because of an ideological commitment to recuperation 
and worker autonomy. Instead, it is important to recognise how legal strategy is also 
constituted by a multitude of non-legal factors that serve as catalysts, obstacles, and 
facilitators of political and legal objectives.  
The aim of the case study has been to provide an empirical insight into the effective ways 
that labour engages with law and to situate our analysis within the practical realities of 
struggle. In this section we will move away from legal analysis and focus on the effect of 
non-legal factors on the BAUEN’s strategic objectives. Importantly, this will provide an 
opportunity to consider the ways the BAUEN managed the dangers of co-optation, and the 
role of political mobilisation in constructing an organisational structure capable of initiating 
and delivering a legal strategy. To this end, I will consider the following three factors and 
their effect on the BAUEN and the ERT movement generally: Political action; organisational 
support; and the changing relation with government. 
3.1. Political strategy: Occupation and solidarity  
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Lawyers usually seem, even to the workers, to be the ones who get the goods, but in 
reality, the success of the lawyers in most cases depends, paradoxically, on the 
workers’ willingness to go beyond what the law prescribes.442 
To understand the BAUEN Cooperative and its legal strategy we have to recognise the 
relationship between political actions taken by workers and legal actions by lawyers. 
Political tactics have provided support to ERTs that legal actions could not and, importantly, 
have ensured the survival of the Cooperative and its longer-term political strategy when legal 
remedies failed to provide protection. In the history of the ERT movement there have been 
extreme and dramatic examples of political action, including clashes between workers and 
police outside the Lavalan factory and the Chilavert printing press443. In the BAUEN case 
we will focus upon two political strategies. First, the occupation of property by workers and 
how it enabled the BAUEN Cooperative to establish its operations and become legally 
relevant to the Bankruptcy Law. Second, mass demonstrations in support of the Cooperative 
prevented the enforcement of eviction orders and ensured the survival of the BAUEN 
Cooperative. 
The recuperation of a company by workers begins with ‘the take’ or occupation. The initial 
act of occupation is essential to their aims of worker-control and their legal strategy because 
it provides the workers with control of the property. Once physically in control of the 
property a group of workers can start to re-organise the enterprise according to the principle 
of self-management and establish a viable business capable of providing secure employment. 
Occupation is a formative act that creates an ERT and mobilises a group of workers into a 
movement committed to its shared goal of worker-recuperation and will, in turn, demand 
legal protections. As Magnani puts it: 
Occupying factories, even precariously, at least creates temporary spaces where the 
workers can cultivate the circumstances to develop political consciousness. While 
there are no guarantees, this will at least give them a chance for greater combativeness 
and commitment to deeper goals.444 
The mobilisation of a worker Cooperative that physically controls property and is committed 
to the recuperation of their workplace is not just politically formative but has been central to 
their legal strategy. A cooperative that controls property can present an effective claim to 
the bankruptcy judge requesting the legal right to remain because it is able to demonstrate 
 
442 Magnani (n 360) 104. 
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its capacity to continue production. For example, prior to controlling the property, the Callao 
Cooperative made an application to continue the Hotel’s operations that was rejected due to 
their inability to satisfy the evidential requirement in article 190 of the Bankruptcy Law that, 
as a third party they were capable of continuing production445. Without control of the 
property the Cooperative could not prove that they were able to ‘continue’ production and 
their legal claim fell short. However, once the Callao Cooperative entered the hotel on 
21/03/2003 they were granted a temporary tenancy. The importance of occupation to an ERT 
means that they must act illegally – occupation of private property – and then seek to make 
their physical control over the property legal. The political practice of occupation has 
provided the foundation for ERTs’ effective engagements with the Bankruptcy Law. 
The second strategy that has played a role in the survival of the BAUEN cooperative is mass 
demonstrations. These acts of solidarity by civil society have physically prevented the 
enforcement of eviction orders. These demonstrations and the vast political mobilisation 
behind the BAUEN’s struggle explain how the Cooperative has managed to remain in 
control of property and continue production in spite of judicial orders for their eviction. 
The BAUEN is a focal point of political activism, the Cooperative has welcomed all types 
of political campaign to use their facilities for meetings and the organisation of popular 
demonstrations. The support given to other political movements has been reciprocated in the 
form of public demonstrations of solidarity with the Cooperative. These have been at their 
most effective during periods of proposed eviction but have included regular demonstrations 
outside of Court during trials. The demonstrations have been attended by a diverse groups 
of trade unionists, political party members, representatives of other recuperations, human 
rights organisations and academics. 
For example, on the day of one proposed eviction, 21st August 2007, a concert was organised 
outside the Hotel, filling the streets surrounding the Hotel with supporters of the 
Cooperative446. The president of the Cooperative, Federico Tonarelli, addressed the 
demonstration and declared that the workers had no intention of abandoning the Hotel nor 
their movement for self-management. The demonstration was transformed into an assembly 
with those present confirming that they would resist any attempt to evict the Cooperative447. 
Given the vast political support for the BAUEN from different social groups, concerns about 
 
445 Ruggeri, Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 55–7. 
446 ibid 104. 
447 ibid 109. 
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public order, and the practical difficulties presented by a mass demonstration, the eviction 
was not enforced and the workers remained in situ. In response to another eviction order, 
10th September 2014, demonstrators again filled the streets and the deadline for eviction 
expired with the Cooperative remaining in control of the Hotel.  
In addition to its concrete role in defending the integrity of the Cooperative, public support 
for expropriation has be seen as a factor that contributed to legislative support for 
expropriation. It would be difficult to prove that mass demonstrations were a definitive factor 
in generating sufficient legislative support for an expropriation; however, we can say that 
the swell of public support for the BAUEN Cooperative made it a politically sensitive issue. 
As Magnani summarises: 
No authority wants to pay the political cost of putting more than a hundred workers on 
the streets. To make it even more complicated, BAUEN workers have always been 
aware of their delicate position and have been building political networks with all 
kinds of political actors: unions, political parties, politicians, social movements of 
unemployed [sic], etc. If there were an eviction, besides the complication of sending 
the police into a 15-floor building full of tourists, there would be huge demonstrations 
10 blocks from the Obelisco, the symbolic centre of Argentina. That is an extreme 
case, but if no definitive solutions are taken, there could be many BAUENs all around 
the city.448 
In the BAUEN experience, mass demonstrations were an effective political tool that 
protected the Cooperative when legal remedies had been exhausted and the Law threatened 
its integrity. The Cooperative would have been unable to continue its legal and political 
struggle without the aid of civil society support. Mass demonstrations made law enforcement 
politically sensitive and practically impossible. These acts of mass solidarity provided a 
basis to resist law where tactical engagements failed to deliver positive outcomes and 
demonstrated the vast political support for the ERT movement. And, as a result, these actions 
managed to defend the political telos and material aims of the ERT movement against the 
enforcement power of law. 
The role of political action in buttressing the BAUEN’s legal strategy provides an example 
of how a labour movement might avoid the limitations of legal mobilisation, or even the 
dangers of co-optation. We have considered in detail both the opportunity and limitation of 
legal mobilisation by labour movements in chapters two and three. The principle concern 
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that surrounds the danger of co-optation is that a social movement’s normative demands may 
be neutralised, misrepresented, and/or de-mobilised as a result of legal mobilisation. I have 
argued that, in spite of these risks labour movements should (and do) look for opportunities 
to draw on State law’s institutional capacity, albeit in a manner that co-ordinates such legal 
tactics with a broader political strategy. The BAUEN’s use of mass demonstration and 
occupation are examples of effective political and legal tactics that have been used at 
different stages both to encourage and resist legal functions. This selective use of law has 
enabled the BAUEN to both benefit from the enforcement of law and to resist its ordering 
capacity depending on its relative effect on their political objectives. In other words, the 
BAUEN engaged with law where it presented an opportunity for effective engagement and 
it resisted law where it threatened the Cooperative’s existence. 
3.2. Organisational support 
Trade unions have played a crucial role in the recuperation movement. From the non-
recognition of the movement by traditional unions to the formation of ERT-specific 
organisations. In this section I will highlight how the provision of practical support and legal 
resources to the ERTs was critical to this labour movement’s foundation and its legal 
mobilisation. In addition, these organisations were critical in mobilising a political 
movement for recuperation by encouraging workers to see their actions as both a viable 
economic alternative and as part of a wider political struggle about the nature of work. This 
will provide insights into the potentially effective relation between the ERT movements’ 
political and legal mobilisation. 
The largest Argentine labour federation, La Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT), 
refused to represent workers involved with recuperations. Two factors debarred workers 
from representation by their union: First, the CGT was concerned about the irreparable 
damage their support for recuperations would cause to employer relations449. Second, 
workers were no longer categorised as employees because, as members of the self-managed 
cooperatives they fell outside the employer-employee paradigm. Workers that were union 
members found themselves precluded from representation and support due to their new 
status as Cooperative members. For example, according to the La Union Obrera Metalurgica 
(UOM, The Metal Workers Union) workers engaged in recuperations qualified as employers 
 
449 Irena Petrovic and Slobodan Cvejić, ‘Social and Political Embeddedness of Argentina’s Worker-
Recuperated Enterprises: A Brief History and Current Trends’ (Social Science Research Network 2015) 
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or cooperative members, not employees or workers. In 2004, the UOM changed its 
membership criteria so that members of cooperatives (socios) could be recognised as 
workers for the purposes of trade union membership.450 The recognition of Cooperative 
members as workers was not carried out by all trade unions; instead, we are left with a 
heterogeneous experience of inclusion and rejection by Argentinian trade unions.  
To provide the necessary support numerous worker-recuperation related organisations were 
established. Multiple national, sector-specific and ad hoc worker cooperative federations (or 
unions) operated in Argentina by 2013451. There have been three main organisations: The 
MNFRT (Movimiento Nacional de Fabricas Recuperadas por sus Trabajadores, National 
Movement of Factories Recovered by the Workers); The MNER (Movement of Recovered 
Businesses); and the FACTA (Federación Argentina de Cooperativas de Trabajadores 
Autogestionados). 
The need for alternative organisational structures stemmed from the exclusion of ERT 
members from traditional trade union structures that were premised upon and structured 
around the representation of workers as employees and wage labourers; as opposed to 
supporting the struggle of labour per se. Moreover, traditional trade unions were ill-equipped 
to support workers engaged in the recuperation and self-management of their workplace. 
The new organisations have provided practical guidance about restarting production and 
how to re-structure an enterprise according to the principles of self-management. For our 
purposes, the organisations have been pivotal in the ERTs’ legal struggle through their 
provision of legal and political resources. 
The mobilisation of legal resources by these organisations has enabled the BAUEN to launch 
legal action and sustain the struggle through the appeals process. The ERTs’ legal strategy 
has been co-ordinated by the legal knowledge of lawyers provided by ERT organisations. In 
order to engage effectively with both the Bankruptcy Law and the expropriation process, the 
ERTs have relied on the financial resources of the ERT organisations to provide expert legal 
practitioners. I have argued in chapter two (see tenet 1) that effective legal strategy is heavily 
 
450 ibid 21.; For a detailed account of the trade unions that did and did not engage with the recuperation 
movement, see pp.21-23. 
451 Ruggeri, ‘Informe Del IV Relevamiento de Empresas Recuperadas En La Argentina: Las Empresas 
Recuperadas En El Período 2010-2013.’ (n 385) 42–6; Andrés Ruggeri, ‘Las Empresas Recuperadas En La 
Argentina. 2010 : Informe Del Tercer Relevamiento de Empresas Recuperadas Por Los Trabajadores’ 
(Programa Facultad Abierta/Centro de Documentación de Empresas Recuperadas 2010) 76–8 
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dependent on an extensive understanding of the available opportunities in law, and a capacity 
to articulate legal claims that are capable of being recognised as belonging to the legal 
system. The provision of resources by the MNER, MNFRT and FACTA ensured a 
competent legal mobilisation that enabled the ERTs to benefit from direct legal remedies in 
the short- and long-term. 
Beyond practical and legal support, the mobilisation of a politicised labour movement is a 
key factor in the establishment of an ERT movement and a coherent legal and political 
strategy. While the workers were responsible for taking action, the new unions forged an 
organisational structure under which it was possible to identify an ERT movement as 
opposed to a collection of ad hoc worker-controlled enterprises. For the MNER and MNFRT 
in particular, a key part of establishing a robust labour movement involved informing 
workers about the political nature of their actions, as the MNFRT’s founder and president, 
Luis Caro, explained: 
In Argentina, private property should be recognised, but secondary to work. Perón said 
it best: we need to put capital at the service of the economy, and the economy at the 
service of social well-being. We have things backwards here in Argentina. We have 
social well-being at the service of the economy, and the economy at the service of 
capital.452 
The aim of the ERT struggle was not simply to advise about self-management structures but 
to develop the political consciousness of workers and emphasise the political significance of 
recovering a factory.453 Caro, for example, viewed the ERT movement as part of a wider 
struggle for social liberation with legal tactics geared toward broader constitutional 
ambitions to re-order the relation between labour and capital.454 It would have been difficult 
to sustain an ERT movement committed to such strategic aims without a political 
consciousness amongst cooperative members that precipitated into the necessary condition 
of solidarity. And, in periods of difficulty – occupation, negotiation, eviction – the 
solidaristic bonds of members have been vital. As such, we can distinguish three essential 
factors that these organisations have provided to the ERTs’ strategy: Political mobilisation, 
legal resources and practical support. 
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There have, inevitably, been issues surrounding the relationship between the aims of these 
organisations and those of the ERTs. For instance, a division in the ERT membership of the 
MNER arose from concerns about the MNER’s leadership and informal structures455. The 
MNER had focused its attentions toward lobbying politicians in search of legislative 
recognition and questions were asked about whether the MNER was representing workers 
or simply furthering the political ambitions of its leaders. The ERTs expressed doubts about 
these organisations’ capacity to represent the demands of cooperative members and not the 
wider political aims of the MNER and MNFRT. For the president of FACTA, Federico 
Tonarelli, an organisation formed in response to the perceived failings of the MNER, the 
support required by a self-managed worker cooperative cannot be provided by pseudo 
political parties but organisations dedicated to ERTs’ specific organisational needs.456 The 
establishment of FACTA was an attempt to provide essential organisational support without 
undermining the political agency of an ERT or the wider movement. The FACTA has been 
focused on the creation of concrete support structures whilst remaining committed to legal 
and political action, including lobbying government about regulations that affect the ERTs 
as businesses (e.g., special status for taxation of cooperatives) and continued legal strategy 
for the recognition of ERTs as public utilities. 
3.3. The changing relation with government 
The government’s policy towards factory recuperations has affected the legality of the ERT 
movement. This case study has already considered the ways that each branch of government 
has enabled and/or prevented the ERTs’ strategic aim to have its actions recognised as legal. 
So far, this analysis has focused upon the judiciary’s interpretation and application of the 
Bankruptcy Law provisions, the need for a legislative majority to expropriate property, and 
the executive veto. This section will highlight how the executive branch’s changing 
‘support’ for the ERT movement affected its legality (i.e., whether the government enabled 
the ERTs’ use of property to be recognised as legal). We will begin by recognising the 
executive’s relatively receptive years between 2003 and 2015, followed by the increased 
 
455 Luis Caro (MNFRT) was a mayoral candidate in the city of Avellaneda, and Eduardo Murúa (MNER) 
stood for the office of deputy for the Province of Buenos Aires and ran for election to the legislature of the 
City of Buenos Aires. For Caro and Murúa, political office represented an opportunity for the ERT 
movement to benefit from legislative and executive power. The decision to stand for elections and represent 
political parties has been met with a mixed response from the workers in the recuperations. We have to 
remember that the recuperation movement began as a consequence of the wider QSVT movement, built on a 
rejection and mistrust of traditional institutions, political representatives’ intentions, and their capacity to 
effect meaningful change. Thus, decisions to enter political office are regarded with suspicion and as 
potentially counter-productive by others in the ERT movement. Ruggeri, Alfonso and Balaguer (n 387) 107. 
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legal and financial precarity of ERTs since the election of President Macri. This analysis 
will reveal how the shift from a centre-left to right-wing executive has had a significant 
effect upon the viability of factory recuperations both in their attempts to mobilise an 
effective legal strategy and capacity to survive the shift in politico-economic policy.  
Before 2003 the State had taken relatively little action to tackle the occupation of property 
by workers. In the post-crisis period, the recuperation movement’s only governmental 
interaction was through article 21 and 190 applications under the Bankruptcy Law.457 In 
2003, the centre-left candidate Néstor Kirchner was elected President and the executive 
began to take a more active role in the ERT phenomenon. The ERTs received ambiguous 
support from the Kirchener governments between 2004-15. The most prominent intervention 
was the provision of subsidies for ‘social development’ to the ERTs by the Ministry of 
Work458. In addition to subsidies, the executive supported further reform to the Bankruptcy 
Law to reduce the challenges faced by ERTs seeking the legal rights to control property. The 
Kirchener governments offered no explicit public support for recuperations459 but, they did 
take decisions that enabled the movement legally and financially. 
While the executive’s financial support for recuperations might be interpreted as merely 
motivated by their general concerns about kick-starting the Argentine economy; the decision 
to recognise, through financial assistance and legal reform, a movement that rejects the 
private property rights of employers cannot be underestimated. The executive’s support 
represents a period during which the ERT movement grew as a political movement and 
received legal protections. In 2004 there were 169 ERTs, 324 in 2013, 367 in 2016460 and 
384 in 2018461. 
This facilitative relation between the ERTs and executive was not applicable nationwide due 
to the contradictory approaches taken at different levels of government. There is no one 
definable response of the government, rather, a range of responses by different branches at 
different levels of government. For example, in spite of the national executive’s willingness 
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to support the recuperation movement as a source of employment through business 
subsidies; the election of Mauricio Macri as head of the City of Buenos Aires Government 
lead to all ERT-related subsidies being cancelled and a more aggressive stance taken against 
expropriation bills462. Moreover, while various regional legislatures have passed 
expropriation laws, the national congress is yet to pass an ERT expropriation bill into law. 
Nonetheless, this was a period of relative, if uneven, support from government with 
expropriation bills, bankruptcy reform and financial support. 
The Macri administration (post-2015) introduced a political, economic and legal climate that 
has had a detrimental effect on the strategic aims of the ERT movement. Before Macri, the 
ERTs had received some governmental support but oftentimes remained in a precarious 
legal, political and economic position463. Following Macri’s election the political, legal and 
macroeconomic situation worsened to the extent that it was extremely difficult, even 
impossible, for worker cooperatives to continue their operations productively and 
sustainably. From the legal and political perspective, the division between conditional 
support for the ERTs and outright rejection was exemplified by the BAUEN’s expropriation 
bill. The centre-left majority in Congress, drawn from the same party as the previous 
Kirchener presidencies, accepted the broad interpretation of the Hotel’s activities as a public 
utility and passed the BAUEN expropriation law only for it to be vetoed by Macri. The 
changing composition of the Senate in the intervening years has left the politico-legal fate 
of the BAUEN in legislative stasis. While the bill can still be passed by the Senate, the 
guardians of the bill need to be sure that sufficient support can be generated again so as to 
bypass the veto. 
Although these politico-legal calculations are important to the effectiveness of the BAUEN’s 
legal strategy; the principal threat to the ERTs during the Macri era has been the introduction 
of a financial programme that affected the viability of small-businesses generally. The Macri 
administration oversaw a general increase in running costs for businesses, specifically a 
significant increase in electricity and gas tariffs, an abrupt decline in consumption, the 
liberalization of import markets, and a currency devaluation. For example, electricity tariffs 
rose between 200-700% and gas up to 1300%, between 10 December 2015 and March 
2016464. The Macri administration’s financial policies have not only affected ERTs, all 
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small-medium enterprises have felt their effect. Figures from 2016 reveal that the 
unsurprising corollary effect of these policies has been the dismissal of some 150,000 
workers from the public and private sector and the closure of 5000 businesses. 
For private capital enterprises, such conditions might precipitate redundancies or other 
‘efficiency’ savings in an attempt to ensure a business’ survival. In the case of self-managed 
worker cooperatives, their response to market pressures does not follow the same logic. 
Decisions are not taken via a hierarchical command structure that views workers as costs, 
they are taken collectively by workers which means that redundancies have not been an 
option for ERTs. The cooperatives have absorbed increased costs through the reallocation 
of financial resources, meaning a collective reduction in salaries or changes in the quantity 
or quality of production, or provision of services. However, the ability of the ERT movement 
to survive these financial pressures has taken its toll and negatively affected the movements’ 
capacity to continue its legal and political struggle. For example, the decrease in growth rate 
can be seen in the decline from 18 new ERTs per year in 2015 to 7 in 2018, and despite an 
increase in the number of recuperated enterprises the total number of workers employed in 
an ERT has decreased from nearly 16,000 (2015) to 15,500 (2018)465. Indeed, the sale of 
expropriated property by worker cooperatives is indicative of the precarious nature of the 
ERTs466. Despite having effectively engaged with law and expropriated their properties, the 
financial conditions have been such that the material necessities of workers were best 
satisfied through the sale of property. 
While we are principally concerned with legal strategy, non-legal factors, such as the 
prevailing politico-economic conditions, have had a significant effect on the ERTs’ 
engagements with law. Periods where the ERT model was economically viable and the 
number of ERTs were growing exponentially have coincided with strategic attempts to 
secure legal protections; however, when the economic conditions make the formation of an 
ERT more challenging its legal struggle becomes less prevalent. In other words, just as the 
ERT movement’s mobilisation was the result of social, political and financial conditions in 
2001, the drastic return of the financial crisis has affected the ERT movement. In short, the 
ERTs are less likely to be in a position to successfully present legal claims under the 
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Bankruptcy Law or the expropriation provisions when they do not exist. As with any labour 
movement, the ERTs’ political mobilisation was a precondition of their legal strategy. 
4 Conclusion 
While the future of the BAUEN Cooperative’s legal struggle remains uncertain, its 
experience has provided an opportunity to assess a labour movement’s engagement with law 
in relation to both its strategic aims and navigation of available legal opportunities. The 
overwhelming lesson from the ERT/BAUEN experience is, I argue, that the potential of legal 
strategy to deliver either short- or long-term legal protections is found in pragmatic 
interaction between law’s excess of meaning, the articulation of effective legal claims, and 
non-legal factors. The BAUEN has not provided a conclusive account of effective legal 
strategy but has revealed the significant legal, practical and political challenges to any re-
interpretation of constitutional rights that may conflict with law’s entrenched interests. The 
BAUEN has allowed us to better comprehend legal strategy within the context of a wider 
political struggle and to account for the range of factors that will shape its effectiveness. I 
will conclude by drawing together the insights from the legal and political analysis of the 
BAUEN Cooperative’s struggle. 
The BAUEN Cooperative’s effective legal strategy has been premised on a competent use 
of available legal rules. Although the BAUEN and other ERTs have received legal 
protections, the law does not recognise the normative aims of the recuperation movement. 
Following our analysis in tenet 1, chapter 3, the ERTs have legalised their actions and won 
direct effects for their political intentions by articulating legal claims that satisfy 
constitutional and legislative tests. The effectiveness of the BAUEN Cooperative’s legal 
strategy has been rooted in its ability to win tangible legal protections that enabled it to 
pursue its normative aims of worker-control and cooperativism. A key part of effective legal 
arguments is to engage with law on its terms and identify an interpretative opportunity or 
legal rule that could offer suitable protections. Rather than making political demands that 
law ought to recognise the ERT movement, the BAUEN framed its political demands 
(control of property and the importance of work) as legal and/or constitutional claims that 
could be recognised as belonging to the Argentinian legal system. 
The Bankruptcy Law’s provisions are an example of the opportunity that legislation may 
offer to a labour movement seeking to have its actions recognised as legal and worthy of 
protection. As we have seen, the Bankruptcy Law presented certain conditions and 
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evidentiary requirements that, where satisfied, could provide the BAUEN with direct legal 
effects. The engagement with expropriation legislation shows the innovation and 
pragmatism that is central to legal strategy. In order to meet the legislative test for 
expropriation, it was argued that the BAUEN represented a public utility because it is a 
provider of public services and because the protection of work is a constitutional right, as 
opposed to simply insisting on the constitutional importance of the ERT’s political 
objectives. In the BAUEN’s case the protection of work was recognised by the legislature 
as meeting the threshold for a public utility only when combined with other actions that 
contribute to the common good. This reveals not just the need for innovative legal arguments 
but also the role of political influence in legal strategy that engages with political 
representatives/legislators. In these cases, pragmatic calculations will be required to balance 
strategic objectives, available legal arguments and the likelihood of achieving sufficient 
legislative support to pass a bill. 
The aim of legal engagement has been the control of property, but the effect of protecting 
an ERT’s legal control of property has wider implications for the constitutional importance 
of labour. What is at stake in the ERT’s legal strategy is the relative constitutional role of 
labour, private property and capital. Effective engagement with available legal rules has 
provided legal protections for worker-cooperatives or the actions associated with 
recuperation. The ERTs’ strategic use of both constitutional rights and legislation has sought 
both short-term protections and to achieve longer-term reform of the constitutional 
protection of work. Their experience has shown that there are opportunities for strategic 
gains through effective legal action, and that labour can challenge the supremacy of property 
rights and capital interests (entrenched interests).  
Where State law imposes legal obligations on employers or capital interests to the benefit of 
workers, we can see the importance of national law’s institutional capacity to the ERTs’ 
legal strategy. As I argued in tenet 2, it is the State’s unique material and symbolic power 
that make it a key site of struggle for labour movements that seek to re-shape the 
contemporary conditions of work and social relation between capital and labour. We cannot 
claim that successful legal strategy transforms the normative structure of the State away from 
its protection of extant property regimes and capital interests. However, we must recognise 
the potential effectiveness of legal strategy to deliver key protections that re-balance legal 
relations or provide much-needed legal regulations. The BAUEN experience illustrated the 
opportunity of the State’s institutional capacity where it won legal rights to control property 
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and pursue worker-controlled recuperation. To be explicit, it is the State legal system alone 
that can secure the future of the BAUEN and the wider ERT movement by recognising their 
actions as belonging to the legal system and bestowing the necessary legal protections. 
The BAUEN case has shown a complex interaction between tactical engagements with law, 
political tactics, and long-term strategic objectives. For instance, the BAUEN sought to both 
shape the constitutional relation between labour and private property and drew on more 
short-term legislative provisions with limited constitutional effect. In spite of the difference 
between constitutional rights and legislative provisions, we can see the potential effect of 
the latter on the former. First, the tactical use of the Bankruptcy Law has inserted an 
exception in specific circumstances to the constitutional right to property. Rather than 
assuming ordinary legislation has no wider constitutional effect, we can see that Bankruptcy 
Law does limit the supposed inviolability of private property. And, these legal protections 
have taken effect due to judicial recognition of the social value of work at the expense of 
creditors and owners of private property. Therefore, in this case, ordinary legislation 
factually limits certain constitutional rights meaning an ERT’s innovative use of its 
provisions can be understood to have a wider constitutional effect. 
At the same time, the BAUEN experience serves as a reminder that the protections provided 
by legislative provisions are not a proxy for the wider constitutional treatment of certain 
issues. For example, while the Bankruptcy Law provided an exceptional means for an ERT 
to control property without holding legal title, its application was limited to specific 
bankruptcy-related circumstances and did not infringe the constitutional rights of non-
bankrupted parties to private property. In other words, there are strategic opportunities 
within law to claim important legal protections and innovative engagements with legal 
provisions are an essential part of the ERT’s effective legal strategy. Nevertheless, we cannot 
overstate the constitutional effects of legislative provisions and should recognise that a legal 
remedy that applies in certain circumstances is not representative of how social relations are 
structured in the rest of the legal system. 
Having said that, and for the purpose of understanding the potential of legal strategy, I 
caution against dismissing tactical engagements with legislative provisions as having a key 
role in a broader legal and political strategy. A tactic need not be an end in itself but a means 
to a strategic objective, which means that we must look beyond the immediate effects of 
legal mobilisation to comprehend the wider effect on long-term aims. In tenet 3 we identified 
the importance of this interaction between legal tactics and strategy to advance a 
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movement’s political aims and protect against the potentially co-optive effects of law. 
Notwithstanding the important distinction in the hierarchy of protections between ordinary 
legislation and the constitution, a legislative protection may not bestow constitutional rights 
or amount to a constitutional reform but it can be a necessary step toward it. For example, 
the tactical engagement with bankruptcy legislation often plays a key role in providing legal 
protections that allows an ERT to stabilise its operations and pursue more permanent legal 
status in the form of an expropriation law. An ERT that does not have the legal rights 
provided by Bankruptcy Law would be less likely, due to the practical and economic 
pressures of precarity, to establish a Cooperative that qualifies as a public utility. 
Furthermore, the indirect effects of legal mobilisation have set in motion a wider political 
and legal strategy. For example, the bankruptcy legislation provided the conditions for a 
political movement that proposes an alternative model of work to the neoliberal capitalist 
norm. One indirect effect has been legislative reforms that extended the rights of worker 
cooperatives against the rights of creditors and holders of legal title in private property. From 
a strategic perspective, the ERTs’ legal struggle received vast public exposure and support 
due to its alignment with the QSVT movement and the broader public rejection of 
irresponsible capitalist interests and the need for alternatives in response to years of financial 
insecurity and austerity politics. These indirect effects have bolstered the BAUEN’s political 
mobilisation and insulated it against co-optation by resisting eviction orders through mass 
public demonstrations. 
In sum, the BAUEN case highlights the deep tension between the opportunity and limitation 
of legal mobilisation. The ERT experience of legal strategy reveals both an opportunity to 
draw on concrete legal protections and the excess of constitutional meaning. The ERTs’ re-
interpretation of constitutional provisions and the judiciary and legislature’s willingness to 
insert such determinations into law provides an insight into the practical exercise of 
jurisgenesis. However, the deficit of task has limited strategic opportunities and shaped 
tactical engagements due to the hierarchy of constitutional rights and entrenched interests. 
Indeed, the unequal protections afforded to the constitutional right to work compared to the 
right to property mean that the former relies on ‘bootstrapping’ additional non-work-related 
legal claims and can only supersede the latter in exceptional circumstances. 
Analysis of legal strategy can focus on legalistic issues but, they are not the only factors that 
determine its effectiveness. To this end, I have identified three ‘non-legal’ factors that better 
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comprehend the trajectory of the BAUEN’s legal strategy by placing it in the context of 
political action, organisational factors and the role of government. 
First, political action has buttressed the BAUEN’s legal strategy. The initial act of 
occupation was central to launching an ERT and was a necessary step in meeting the 
evidential requirements for a short-term lease under the Bankruptcy Law. And, when all 
legal remedies had been exhausted the only protection against an eviction order was to 
physically resist its enforcement through mass demonstrations. This returns to and highlights 
the central claim in tenet 3 about the potentially productive interaction between strategy and 
tactics and direct and indirect effects as a means to resist the danger of co-optation by law. 
Political tactics ensured that the ERT’s strategic objectives were not co-opted by eviction 
orders or extinguished by legal decisions that rejected the BAUEN’s legal claims. 
Importantly, the BAUEN has deployed legal and political tactics in search of strategic 
objectives without being entirely dependent upon the outcome of these tactical engagements. 
The BAUEN Cooperative’s continued control over the Hotel is testament to the capacity to 
separate the effectiveness of legal tactics from the effectiveness of a political strategy in the 
long-term. 
Second, organisational structures dedicated to the ERT movement have provided the 
practical support and resources required for an effective political and legal mobilisation. The 
co-ordination between the ERTs’ lawyers and the movement’s political aims has been key 
to its effective engagement with law and tactical use of political action. Third, the reception 
of the aims and context of a political movement by government has affected the scope for 
legal and political protection. Analysis of ERT movement has to be assessed against the 
changing political context because of the significant effect that a government’s normative 
receptiveness to labour has had upon the successful application of legal and political 
strategies by ERTs. 
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 Conclusion 
The pressing concern that underlies and motivates this research has been the legal, political 
and economic challenges facing contemporary labour. Under contemporary conditions 
labour faces widespread changes to working practices according to market dictates467, a 
hollowing-out of hard fought labour regulations468, a decline in the political power of 
organised labour movements469, and a social landscape that is increasingly ordered according 
to the ideological imperatives of ‘total-market thinking’470. In light of these challenges the 
question posed and explored by this thesis has been about the strategic opportunities for 
labour to insist on the enforcement of legal protections and intervene in the determination of 
what law ought to be. This highlights the importance of law as a tool of social struggle and 
calls for a strategic approach to the relation between social conflicts and law. 
The central contribution of this thesis to an understanding of the ways that labour can realise 
its political objectives has been through a conception of effective legal engagements. The 
potential effectiveness of legal engagements, I have argued, is premised on a strategic 
approach to law that identifies both its opportunities and limitations as a tool of social 
struggle. This means that effective engagements with law are determined by their capacity 
to influence law’s determination of legal regulations and social relations, and to avoid law’s 
limitations with respect to political demands that confront its normative commitments. In 
order to draw out the ways that labour can negotiate this tension, this thesis has sought a 
sobering and pragmatic conception of the tenets of effective legal engagement. I have 
presented a nuanced analysis of (i) the articulation of coherent and innovative legal 
arguments, (ii) law’s institutional capacity and (iii) how the tactical use of law can be 
oriented toward the achievement of strategic aims. And, importantly, I have built on this 
conceptual account with empirical analysis that recognises the contextual contingencies of 
struggle and the important role of non-legal factors in effective legal mobilisation. 
These insights provide a conception of labour’s capacity to act as a democratic subject 
through strategic engagements with the legal system. In spite of the challenges that labour 
faces, we can identify how, under certain conditions, labour can impose legal obligations on 
capital and insert new protections into law that shift the emphasis of regulatory frameworks 
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from capital interests to a commitment to labour protections. By reclaiming law as a tool of 
social transformation we bring forward the opportunity for transformatory social reform and, 
at the same time, confront the undoubted challenges that labour faces in registering a truly 
emancipatory legal demand. While this does not emancipate labour from the pressures and 
challenges of capitalist conditions, it does provide an opportunity to present its political 
demands and win much-needed legal protections. Indeed, the fact that labour’s plight is not 
intangible or a merely scholastic problem can often be missed in theoretical work. On the 
contrary, it is connected to everyday working conditions, health, safety, dignity and the 
material needs of workers. In this sense, the strategic opportunity of legal action may be 
limited to what can be done within the normative boundaries of law, but it offers an important 
avenue for political and legal redress. More radical forms of political action may seek to 
expand the scope of such action, but in the meantime, the potential effectiveness of legal 
mobilisation needn’t be discarded as a useful tool. 
This focus on the practices of social struggles has expanded upon an account of agency 
within constitutionalism. The presence of social struggles in constitutional practices is not a 
new phenomenon but the CfB method has enabled the role of social forces in societal 
reproduction to be recognised as a constitutionally-relevant practice. This methodological 
approach to social struggles refreshes constitutional discourse by re-introducing the 
importance of the political in constitutional practices. By moving away from a formal 
account of constitutionalism we have been able to document labour’s democratic impulse 
and identify the mechanisms through which political demands can agitate and confront the 
processes of constitutional ordering. 
In the remainder of this conclusion, I will summarise the four stages of my central argument 
about the potential effectiveness of labour’s engagements with law. The initial challenge to 
any comprehension of social conflicts in a constitutional key is the identification of a 
methodological approach capable of recognising the significance and aims of social conflict 
on its own terms. For instance, top-down constitutional analysis has failed to grasp the role 
of social struggles owing to a methodological perspective that overemphasises governing 
processes, and excludes the capacity or agency of social conflict. By privileging the role of 
government in managing social conflicts as either demands or threats, top-down 
constitutional theories provide a formal conception of government functions which struggles 
to engage with the role of social autonomies in societal reproduction.  
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I have argued that in order to contend with the agency in social struggles and the 
constitutional-relevance of their actions, we must shift our analytic lens and consider the 
ways that labour movements engage with constitutional processes from-below. Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos and Gavin Anderson’s call for a constitutionalism-from-below provided a 
methodological frame that highlighted the necessary role of social struggles in the 
achievement of social reform. Moreover, this approach calls for new constitutional 
knowledges that are capable of documenting the legal and political experiences of excluded 
social autonomies. From this methodological perspective, this thesis has sought to build on 
CfB’s research agenda by considering how labour movements challenge the content and 
application of State law through strategic practices ‘from-below’. 
Having set up the methodological importance of CfB, I analysed its substantive treatment of 
the relation between social struggles and law and applied these insights to our present 
concern for strategic legal action at the State level. I set out four main insights that lay the 
groundwork for our conception of effective legal strategy ‘from-below’. The first simply 
identifies the relevance of CfB scholarship for our present aims by identifying its concern 
for law as a tool of struggle. While it does not provide a comprehensive account of the 
effective conditions of legal mobilisation, the potential of State law is brought within the 
frame of CfB’s analysis and provides certain key insights about the opportunity law presents 
to social struggles. Second, law is understood not simply as a means to achieve new 
legislative protections and rights but also a mechanism that can be used to amplify and realise 
political objectives. We identified the repeated reference in CfB scholarship to the 
importance of legal mobilisation as an opportunity to politicise the content of law and rights. 
This interaction between legal and political mobilisation has been an essential element of 
our conception of effective legal strategy. 
Third, CfB highlights the plurality of contemporary legal systems and encourages social 
movements to engage in those sites that offer suitable opportunities. Underneath this concern 
for pluralism is a broader proposition that legal meaning is not monopolised by the present 
determinations of State law. This struggle over meaning is the subject of the fourth, and most 
important, lesson from CfB to an understanding of legal mobilisation. The key contribution 
of CfB is its identification of the tension that runs through the heart of law and, in turn, our 
current investigation – the relation between law’s excess of meaning and its inherent 
limitation or deficit of task. 
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The relation between the excess of meaning and deficit of task is representative of the tension 
between the opportunity and limitation of legal mobilisation. On the one hand, we can 
recognise how law’s meaning can be re-interpreted so as to recognise and deliver 
emancipatory demands. In the Cover-ian sense, labour movements can engage with law for 
the purpose of presenting legal arguments that are sensitive to the political and material 
demands of workers. Constitutions are replete with interpretative opportunities, their 
promises about the values of dignity and equality as well as a range of rights protections 
provide a potential arsenal of legal claims to be deployed by social struggles. This represents 
the opportunity for what can be done in law. Labour movements can draw on values, 
principles, rights and legislative provisions in their attempts to realise certain strategic ends. 
On the other hand, law’s deficit of task reveals the limitation and key challenge for legal 
strategy. The normative commitments of liberal legal systems to economic individualism, 
the inviolability of private property rights and the interests of capitalist accumulation 
introduce the reasons why certain legal claims cannot be heard in law. This underpins a 
strategic approach to law that recognises the normative orientation of liberal legal systems, 
and the fact that there will be limitations on what social struggles can and cannot argue for 
within law’s normative boundaries. As such, labour movements will be unable to present 
normative demands about work that contradict a legal system’s entrenched interests. 
In order to build on CfB’s insights, I presented an internal critique that highlighted three 
issues that needed to be addressed if we were to provide an answer to our research questions. 
First, it was necessary to bring in a strategic and tactical approach to engagements with State 
law. The distinction between strategy and tactics provides a means to comprehend the ways 
that labour movements manage the opportunity and limitation of legal mobilisation. Tactics 
refer to short-term engagements with law and strategy to longer-term political objectives. 
As we shall summarise below, this provided an opportunity to better account for the reasons 
why movements might draw on seemingly short-term legal provisions in spite of their 
longer-term objectives, and, importantly, why the fate of a political struggle is not 
necessarily tied to the outcome of a court judgment. 
Second, we identified the lack of a dedicated empirical analysis of labour in the CfB 
scholarship. This is coupled with the third concern that highlights the general exclusion of 
labour from CfB’s conceptual analysis of the conditions of social transformation. This 
absence of labour in an area of scholarship that is concerned for dispossessed and under-
represented social groups can be explained by Santos’ specific approach to social exclusion 
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and a historical wariness of the organised labour movement. Santos has focused on a 
normative approach to social exclusion that focuses on those populations of the globe that 
have no access to legal rights and are without recourse to political representation. While such 
an approach is undoubtably necessary, I have argued that it ought not to be the only type of 
concern in CfB studies. For instance, there are a range of social struggles that cannot be 
categorised as suffering from extreme social exclusion but whose experience of struggle are 
vital to an understanding of legal and political mobilisation ‘from-below’. Furthermore, 
labour ought to be an essential subject of CfB’s analysis because its engagement and 
endeavour in the reproduction of the social world cannot be underestimated, nor can the 
historic role of labour in struggles for social transformation be ignored. 
In order to build on CfB and comprehend the effectiveness of legal mobilisation ‘from-
below’, I have presented three tenets of effective legal engagements. The first tenet confronts 
the issue of what constitutes an ‘effective’ engagement with law. Michael McCann’s 
conception of legal mobilisation identifies both its direct effects through legal protections 
and its capacity to contribute indirectly to a movement’ political objectives. This provides 
us with a broader understanding of the opportunity presented by tactical litigation. For 
instance, where a legal case does not impose legal obligations onto an employer it cannot 
provide direct effects to a group of employees. However, litigation may have an indirect 
effect on a movement’s objectives through the publicisation of its proposed injustice, which 
can build public support and contribute to a wider political mobilisation.  
The first tenet draws on the insight of in/direct effect and explores the challenge of presenting 
effective legal arguments. The main argument is that movements that require direct effects 
must frame their political demands in a form that is recognisable to law. The articulation of 
an effective argument relies on identifying the normative boundaries of law and presenting 
a claim whose content law can recognise as belonging to the legal system. As we have seen, 
the jurisgenerative capacity of social movements presents an opportunity for movements to 
present alternative interpretations of what law ought to be; however, this practice can only 
be directly effective where legal claims are capable of being recognised and inserted into 
any re-determination of law. In other words, at the moment of adjudication, or determination 
of law by a judge, a labour movement’s claims must be recognised as worthy of legal 
protection.  
The potential effectiveness of indirect effects expands our conception of legal argumentation 
by recognising that movements may decide, for strategic reasons, to present its political 
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claims in law. Indeed, the opportunity to politicise the content of legal rules by confronting 
law’s present normative boundaries with a movement’s political demands may better serve 
a movement’s long-term objectives. 
A neglected, or unfashionable, factor in analysis of the potential for social transformation 
‘from-below’ has been the continued role of the Nation State. In the second tenet, I have 
argued that, by assuming a critical approach to national law as irredeemably aligned to 
bourgeois interests, socio-legal scholarship risks passing over potentially profitable tools of 
struggle. Grassroots political struggles, such as labour, are characterised by a lack of 
financial resources, political and legal power, and are driven by the need to impose 
obligations on employers, landlords, corporate actors and/or politicians. In this sense, law 
can become a weapon of the weak or dispossessed because it provides an opportunity to 
enforce legal obligations and expand the scope of law to tackle conditions of oppression and 
exploitation. I have unpacked the importance of the State as an effective site of legal 
engagement by documenting its institutional capacity to not only issue normative claims 
(symbolic power) but also enforce (material power) its judgments. Given the State’s 
monopoly on coercive power and symbolic power that flows from social legitimacy, it 
remains a potential site of social transformation sine qua non. For labour, an important 
element of effective engagements with law that cannot be underestimated is the institutional 
capacity of the legal system. The fact that labour is uniquely subject to the decisions and 
actions of capital, labour cannot afford not to engage with a legal system capable of forcing 
capital to abide by certain minimum standards. Indeed, the battleground for the labour is the 
content of those standards. 
If institutional capacity is a general tenet of effective legal mobilisation, we can bring back 
CfB’s identification of the importance of legal pluralism and evaluate its potential 
effectiveness and limitations. The latter will, inevitably, revolve around pluralisms’ lack of 
enforcement functions. It is precisely the State’s capacity to determine social relations and 
apportion legal responsibility that means it remains a key site of action for labour. However, 
in light of scepticism about the State’s capacity for radical social transformation and the 
potential limitations that law’s deficit of task may impose on certain strategic objectives; 
one cannot simply instruct all labour movements to engage at the State level. Under certain 
conditions engagements with plural legal systems may be tactically more effective. For 
instance, plural legal systems may offer limited direct effects for labour but, they may 
provide much-needed publicity and/or politicise the content of a legal conflict. As such, the 
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general rule will be that direct effectiveness is tied law’s institutional capacity, but, from the 
strategic perspective we can much recognise the potential of pluralism.  
Importantly, I do not embrace pluralism for the purpose of protecting the autonomy of a 
movement’s normative claims. On the contrary, this strategic approach to pluralism 
identifies an opportunity to target, albeit indirectly, the content of regulation at the State 
level. In other words, pluralism provides an opportunity to indirectly effect labour’s struggle 
in a manner that politicises the content of law and, potentially, leads to reform of national 
legal standards. 
A key criticism of legal mobilisation has centred around law’s co-optive effects on the 
nomos of social struggles. For instance, when viewed from the top-down, the aims of 
political struggles in legal processes appear to be ordered according to law’s normative 
determinations. In this way, a social struggles’ political claims are understood to be 
domesticated by law’s governing processes. However, a key aim of this thesis and the 
preoccupation of tenet three has been to show an alternative perspective of this ordering 
process. Returning to the insights of in/direct effects and the distinction between strategy 
and tactics, I have argued that labour movements can engage with law whilst holding onto 
their strategic aims. This means that, rather than viewing law as having a necessarily taming 
effect on social struggles, we can better comprehend the productive tension between 
strategic objectives and legal mobilisation. 
A central claim of tenet three is that a movement’s political demands are less likely to be 
exhausted by a legal decision where their legal engagements are tactical and part of a broader 
political mobilisation. The argument here is that, the danger of co-optation needs to be 
understood against the backdrop of both a movement’s tactical engagements with law and 
their in/direct effect on strategic objectives. The first distinction highlights the higher risk of 
co-optation for a labour movement that lacks a broader political aim and whose objectives 
are reducible to the enforcement of a legislative provision. In other words, if a movement’s 
strategic objectives do not extend beyond the determination of existing legal rules, its 
political struggle is entirely dependent on legal and not political processes. This draws a link 
between a movement’s strategic objectives that cannot be contained by law and such a 
movement’s wider political mobilisation. A key condition for insulating against the 
limitations of legal mobilisation has been the existence of a strong political mobilisation 
which may include organisational structures that are able to mobilise civil society support 
and apply political pressure through strikes or demonstrations. Moreover, the presence of 
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both a political and legal mobilisation highlights the co-ordination between both tactical 
engagements with law and a movement’s strategic political aims. The first distinction draws 
on strategic reasoning and identifies the fact that an effective labour movement is one that 
cannot be reduced to its purely legal actions. 
The second distinction re-introduces texture to our evaluation of the effect of legal 
mobilisation. Ostensibly, a labour movement that simply enforces a legislative provision or 
even fails in an attempt to impose legal obligations may be viewed as ‘co-opted’ by law for 
any of the following reasons: The movement framed its claims in legal argument and not its 
more radical political claims, law successfully ordered its claims and, as a result excluded 
its political demands from law. However, the insight about indirect effects reveals that 
litigation, even where it fails to deliver direct legal protections, may still serve an important 
purpose to a labour movement’s strategic objectives in the form of indirect effects. In this 
regard, focusing on legal processes misses a broader set of political practices and effects. 
The ERT movement in Argentina, and the BAUEN Cooperative’s experience in particular, 
provides an opportunity to examine the practical experience and trajectory of a labour 
movement’s engagement with law. The radical nature of the BAUEN’s legal claims about 
work and the duration of their struggle contributes a unique insight into the ways that legal 
and non-legal factors determine the effectiveness of legal mobilisation. Our analysis of the 
ERT movement’s strategy considered: The legal rules that presented a tactical opportunity 
to deliver important protections for the movement’s broader political objectives; the ways 
that the BAUEN seized upon these opportunities and framed their claims (in)effectively; and 
the impact of non-legal factors such as political action, organisational support, and the effect 
of government on the outcome of legal strategy. To conclude, I will summarise what these 
three lessons from the ERT movement tell us about effective legal engagements by labour 
movements. 
The first insight from the BAUEN experience has been that a tactical use of legal 
interpretation and coherent articulation of legal arguments is an essential part of an effective 
legal mobilisation. The BAUEN identified an opportunity in the Bankruptcy Law and made 
a successful claim that provided short-term direct protections. In addition, an expropriation 
law was passed by a majority in the legislature due, in part, to the jurisgenerative 
interpretation of both existing legislative tests, constitutional values and their application to 
the facts of the BAUEN’s case. The BAUEN managed, in both cases, to present claims that 
were recognised as belonging to the legal system and therefore deserving of legal protection. 
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Therefore, the tactical effectiveness of legal argumentation was premised on the 
identification of legislative provisions or rights claims that could be re-identified by law as 
legal claims. This aspect of labour’s strategic use of law will rely on lawyers capable of 
constructing legally effective arguments that are also sensitive to a movement’s political 
objectives. 
In addition to these engagements with law, we identified how non-legal political factors and 
contextual contingencies determined both the success and failure of the BAUEN’s legal 
strategy. Three key factors were identified: First, the political acts of occupation and 
demonstration, the changing relation between the Presidency of Argentina and the ERT 
movement, and the role of organisational support. Political action enabled the productive 
interaction with the Bankruptcy Law by providing the material conditions to satisfy the 
evidential requirements of the legislative test for a preventative bankruptcy order and a third-
party right to continue production. And, mass demonstrations buttressed this tactical use of 
law where its opportunities for the ERT movement reverted to limitations in the form of 
eviction orders.  
The government both facilitated the ERT movement’s development through favourable legal 
reforms and government programmes, and threatened to extinguish the movement altogether 
through legislative vetoes and damaging economic policies. In the ERTs’ case, the political 
orientation of the national executive mattered. A radical labour movement faces inherent 
difficulty in gaining traction in liberal legal systems but, the potential effectiveness of legal 
mobilisation for political reasons was made significantly more viable in the ERTs’ case 
where the Presidency, which was by no means explicitly supportive of the ERT movement, 
provided the economic, legal and political conditions to foment and pursue its strategic 
objectives. And, when the Presidency shifted to the right the tools of government were 
exercised against the ERT movement.  
This highlights the significance of institutional capacity in determining the (in)effectiveness 
of the BAUEN’s legal struggle. Only national law had the capacity to secure the 
Cooperative’s legal right to remain in control of property which ensured that bankruptcy 
proceedings and the attempts to secure an expropriation law were vital sites of action. While 
the BAUEN has resisted law’s material power through demonstrations and challenged law’s 
claim to correctness (symbolic power) through the politicisation of their legal struggle, the 
long-term aim of the BAUEN is to have their claims recognised as legal and, as such, draw 
on law’s institutional capacity. In other words, despite the challenges that State law 
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presented to the BAUEN, its strategic objectives are reliant on defeating the former 
employers' rights claims and winning legal protections that are enforceable against parties 
that reject their normative claims about public utility. 
The final issue connects with tenet three and recognises how organisational structures 
provided invaluable practical support in the initial formation of worker-cooperatives, co-
ordinated legal tactics, political actions and strategic objectives, as well as enabling effective 
legal mobilisation through the provision of legal expertise and financial resources. We have 
highlighted the importance of a coordinated legal and political mobilisation. The existence 
of a strong political mobilisation ensures that a legal strategy is not reducible to the outcome 
of an engagement with law, be it litigation or legislation. The BAUEN case highlights the 
importance of a labour movement having both distinct political objectives, an organised 
support network and an organisational structure. A movement’s political demands represent 
its strategic objectives and ensure that, where tactical engagements with law fail to provide 
protections the BAUEN’s political aims remain intact. Indeed, it is these political demands 
that have mobilised civil society support and enabled acts of solidarity in defence of the 
BAUEN Cooperative’s control over property. Finally, the BAUEN’s use of political action 
to buttress failed attempts to secure legal protections illustrates the importance of a 
coordinated use of both legal and political tactics in pursuit of strategic objectives. 
Bringing these factors together we can see that, as far as generalisable conclusions are 
possible, the interaction between the jurisgenerative opportunity presented by law, coherent 
articulation of legal claims, law’s deficit of task, political action and contextual 
contingencies will determine the effectiveness of legal engagements. To some extent this is 
an unsatisfactory conclusion, it provides no definitive account of an effective tactical and 
strategic use of law and leaves our understanding premised on the tension between law’s 
opportunity and limitation being played out in each specific circumstance. However, I have 
argued that this inability to predetermine a blueprint of effectiveness is an unavoidable 
reality of political and legal mobilisation. In each locale, the use of law as a tool of struggle 
will be subject to available legal rules, constitutional values, and relative political-economic 
conditions. As we have seen in Argentina and the Wards Cove case, a social struggle may 
effectively attend to all of the factors at its disposal and receive no in/direct effects owing to 
contingent factors beyond its control. 
To this extent, this thesis has contributed to an understanding of the ways that labour 
movements will construct effective legal strategies. However, what we cannot say is how a 
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movement will necessarily present an effective argument or, indeed, that there will not be 
effective engagements outside of the tenets presented in this thesis. Given our 
methodological commitment to new constitutional knowledges we must accept that 
pragmatic decision-making, contextual factors, and innovative engagements with law will 
mean that the scope of constitutional strategy will be always open. It has been our aim to 
rationalise and categorise our present understandings and contribute to a conception of 
strategic engagements with law ‘from-below’.
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